योऽयम् स्वभावो लोकस्य सुखदुःख समन्वितः ।
सोऽङ्गाद्याभिनयोपेतो नाट्यमित्याभिधीयते ॥

METHODOLOGY OF THE ANALYSIS OF SANSKRIT DRAMA

M. CHRISTOPHER BYRSKI

METHODOLOGY OF THE ANALYSIS OF SANSKRIT DRAMA

By

M. Christopher Byrski

BHARATIYA VIDYA PRAKASHAN

Oriental Publisher & Book-Sellers

DELHI (INDIA) VARANASI

Publisher :

Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan

1. : 1-U.B. Jawahar Nagar, Bungalow Road,
   Delhi- 110007
2. : Post Box 1108, Kaçhauri Gali,
   Varanasi- 221001

First Edition : 1997

Price : 300.00

ISBN : 81-217-0119-8

Type Setting by :

Geeta Computers
C-446, Gali No.10, Majlis park
Delhi- 110033

Printed by

Jain Amar Printing Press
Jawahar Nagar, Bungalow Road,
Delhi-110007

To,

Barbara, Lukasz and
Mateusz
without whom nothing
would have been possible

Author

Preface

The book that is being placed now before the Readers, in its main portion, was written some time back and circulated in the seventies in a limited number of cyclostyled copies by the Publication Division of the University of Warsaw. It has remained practically unknown in India. Thus it was suggested that it may be brought out in a regular book form so as to become more easily available to those interested in this country and elsewhere outside Poland.

The Author is well aware that during the past twenty years much has been done in the field of Sanskrit literary studies both in India and in many other countries. All this should have normally been taken into consideration before the publication. Yet since other responsibilities connected with the duty to represent Poland in India precluded the Author from doing justice to this task, it has nevertheless been decided to go ahead with the publication on the assumption that basically the main purport of this study may still be valid.

Yet the Author availed himself of this occassion to add to the original text four new chapters and to include here and there some later observations that he found relevant. The first among the added chapters presents the analysis of the *Śakuntalā* of Kālidāsa done on the same lines as the other two plays of Bhāsa. Chapter VII presents the results of studies in the course of which it has been attempted to situate the classical Indian art of theatre within the perimeter of its contemporary value-system. The results of this enquiry were first published few years ago in Rtvik Ritualia by Uma Marina Vesci. Chapter VIII tackles the same problem in its sociohistorical dimensions drawing a parallel between theatre and modern Indian cinema. It was originally published sometime in the eighties in Bombay by Moti Bhuvania in his ephemeral-alas !-Pushpanjali Annual. Here it is presented in somewhat altered form to make the historical parallel even more striking. The last Chapter IX was inspired by the late Professor Sontheimer from Heidelberg who invited the Author to present the paper on the hero in Sanskrit drama at the seminar organised by him there. By now it might have also been published by the University of Heidelberg. This study relies heavily on the results of the enquiry presented in Concept of Ancient Indian Theatre while adding to it material drawn from Sanskrit dramas.

The Author trusts that the present book may be found of interest to those who consider Sanskrit drama and classical Indian theatre as valuable source of inspiration for modern artistic endeavour. It has basically been meant for a non-Indian Reader for the Author is well aware of his limitations and holds deep belief in what best maybe termed *Saṁskāra*. But thanks to this very fact the book stands a chance to excite some curiosity also in India. The Author, conscious of its obvious shortcomings, counts on the indulgence of Readers of the present book.

Finally, the timely help of Dr. Chandra Bhushan Jha, a lecturer in the department of Sanskrit of St. Stephen's College, Delhi, who has helped with proof readings and who has prepared the index has to be gratefully acknowledged.

Last but not least, a lot of credit has to go to my very dear friend Mr. Kishore Chandra Jain of the Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan without whose persistence and patience this book would have never come to be in its second avatara.

Delhi Author

27.7.1996

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend my hearty thanks to Professor Constantin Regamey of Lausanne (Switzerland), Professor Eugeniusz Suszkiewicz of Toruń (Poland) and to Professor Ludwik Sternbach of Paris (France). Their critical yet friendly appreciation of this text while still in typescript, helped me to get rid of many an unwanted shortcoming which would otherwise contribute adversely towards the readability of this book.

CONTENTS

Page

Preface ....

Acknowledgements ....

Introduction .... i-xiii

Chapter I. THE TYPOLOGY OF SANSKRIT DRAMA (*DAŚARŪPAKA)* *1-8*

II. THE FOUR DEMEANOURS (*VṚTTI*) 9-20

III. THE STRUCTURE (SAṀDHI) 21-32

IV. THE THREEFOLD SPHERE OF ETHICS (*TRIVARGAŚṚṄGĀRA*) 33-52

V. THE ANALYSIS OF THE *PRATINJÑĀYAUGANDHARĀYAṆA* AND THE SVAPNAVĀSAVADATTĀ 53-75

VI. THE ANALYSIS OF THE ŚAKUNTALĀ 76-81

VII. "*KĀNTAḤ KRATUḤ CAKUṢĀM*"- THEATRE : THE *YAJÑA* OF THE *KĀMAPURUṢĀRTHA* *82-87*

VIII. *NĀṬYOTPATTI* : MYTH OR SOCIO-HISTORY 88-93

IX. THE HERO IN SANSKRIT DRAMA 94-101

Bibliography 102-104

Index of Technical Terms. 105-106

Introduction

More than half a century ago Andrzej Gawroński wrote the following words : 'Indian poetry has to be judged according to Indian standards of taste. It can reveal its surpassing beauty only when it ceases to appear exotic. In my opinion, it is unfair to pass judgment upon the civilisation of a foreign people before we have made every effort to identify ourselves with it[1]. The meaning of this phrase and its message is aboundantly clear and one cannot but enthusiastically endorse this point of view. Yet, there is one moment here at which we need to pose further question; namely—how to understand this identification postulated by the greatest Polish Indologist ? My own long stay in India convinced me that this identification should never happen at the cost of our own identity. People who stop to be what they have been born into—Europeans, Americans or Chinese—loose all chances to understand and appreciate genuine Indianness. Thus for me identification would mean intellectual openness accompanied by empathy in the sphere of emotion. Now, the question arises how to execute this openness ? In other words, what precisely should we do when confronted with an exotic culture? To my mind, one who investigates such culture should try to understand basic tenets of it in its different aspects and try to reformulate them in such a way that they stop to be hermetic to his own intellectual compeers who cannot study this culture so closely as he does. This constitutes the basic premise of the present study.

It seems that the proof of success in such a venture would be a more or less lasting presence of some elements of the investigated culture in our own cultural milieu. Yet, our palate is in this respect more demanding than our intellect. Mediaeval Europe was so unhappy without Indian spices that very soon after the Ottoman Empire cut the route to India, the other route was discovered. I guess similar thing would happen if today Europe were deprived of her everyday tea. Unhappily or happily, culture is less attractive commodity, though by no means less important. Had Europe been consuming as much Indian culture as it is consuming Indian tea, our cultural life might have had richer and certainly more variegated and interesting flavour. Exactly like tea in our shops testifies to our food habits, Indian literature in our libraries, Indian music in our philharmonies, and Indian drama in the repertoire of our theatres, give testimony to our broadmindedness and our sophistication in the best sense of the word. Since I have

never lost my European identity, it is, therefore, difficult, nay—impossible for me, to attribute the present rather discouraging state of affairs to some inborn disabilities of my culture. Thus, the only culprit I can point out is the wretched Indologist who must have betrayed the trust placed in him.

So far Indian literature fared best. This may be partly attributed to the philological bias of European Indology and partly to the fact that one can buy a book and never read it. While once a ticket is bought one has to listen to music or has to watch a performance. Historically speaking, as far as theatre is concerned this is somewhat unexpected because European theatre seems to have been taking lively interest in Indian themes for quite some time.

Most probably all over Europe the first theatres to lend their stage to exotic themes were those of the Jesuit Colleges. In Poland in such places like Lublin and Lwów plays dealing with spectacular exploits of missionaries were staged by the end of the XVIIth and the beginning of the XVIIIth century. We can safely assume similar occurrences all over Europe[2]. The more so that already by the middle of the XVIIIth century and especially in the latter half of it similar "exotic" plays, though no more concerned with religious missionaries and already outside the Jesuit Colleges, appear all over Europe. The best example of it might be the notorious "*Indian Widow*", which under different titles and in different versions was played in theatres of Europe; everywhere, it seems, it was well received by the public[3]. Inspite of the fact that those plays did present a highly adulterated picture of India or rather because of that very shortcoming of them, the European public should have been well prepared to welcome the genuine Indian drama. Consequently it comes rather as a surprise that when in 1789 William Jones for the first time translated the "*Sacontala*" of Kālidāsa and two years later his translation was rendered into German by Georg Förster, it was not followed by an outburst of interest on the part of the European public. Staging of the "*Śakuntalā*" and other Sanskrit dramas remains rare to this day. And when attempted often it dissolves into meaningless candy–pageantry or evolves into a completely un-Indian novel theatrical performance like Grotowski's for instance[4].

The reason of that is not very difficult to find. In what might be called here exoticism on the European stages we used to mould our rather modest knowledge of India into something which we Europeans could understand and with which we could easily identify ourselves. Consequently such plays like that "*Indian Widow*" mentioned above presented a picture which apart from few exotic and often wrongly applied names and faces of the chief protagonists covered with brownish make-up, did not contain any other apparent Indian features. Indian heroes and heroines of those plays, as well as villains, behaved in European manner and if among the audience of theatre there would have been an Indian, probably he would have wondered why Europeans need

this pseudo–Indianness in order to show themselves to themselves. It seems that it is a deeply ingrained narcissism of man which bars him from a meaningful contact with another man.

Most often we have been more interested in ourselves in India than in India herself. Out of personal experience I can say that to break that shell is not easy. Yet it is an absolute condition of any real encounter. Otherwise we shall endlessly gaze at our own image simply dressed up in an Indian costume—not quite faithfully copied at that. This danger does not threaten only while writing and producing the so called exotic plays entirely of Western make. It also applies to the productions of the original Indian plays. Our critical apparatus is not geared to appreciate and judge those aspects of the ancient Indian theatrical tradition which determine its peculiar Indian character. Consequently we try to see in them just the same values (or their absence) which we used to appreciate in the "*Indian Widow*" of ill fame. Resulting product only testifies to a sad fact of basic misunderstanding. For original Sanskrit dramas (even in translation) do neither yield themselves to an operetta-type of interpretation or to any other known to us. The unattractive outcome of such ventures confirms this presupposition. Thus precisely here we have to look for the reasons why these dramas did not appeal to general public in the way comparable to our own pseudo-Indian plays. It may not be out of place to add here that a perfect innocence of Westerners with regard to classical Indian theatrical convention of staging plays contributed to an overall failure on our part to understand and appreciate those plays.

Therefore our most immediate task is to pinpoint the weakness inherent in the way Sanskrit drama is usually expounded. This pattern has been so forcefully established by such scholars as M. Winternitz, A.B. Keith, S.K. De and others, that it is by no means easy to challenge it. Yet it seems that a completely new set of criteria—or at least substantially modified ones—should be applied to the evaluation of the dramatic text. The principal objection to those hitherto applied is that they are haphazard and for the most part subjective. In what follows we shall try to substantiate this view and offer some positive suggestions. Since Sanskrit literary criticism as a whole developed out of the study of theatrical arts, these suggestions may be relevant to the entire field of Sanskrit literature.

A well-known Polish scholar, J. Krzyżanowski, writes in his *Nauka o literaturze (Science of literature)*, "Literary criticism which is unable to be so fresh and sensitive as to view literary works through the eyes of their first critics is not worth much"[5)]. Scholars like Wilson, Winternitz, Keith and De have made detailed studies of the history of aesthetics but have failed to apply its criteria when evaluating the dramas themselves. For example, Winternitz stresses that, in order to approach an Indian literary work properly, it is necessary "to let oneself plunge in the spirit of India for a moment and believe all that Indians believe." Yet he can find in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* only"a pretty fruitless

science, that is devoted more to classification and systematisation than to exploration of facts and formulations of rules"[6]. When it is no longer a question of paying mere lip-service to Indian literature but making a radical change in the entire manner of reasoning, this is how Winternitz understands his "plunging in the spirit of India". Nevertheless, it would be unjust to discredit all existing criticism only because it is defective. Let us therefore try, before restating our reservations, to analyse what has been achieved in this field.

As a starting point let us turn again to Krzyżanowski. In chapter VIII of the *"Science of literature"* he says that the criticism of a literary work in its entirety must apply sociological, historical, aesthetic (or formal) and ethical criteria. By sociological criteria Krzyżanowski understands "the duration in time and territorial range of the appreciation", and by historical, "the problem of originality, and the problem of setting a given writer against the background of his literary tradition as well as defining his attitude towards it." These criteria have to be taken in conjunction, for, "it is necessary to consider the fundamental attitude of the epoch towards literary tradition and the way it understands the problem of originality". The aesthetic criteria are, of course, "the peculiarities of formal nature" and "the factors which shape the outer form of the literary work in relation to its inner structure". Finally, by ethical criteria Krzyżanowski understands "the appreciation of a literary work based on the assumption that it always is an expression of some reactions to life. The more they are general, universal, and unconnected with the exigencies of a particular moment which has given birth to the work in question, the broader, deeper and more universal will be the response they evoke."

Modern traditional criticism of Sanskrit drama operates mainly with sociological and, above all, with historical criteria, quite often ignoring—because of its western provenance—the indigenous literary tradition and its peculiar, not very stringent attitude towards originality. The remaining two criteria tend to be applied haphazardly or not at all. Moreover, in the case of European scholars, they are applied from the modern, western point of view; while in the case of Indian scholars, they are applied either according to western standards or, by disputing those standards, still concentrate attention upon the same points. It can be safely said that western scholars either ignore the achievements of Sanskrit literary criticism or dismiss them after totally inadequate consideration. If Indian scholars turn to Sanskrit aesthetics, they apply it in fragmentary and disorderly fashion.

Evidently, then, both Indian and western scholars show the same bias towards sociological and historical treatment of the subject while neglecting aesthetic and ethical critieria. This bias had led to considerable achievement in the spheres of criticism neglected by traditional Indian scholarship; there have been careful and painstaking investigations of Krzyżanowski's "duration in time and territorial range of appreciation", as well as

of chronology and of the degree of originality of individual authors. It is thanks to the historical and sociological bias of modern criticism that we can today attempt the chronological presentation of Sanskrit drama. But if we still cannot—especially in the West—reconcile ourselves to peculiarities of style, diction, ethics and behavioural patterns in Sanskrit dramas, it is because we are still, it seems, unable to look at them through the eyes of their first critics. We constantly admit that such an attitude is necessary and yet we ignore "the eyes" which they have left to us in the form of their ancient aesthetics.

In order to substantiate the above criticism let me review some books, chosen at random, offering opinions about the three dramas which have been selected for the analysis, i.e., about the *Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa*, the *Svapnavāsavadattā* and the *Śakuntalā*. To begin with let us take M. Winternitz's monumental work on the Indian literature. Yet before we begin this review one methodological reservation has to be made specially in connection with the two dramas of Bhāsa : we shall comment only upon those remarks which concern the analysis and the estimation of the dramas proper. The entire problem of the discovery of thirteen dramas, their authorship[7)], dating and linguistic peculiarities find themselves, of course, outside the pale of interest, since they exactly represent those sociological and historical aspects of criticism the merits of which go unquestioned. Thus Winternitz begins with a summary of each play. Then, in the case of the *Svapna*, he dwells upon the comparison of the story with what we know about it from the *kathā* literature. In the course of this comparison he praises Bhāsa for well grounded scenes. Further on, he says that the play can be appreciated by the Westerners for different qualities than by the Indians, since two women love one husband in it. Nevertheless, Bhāsa is acknowledged as an outstanding poet on account of the poetic beauties of the play. The remark that the play can hardly be of interest for the European theatre, since a western monogamy–minded audience can scarcely appreciate the Indian sentiment winds up his review of the *Svapna*. The *Pratijñā* does not fare much better. Winternitz first contrasts it with the *Svapna* saying rightly, although somewhat superficially, that the love that in the *Svapna* stands at the centre, goes wholly into background in this work. Some obvious information concerning the hero follows and it ends with the conclusion that the contest of the two ministers constitutes the moving motif in the dramatic development. In the course of the summary Yaugandharāyaṇa earns some praise and the review ends with the conclusion that the end of the play is seemingly abrupt and unmotivated and that the interlude of Act IV is not devoid of humour[8)].

A.B. Keith begins with a remark that the *Pratijñā*, styled in the prologue a *prakaraṇa*, has four acts and resembles in part that form of drama as recognized by the theory. Then follows the usual summary and a brief polemic with some points levelled by traditional criticism against this drama. The discussion of the *Svapna* begins with the

summary of its contents. The conclusion drawn by the critic is that the drama in question is undoubtedly the poet's masterpiece and the most mature of his dramas. In the next paragraph on Bhāsa's art and technique we find an assurance that Bhāsa excels in suggesting heroism; this characteristic is admirably depicted in Yaugandharāyaṇa. There are also there some more or less standard remarks on the character of the *vidūṣaka* and praises of the genuine humor of the interludium of Act IV. Then comes a rather highhanded opinion that of deeper sentiments we need expect nothing from Bhāsa; in this respect he sets the model for his successors. Some general technical remarks of little consequence follow; finally Keith writes that in both cases the working out of the plot is open to criticism. But already the first detailed point about the superfluous second entrance of Vāsavadattā in Act VI of the *Svapna* proves groundless, for Padmāvatī does not enter at the beginning of this act accompanied by Āvantikā. She comes in the company of the *pratīhārī*. Next Keith positively evaluates the way Act I and Act V were composed. As if contradicting his earlier opinion, in the paragraph dealing with Bhāsa's style, Keith praises him for the power of expressing strong emotions adequately and forcibly. It appears somewhat unusual that the same poet can do justice to strong emotions, but cannot do it to deep sentiments. Bhāsa's fondness for expressing typical feelings in simple language is approvingly noted in the context of the *Pratijñā* as also his power of depicting irony in the *Svapna*. Keith closes his criticism with the following statement; The harmony and melody of Bhāsa's style, added to its purity and perspicuity, have no better proof that the imitations of his verses which are unquestionably to be traced in Kālidāsa, who attests thus his practical appreciation of the merits of the dramatists with whose established fame his nascent genius had to contend[9)].

S.K. De dispenses with the detailed summary. After a series of remarks not relevant to our problem he says that in the *Pratijñā* some episodes are skillfully drawn; the characterisation, especially of Yaugandharāyaṇa, is vivid and effective; and the sustained erotic sub–plot, despite non–appearance of the principal characters, enhances its main interest of political strategy. The *Svapna* on the other hand has more effectively devised plot and there is a unity of purpose and inevitableness of effect. the dream is finely conceived, the characters of the two heroines are skillfully discriminated and the hero is figured as serious, faithful, if somewhat lovesick and imaginative. The main feature of the play, continues De, is the dramatic skill and delicacy with which are depicted the feelings of Vāsavadattā, to whose noble and steadfast love no sacrifice is too great; while her willing martyrdom is set off by the equally true but helpless love of Udayana as a victim of divided affections and motives of statecraft. It is a drama of fine sentiments; the movement is smooth, measured and dignified, and the treatment is free from the intrusion of melodrama, or of rant and rhetoric, to which such sentimental plays are often liable. If it is roughhewn and unpolished, it also reveals the sureness of touch

of a great dramatist; and to stint the word masterpiece to it is absurd and ungenerous. Further on, De adds, that what appeals most in these dramas is their rapidity of action, directness of characterisation and simplicity of diction. In this vein, De continues for one and a half page till the close of this chapter[10)].

C. Kunhan Raja after a summary of the play says that the *Svapna* is a very beautiful drama, that it is not complete and that the described events give an occasion to create situations that are full of pathos and display of very tender feelings. The characterisation is superb and the plot development is very natural and charming. Kunhan Raja continues by saying that language is simple and elegant, that it is esentially a drama of the study of human feelings, that there is little supernatural in it, plenty of arresting situation, hero has many exploits to his credit etc., etc. In the case of the *Pratijñā*, Kunhan Raja yields to a temptation to give a summary of the play and then writes that this is a drama full of action and the characters are full of life and energy, with plenty of resources and Yaugandharāyaṇa is real moving spirit in the whole drama[11)].

K.Chaitanya calls the *Svapna* a moving romantic comedy, while the *Pratijñā*, according to him, is a powerful play of political intrigue. Then comes a general remark that Bhāsa is always on his guard against the merely poetic which serves no dramatic function. Continuing in this vein Chaitanya says that in structuring the plot and working out the dialogues, Bhāsa always visualised how effective they would be on the stage. A remark follows that humour, lusty or gentle, enlivens these plays. Superb characterization, profound insight into human nature duly exemplified follow and Chaitanya finally ends almost summarising the *Svapna*[12)].

The situation within the field of Hindī language writings is not much different. Although one thing has to be noted, namely, natural in such circumstances, willingness to employ traditional terminology. Unhappily either superimposing upon them western semantic values or, as in the case of *rasa*, using them rather as more or less colloquial words without bothering about their strictly technical connotations. Sūryakānta's the *Saṁskṛta vāṅmaya kā vivecanātmaka itihāsa* may be quoted here as a good example. After giving a very brief summary of the plays, the author tenders usual general praises in connection with Bhāsa's reworking of the *kathā* motives. Then he describes briefly the nature of the subject-matter in these dramas and concludes that Bhāsa has a marked predilection for the invented or mixed plots, i.e., partly invented. This, even in the case of the *Pratijñā* and the *Svapna*, holds well, since Bhāsa considerably altered the story, so far as we can judge on the basis of existing versions of that literature which, most probably, are later than the two dramas. Following the traditional order (*vastu, nētā, rasa*) Sūryakānta discusses now the hero of Bhāsa's dramas. Udayana, according to his opinion, is in the literary tradition in India a paragon of a lover. Next comes *rasa*. Here Sūryakānta assures us that Bhāsa is a master of evoking *rasa* and then lists which

rasas are to be met with in which dramas[13]. The remark follows that Bhāsa does not attach importance to the rules of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Then Bhāsa earns some praise as the creator of dramatic situation—in such form entirely western notion. This is followed by an assurance that these dramas are suitable for three types of acting traditionally called the *sāttvika*, the *vācika* and the *āṅgika*. Surprisingly Sūryakānta does not mention the āhārya (*costume*). Warm acknowledgement is then extended to the language of our plays which is simple and steers clear of the poetic exteravagancies. Sūryakānta ends by saying that even today Bhāsa's plays may be successfully staged and that this exactly decides about the superiority of the art of Bhāsa.

Now moving on to the *Śakuntalā* of Kālidāsa we should again see first what the acknowledged authorities have to say about this play.

In H.H. Wilson's *The Theatre of the Hindus, the Śakuntalā* is not separately discussed. But in the course of considering other plays he says that the *Śakuntalā* cannot give a proper idea of Indian theatre. According to him, it is a mythical and pastoral play which he praises for frank descriptions, tenderness of feelings, delicate beauty of thought, the highest elegance of style, and an interesting heroine.[14] A. Macdonell showers even more generous epithets upon the drama. praising it for "the richness of creative fancy . . . skill in the expression of tender feelings . . . undisturbed harmony of the poetic sentiment . . ." He concludes that in the drama "every passion is softened without being enfeebled. The ardour of love never goes beyond aesthetic bounds, it never maddens to wild jealousy or hate. The torments of sorrow are toned down to profound and touching melancholy. It is here at last that the Indian genius found the law of moderation in poetry . . . . Kālidāsa stands highest in poetical refinement, in tenderness and depth of feeling.[15]

Winternitz tackles the play with great precision. He first discusses the reception of the play in Germany and then remarks that Kālidāsa is the greatest Sanskrit poet and the *Śakuntalā* the finest work of art that man can imagine.[16] He quotes Goethe's opinion of the play, which is the best example of what we could call "critical impressionism." It is to Goethe that we owe such resounding epithets as unfathomable depth, summit of talent, presentation of natural order, the best way of life, the purest moral endeavour, the most sober divine meditation, etc., etc. Analysis of the playwright's sources and remarks on the popularity of the *Śakuntalā* in India are followed by his own opinion that in Kālidāsa's poetry there is no dramatic element, such as it is understood in the West, but rather that the *Śakuntalā* is narrative in form. Though he adds that "whoever would try to measure the depths of this consciously attempted fable-like drama with the yard-stick of Greek tragedy, would be unable to recognize its unequalled beauty." Winternitz does not apply any yardstick other than that of Greek theatre but mainly confines himself to imploring the reader to an admiration for this magnificent work.

Finally, he gets on to safer ground; he returns to the reception of the play in Europe and lists its Indian versions.

The Indian scholar S. K. De begins his remarks about the *Śakuntalā* by writing that it reveals "a rare balance of mind, which harmonises the artistic sense with the poetic, and results in the practice of singular moderation."[17)] According to him, the *Śakuntalā* is the full-blown flower of Kālidāsa's genius and in it we have a unique alliance of his poetic and dramatic gifts. "As a dramatist Kālidāsa succeeds mainly by his poetic power in two respects : he is master of poetic emotion which he can skillfully harmonise with character and action, and he has the poetic sense of balance and restraint which a dramatist must show if he would win success." De then takes refuge in a catalogue of images and sonorous adjectives, which begins as follows: "we see to best effect Kālidāsa's method of unfolding a character, as a flower unfolds its petals in rain and sunshine. . . . There is temperance in the depth of passion, and perspicuity and inevitableness in action and expression, but above all this drama surpasses by its essential poetic quality of style and treatment."

A. B. Keith, too, begins by saying that the *Śakuntalā* "certainly represents the perfection of Kālidāsa's art."[18)] He summarizes the play and discusses different Indian versions of it. By way of critical appreciation he offers us :

Śakuntalā's dawning love is depicted with perfect skill. . . . The king is a worthy hero. . . . his love for his son is charmingly depicted. . . . [Śakuntalā] has suffered tribulation of spirit and gained in depth and beauty of nature.

The other characters are models of skilful presentation. . . . Kaṇva is a delightful figure. . . . The companions of the heroine are painted with delicate taste; both are devoted body and soul to their mistress, but Anasūyā is serious and sensible; Priyaṁvadā talkative and gay...

Kālidāsa excels in depicting the emotions of love; . . . he is hardly less expert in pathos; the fourth Act of the *Śakuntalā* is a model of tender sorrow. . . . The humour of the *vidūṣaka* is never coarse; . . .

Despite so much praise, however, he goes on to say that. . . . admirable as is Kālidāsa's work, it would be unjust to ignore the fact that in his dramas as in his epics he shows no interest in the great problems of life and destiny. . . . He was incapable of viewing the world as a tragic scene, of feeling any sympathy for the hard lot of the majority of men, or appreciating the reign of injustice in the world. It was impossible to him to go beyond his narrow range; . . .

Keith does give an expert analysis (from the European point of view) of the style and language of the *Śakuntalā*, and where he is forced to do so by the very nature of the Sanskrit language, he accepts certain elements of Indian rhetoric. Yet a strong feeling persists that the critic has missed the point.

Where scholars are content with images and impressions, popular surveys can hardly be expected to do better. One of the most recent popular studies of Sanskrit literature offers: "The play opens with the picture of exultant manhood. . . . Her beauty is tender, fresh and unspoilt like the woodland creepers she affectionately tends every day. . . . Kālidāsa's poetic powers are at their best in this play, . . . they are conserved and blended with profoundly moral perception."[19] And a Hindi survey, very popular with college students, adopts the same approach. Its author, B. Upadhyaya, offers a different date for Kālidāsa than do those writings in English. More important, he follows the categories of traditional aesthetics and, to a certain extent, traditional ethics (although current ethics seem to exert a strong pull—for instance—on his view of *gāndharva vivāha).*[20] Yet the advantage of arranging the discussion under partly traditional captions like plot, characters, beauty *(saundarya-bhāvanā),* sentiment, and message is nullified by the subjectivity of his opinion.

Although this review is rather selective yet we can conclude with considerable certainty that if a stage-manager belonging to a different tradition from the Indian one would wish to stage these plays is left only with the above quoted opinions, he would surely find himself as helpless as if these opinions would have never been formulated.

In spite of its brevity, this review of the more commonly known, comprehensive works in the field of Sanskrit drama or Sanskrit literature in general should have made clear how derivative criticism of Sanskrit drama has been. What has been done in the historical and sociological sphere goes unchallenged; one might even say that there can be further progress here only if new source material comes to light. But aesthetic and ethical appreciation is still dominated by generalisation, affected 'impressionism', sentimental effusion and, occasionally, tedious journalism.

The reviewed opinions being easily accessible stand the greatest chance of substantially influencing—nay, even moulding the popular opinion regarding Sanskrit drama. Therefore, methodologically speaking, this review constitutes sufficient basis for undertaking an effort directed towards formulating such criteria, especially aesthetic and ethical which would permit drawing somewhat more tangible conclusions regarding the aesthetic and the ethical content of Sanskrit drama. Otherwise making it part of the western cultural 'baggage' will be impossible. Without deciphering its deeper aesthetic and ethical values 'a western monogamy–minded audience' cannot and will not appreciate it. Happily enough the task of formulating such criteria is not as difficult as one would expect. For, as I have already mentioned, Indian antiquity has left behind such an elaborate and precise theoretical science regarding both aesthetics and ethics that the only thing which we have to do is to try to understand it and reformulate it in such a way that it may become a handy tool or a sort of easily accessible scales for weighing the real merits and equally real demerits of any drama.

The *Nāṭyaśāstra* is the text selected as the basic source of information and as supplying the much needed guidance in the intricacies of the science of theatre. It is the most ancient text and practically speaking the only one with undisputed primary allegiance to theatre. All later texts betray an obvious literary bias and less obvious, though fairly discernible ignorance of practical theatre. The first problem that arose was what to select out of a large mass of different principles, definitions, formulae and theories. In other words which criteria are absolutely substantial for the recognition of the true perspective of the ancient Indian theatre, since popularising the entire science of theatre would have been impractical, if at all possible. Looking for the first clue attention was concentrated upon the concept of plot (*itivṛtta*). The *Nāṭyaśāstra* calls it the body of theatre. On closer investigation it appeared that action constitutes the conceptual basis of the notion. This agrees well with the commonsense notion that we have about the theatre. Undoubtedly this is the art that communicates through action. If, then, action stands in the centre of our attention, the task we face is not very difficult. For in order to appreciate any action we have to know three things about it. Primo—what is its structure, i.e., which constant elements of human behaviour constitute an action ? Secundo—what is its manner ? In other words through which agents and in what spheres action is perceivable ? Tertio—what are the circumstances and the motives of action in the light of which it may be evaluated ? By knowing the structure of action we shall be in a position to use such descriptions as for instance the easy flow of action or the artificial turn in the development of action, etc. responsibly. In addition, we shall know where to look for specially tense moments and where action should enter its subsequent phase. These are not trifling informations when we are confronted with human behaviour which takes place totally outside our cultural points of reference. By knowing how the Indians visualised and systematised the process of exteriorisation of action depending on the kind of information which an action is supposed to convey, we shall be in a position to judge whether the means used are adequate or not. Last but not least, knowing the circumstances and the motivation of action we shall be able to recoginse its moral value and discover the proper message of the play. All this will give us a considerable advantage not only *vis á vis* theatre but above all *vis á vis* Indian man in action as he conceived himself to behave. Can theatre give us more?

Consequently which concepts of the science of theatre answer our needs and how to find them ? The easiest way seems to analyse and compare typological descriptions of all genres of plays in order to find out which are the elements that repeat themselves in all the definitions. Thus the notion of *Daśarūpaka* found itself first under the investigation. The results have been more than rewarding. First of all it appeared that the main differentiating factor of the ten types of drama is formulated as the concept of four demeanours (*vṛtti*), i.e., four different ways or manners of exteriorising an action. In more colloquial terms

they may be called the four fold means of communication. As anticipated, the plot with its elaborate structure fulfils our second demand. The third query concerning motives and circumstances of action has found an answer in the concept of triple predicament (*vidrava*), triple intrigue (*kapaṭa*) and triple fascination (*śṛñgāra*). All these concepts will be elaborated on the subsequent pages with one notable exception of the concept of *rasa* which is practically absent from our deliberations. Methodologically speaking we are concerned in this book with action and not with reaction which the *rasa* concept signifies. Abhivanagupta in his commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (vol. III, p. 1) calls *rasa* the soul of theatre in this manner giving another convenient occasion to explain the disregard of *rasa*, for this book may be considered a handbook of dramatic surgery. Surgeons are concerned with the anatomy, with the manner of its functioning and with causes which are responsible for this or that change in functioning of anatomy. They are not concerned with the soul of their patients. Although sometimes, being religiously minded for instance, they may believe that in final count the entire anatomy is subservient to soul and certainly in protracted treatment a physician has to take into consideration what we could generally call the spiritual side of his patient. Thus, *rasa* will provide us with some interesting insights, may be especially interesting for actors, who are directly responsible for evoking emotional reaction of the audience. Yet technically speaking it undoubtedly matters less for the analysis of the dramatic texts which come into our hands.

Finally I owe the reader an information regarding the genesis of the present study. Already when the concept of ancient Indian theatre was in the centre of my attention, I realised how deficient our understanding of Sanskrit dramas is. That was the occasion on which I have tried to analyse the concept of *itivṛtta* which, substantially broadened, found its place in this study as well. Apart from that I have utilised for this book my different papers published some years ago. Some of them I have included almost verbatim here. The paper entitled : Appreciation of Sanskrit drama in Kaliyuga, was delivered at the First world Sanskrit Conference in Delhi in 1972 and later on published in the Journal of the Sangeet Natak Akademi, No. 27 (Jan.–March 1973). This paper revised and under the changed title : Can Sanskrit drama tell us anything more ?, was republished in the Educational Theatre Journal, vol. 27, no. 4, December 1975. A paper entitled : Sanskrit drama as an aggregate of model situations, was delivered at the seminar on Sanskrit drama in performance in March 1974 at the University of Hawaii and later on published by that University. Another paper entitled : *Puruṣārthas* and Sanskrit literary criticism, was delivered at the Sanskrit conference at the Humboldt University of Berlin in March 1975 and was also subsequently published. The paper entitled : *Daśarūpaka* as the basic notion of Sanskrit dramatic criticism, was delivered at the Soviet Conference

of Indologists in Moscow in January 1976. It has been incorporated here in a revised version. The paper entitled : *Trivarga* (The threefold sphere of Indian ethics), was published in Dialectics and Humanism No. 3–4/1976. Finally the paper entitled : The structure of Bhāsa's Pratijñā, was delivered at the third International Sanskrit Conference in Paris in June 1977.

Last but not least, I should beg the indulgence of the readers as regards the language of this book. English is not my native tongue. Still I hope that it is comprehensible.

Footnotes :

1. A. Gawroński, Review of the book by J. Schmidt Az ó–ind epika, Budapest 1921. Rocznik orientalistyczny II, 1925, p. 283–4.
2. S. Windakiewicz, Teatr kollegjów jezuickich w dawnej Polsce, (The theatre of Jesuits colleges in early Poland) Kraków 1922. G. Artola, The earliest plays about India, Saṁskṛta Raṅga. Annual IV, Madras 1965, p. 1–19.
3. W. Bogusiawski, Dzieia (Collected Works) vol. X, Warszawa 1830 writes about this in the introduction to his Polish version of the Indian Widow.
4. M.C. Byrski, Grotowski and the Indian tradition, Journal of Sangeet Natak Akademi, 1970.
5. Wrociaw, 1969, p. 272.
6. A History of Sanskrit Literature, Delhi 1963 pp.11, 241.
7. For the sake of convenience we shall speak about these dramas as written by Bhāsa, although we are well aware of the tentative character of this ascription.
8. Op. cit., pp. 214–221.
9. A.B. Keith, The Sanskrit Drama, Oxford 1924, pp. 91–126.
10. S.K. De, A History of Sanskrit Literature, Calcutta 1962 (Second Ed.), pp. 101–117.
11. C. Kunhan Raja, Survey of Sanskrit Literature, Bombay 1962, pp. 157–162.
12. K. Chaitanya, A New History of Sanskrit Literature, Bombay 1962, pp. 289–307.
13. Sūryakānta, Saṁskṛta vāṅmaya kā vivecanātmaka itihāsa, Naī Dillī 1972, pp. 207–214.
14. /Calcutta, 1955/, pp, 2, 58.
15. A History of Sanskrit Literature /1929:rpt Delhi, 1962/, pp. 298-305
16. Winternitz, pp. 237 ff.
17. S.N. Dasgupta and S.K. De, A History of Sanskrit Literature, Calcutta, 1962, pp. 134-149
18. The Sanskrit Drama, Oxford, 1924, pp. 152ff.
19. K. Chaitanya, A New History of Sanskrit Literature, Bombay, 1962, pp, 157ff, 316.
20. Saṁskṛta Sāhitya kā itihāsa (Kāśī, 1961), pp. 173ff. the ghāndarva vivāha was in ancient India one of many admissable forms of contracting marriage. It was done by mutual consent of the parties involved and without the permission of elders. Among the warrior class this was a perfectly legitimate, if not advisable, form of marriage. But in present-day Indian morality it is considered by the average person to be one of the grossest abuses. See an excellent paper by K. P. Jog. "A Fresh Revaluation of the Inner Meaning of the Śakuntalā, *"Velankar Commemoration Volume* (Poona, 1965), pp. 206ff.

I. THE TYPOLOGY OF SANSKRIT DRAMA (*DAŚARŪPAKA*)

Typological terminology used in the field of dramaturgy answers very practical requirements of communication among people involved in theatrical practice. Any theatre-manager, even before he actually reads a play, will want to know whether it is a tragedy, comedy, melodrama, farce or vaudeville. Beyond that he will invariably enquire how many actors and actresses are required, how many acts and changes of decoration are involved and the like. All this information, usually to be found on the frontispiece of a printed text of a play, fulfils the role of a label which helps us to recognize salient features of the play in question.

Recently, of course, exactly as all other conventions this one too has been challenged or simply disregarded. Yet according to A. Nicoll, for instance, it does persist. Says he : "Tragedy and comedy were technical words belonging to the ancient Greeks; the modern playwrights tend towards the use of the indeterminate word "play", yet the extraordinary fact is that both within the theatre itself and within the field of criticism, tragedy and comedy continue to bear as strong a force as they ever did. The terms are among the commonest in ordinary use; anxiously we seek to determine the exact nature of tragedy and to inquire whether the tragic spirit can find expression in the modern theatre; we debate whether a particular play can properly be placed within comedy's realm or whether it belongs to the sphere of farce"[1].

The above stresses that what we propose to discuss, although couched in an oriental idiom, is, as a matter of fact, one of the basic problems of communication in theatre and in theatrical criticism. The purpose of classification of plays by kinds or genres, about which Ronald Peacock says that "these persistent forms of drama are natural and organic because they pertain to its profoundly communal character, and are based on salient general features of experience"[2], is not—as Northrop Frye wants—"so much to classify as to clarify traditions to which a given work belongs and its affinities, there by bringing out a large number of literary relationships that would not be noticed as long as there were no context established for them"[3].

Consequently it seems obvious that the problem of the generic classification of Sanskrit drama is not just an idiosyncrasy of Indian culture, but is shared by our own culture as well. And by the way it even may occur that Indians have evolved equally

precise formulae. Here it may be added that as these genres also function, in a way, as standard models of plays, they allow us to judge not only academic correctness of a given play, but above all its originality, inventiveness and the daring of its author as well as his command over the technicalities of the convention.

The notion of *Daśarūpaka* has been much talked about ever since Dhanañjaya (Xth cent. A.D.) had chosen it for the title of his standard work on dramatic theory. Yet the oldest exposition of it is to be found in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Nowadays it is one of the topics of dramatic theory which is most frequently dealt with. Each author dealing with Sanskrit drama considers it his bounden duty to retell this theory[4]. It is therefore a very risky undertaking to discuss it yet once more. Still it is a just attempt, for all those who wrote about it, with one notable exception of D.R. Mankad[5], limited themselves to a simple exposition of the theory, while we would like to investigate the utility of this notion for practical analysis and for a critical appreciation of Sanskrit drama. We suspect that it is a carefully thought out scheme facilitating, as we already mentioned, once upon a time communication among those who were practically involved in classical Sanskrit theatre.

Now, since these ten generic classes of dramas were supposed to furnish necessary information needed in order to judge a play from the angle of the demands of stage, let us review what kind of information it is and how useful it may be to us now.

The *Nāṭyaśāstra* is the only text undisputably theatrical, while the most of later texts, if not all, are treating drama as literary work more or less independent of theatre, the so called poetry to be seen, with the stress put on the word poetry (*dṛśyakāvya*). It is for this reason that in the present study we have chosen this treatise as the only source of information. Later texts had often misinterpreted the dicta of Bharata by detaching drama from theatre[6].

The text in question, i.e., *Adhyāya* XVIII of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*[7], entitled *Daśarūpalakṣaṇam*, betrays the compilatory characters so characteristic of the entire treatise[8]. So far as the *Kāvyamālā* edition of 1943 is concerned the inserted part from verse 38 up to 86 dealing with *śabdaprayoga* has to be mentioned first. Next, the extremely unsystematic treatment of all ten *rūpakas* must be mentioned as well. For instance an act is defined while discussing the *nāṭaka*. Most obviously it applies to all multiact rūpakas[9]. Further *lāsya* and its *aṅgas*, though discussed at the end, apply also to the *nāṭaka*[10]. Another good example is the discussion of the *"endroit"* or locale of the play. Here remarks are made in the course of discussing *utsṛṣṭikāṅka*, but they hardly can belong exclusively to its definition[11]. Still one more case is that of an interlude (*viṣkambhaka*), discussed twice : once on the occasion of defining the *nāṭaka* and again on that of defining the *prakaraṇa*[12]. Although the Gaekwad Oriental Series edition seems to be more orderly, yet, with the exception of the *śabdaprayoga* almost all other remarks

hold good in its case too. The above situation justifies in our opinion a less rigid approach to the text in question, allowing or even demanding certain rearrangements of its contents. Especially since it seems obvious that various problems dealt with, while describing this or that *rūpaka* do not have to be limited in their import to the particular genre in the context of which they are discussed. In addition to that, the structural aspect of the entire notion of ten *rūpakas* is not even properly indicated in Chapter XVIII, but is left entirely to the subsequent one, dealing with the *itivṛtta*, when we are told that it is one of the important aspects of the tenfold typological division of plays.

This lack of consistency in the exposition of the generic classification of plays makes it necessary to decide which aspects are indispensable constituent parts of these ten definitions. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* assures us that it is first and foremost the *vṛttis*, i.e., demeanours, commonly known as styles, which determine what is what in the *rūpaka*–wise classification[13)]. Unhappilly whatever it has to say on the subject is far from being very precise. For it says that only the *nāṭaka* and the *prakaraṇa* have all the demeanours (XVIII.7.). All the rest are devoid of the delicate demeanour (XVIII.8-9). Further on it superfluously repeats that the *prakaraṇa* has the same demeanours as the *nāṭaka* (XVIII.47). But in connection with the *ḍima* it says that it should have two demeanours : the conscious and the violent (XVIII.88) which should eliminate the verbal demeanour. To the contrary, the *utsṛṣṭikāṅka* should be devoid of all with the exception of the verbal demeanour (XVIII.96).

The number of acts is the next common distinction, also not devoid of shortcomings. It gives the exact number of acts only for eight *rūpakas*[14)]. The case of the *utsṛṣṭikāṅka* is obvious, since the very name indicates that it is a single act play. But the *prahasana* remains undefined[15)]. Further on comes the number of *dramatis personae*. It is fairly precisely stated only in seven cases. The *nāṭaka* and the *prakaraṇa* should have from four to five (XVIII.41). The *samavakāra* should have twelve (XVIII.64). The *īhāmṛga* should have the same number as the *vyāyoga* (XVIII.81), although it has not yet been listed and comes only later. Further on the *ḍima* is said to have sixteen (XVIII.88) and the *vyāyoga* when it comes at last is said to have many of them (*bahavaḥ*) (XVIII.91). In all the above cases the word *puruṣa* is used which would rather indicate male actors, while in the case of the *vīthī* the word *hārya* is employed meaning: "to be played." The *vīthī* is said to have either one or two such players. (XVIII.112). To this the *bhāṇa*, being a monologue, may be added for evident reasons. This leaves us with the *utsṛṣṭikāṅka* and the *prahasana*, where this aspect remains undefined[16)]. Characteristic of heroes is the next constituent part of the definitions of *rūpakas*. Apart from the four *vṛttis* it is the only aspect consistently discussed. Yet also here we do not have in all cases equally precise information. The *nāṭaka* has a well known and exalted hero who can be a king of celestial connections. The *prakaraṇa* has for its hero a brahmin a merchant,

a minister, a priest. He should be neither exalted, nor have any celestial connection and should not be a king. The hero of the *samavakāra* should be like in the *nāṭaka* well known and exalted but he should not be so much human as divine or demoniac. The *īhāmṛga* should have for its hero celestial being of vehement disposition and also goddesses. The *ḍima* in turn is said to have a famous and exalted hero exactly like in the *nāṭaka* but without further distinctions of the later. The *vyāyoga* has also a well known figure for its hero which is explicitly said to be a king and not a god. The hero of the *utsṛṣṭikāṅka* is only described as human and not divine. The *prahasana* concerns *bhagavats*, brahmins, courtezans, servants, eunuchs, *viṭas* and the like. The hero of the *bhāṇa* is just the *viṭa*. The heroes of the *vīthī* finally can be superior, middling on inferior and that is all what the *Nāṭyaśāstra* has to say on the subject[17)]

The following chapter, while dealing with the intricate structure of drama, makes the most important statement regarding the *saṁdhi* content of each *rūpaka*. As we can see this content varies and therefore it becomes a handy means with which to determine the generic character of different plays. According to Bharata's treatise the *nāṭaka* and the *prakaraṇa* should have all *saṁdhis*. The *samavakāra* and the *ḍima* should have no *vimarśasaṁdhi*. The *ihāmṛga* and the *vyāyoga* should have no *vimarśa*– and *garbha-saṁdhis* while the rest of *rūpakas* should consist only of the *mukha*– and the *nirvahaṇa-saṁdhis*[18)]. The fact that apart from few allusions to the structure, for example to the *bindu* and the *nirvahaṇa* (*nāṭaka*), the *sarvasaṁdhi* (*prakaraṇa*) and the *bīja* (*samavakāra*), there is no coherent exposition of the *saṁdhi* content of each *rūpaka* in Chapter XVIII, but only in the subsequent one, is yet another proof of the defective compilatory character of our text. To our mind the statement regarding the *saṁdhi* content of each *rūpaka* should have been made while discussing the *Daśarūpaka*.

Now, if we review all the elements discussed above we shall certainly discover that neither the *vṛttis* nor the *saṁdhi* or for that matter the number of acts or of the *dramatis personae* or even the *rasa* content give any definite information regarding the inner ideological import of each type of *rūpaka*. To some extent the characteristics of a hero can be of help here, as well as the general remarks concerning the nature of the subject-matter to be presented. As for instance an indication that the *nāṭaka* should present good fortunes and amorous pastimes (*ṛddhivilāsa*) of the royal sages. On the other hand the *prakaraṇa* should deal with the exploits of brahmins and merchants, etc., the *īhāmṛga*-with fight and women's anger. Similarly fight should be depicted in the *ḍima* and the *vyāyoga*. The *utsṛṣṭikāṅka* should tell a story of lamentation of women after the battle. The *prahasana* should abound in comic disputations, jocular remarks and incidents of hypocrisy (*dambhasaṁyoga*). The definitions of the *bhāṇa* and the *vīthī* give even less precise information, maybe because of their altogether different nature : one being a monologue and the other a variety of sketches of which the *Nāṭyaśāstra*

lists thirteen kinds (XVIII. 116-127). To describe exactly the nature of each one of them would require a separate study. In the absence of living tradition not in all cases the definite solution may be arrived at. Yet one things is certain that these are monologues or dialogues of absolutely verbal character and that this genre may either constitute independent short sketches or may be incorporated into a larger dramatic type, as for instance the *nāṭaka* or the *prakaraṇa*. The same remark concerns the *prahasana*, which may also appear in the double role of an independent type and of a fragment of a larger composition.

All this does not give anything comparable with the remark on the tragedy to be found in the Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics : "The hero's predicament can arise primarily through elements in his own make-up, through the plotting of another or others, through the very nature of his environment, through the will of heaven, or, more probably, through a combination of these"[19)]. Yet if we scrutinize our text more minutely we shall discover as if hidden within the definition of the *samavakāra* the threefold concept of the *vidrava*, which I would render here precisely "predicament", the threefold concept of the *kapaṭa*-"intrigue" and the threefold concept of the *śṛṅgāra*-"fascination"[20)]. Despite un unconvincing attempt to connect this concept with the *samavakāra* only[21)], the possibility of its broader application strikes one forcibly. The last one of the tree triple concepts listed does not need special argumentation. Fascination with the three *puruṣārthas*-the *trivarga* of the Indian ethics-is one of the presuppositions of the ancient Indian *weltanschauung* and as we shall see later, has been repeatedly acknowledged in the context of art as well. The *kapaṭa* is another notion the broader character of which is most apparent. Its definition says that an intrigue may be either determined by the deportment of the protagonist himself[22)], by fate (*daivavaśāt*) or by antagonists (*paraprayukta*) and that it is related to the rise of happiness and despair.

Somewhat more complicated is the problem of the *vidrava*, i.e., of the predicament. The term itself appears among others in the description of the *aṅka*, i.e., an act[23)] and the definition of the *īhāmṛga*[24)]. Apart from that it is one of the *saṁdhyaṅgas* of the *garbha-saṁdhi*[25)] and also according to some manuscripts one of the *saṁdhyaṅgas* of the *vimarśa-saṁdhi*[26)]. This additionally proves that it should not be a concept strictly limited to the *samavakāra* only. Still the very definition of the *vidrava* is puzzling:

yuddhajalasambhavo vā vāyvagnigajendrasambhramakṛto vāpi
nagaroparodhajo vā vijñeyo vidravas trividhaḥ (XVIII.70)

There is certain unexpectedness in the very definite character of these causes. One is inclined to suspect that these may be only concrete exemplifications of more general notions and that haphazard enumeration of them would suggest negligent original editorship. Apparently this must have been the feeling of Abhinavagupta also, for he

says that causes of the *vidrava* may be non-sentient (*acetana*), different or another (*anya*) and double (*dvaya*). From his further words it follows that *anya* possibly stands for sentient causes, the example of which he sees in *gajendra*, while siege of the city (*nagaroparodha*) is according to him an example of predicament caused by both these categories, i.e., the fight (*cetana*) and the fire (*acetana*)[27]. The strength of this proposition lies in its being a generalization. Most obviously the hero's attitudes and reactions depend on whether his predicament is for instance man made or is natural. Its weakness on the other hand is that it puts all sentient beings into one bag exemplifying them by the elephant and by the fight (*yuddha*). Thus the basic text appears somewhat inadequate, unable to put ideas into correct order and logical sequence. The fight (*cetana*) is combined with the water (*acetana*). The wind and the fire (*acetana*) are combined with *gajendra* (*cetana*) ! Strong feeling persists that certain emendations of the text are unavoidable. Since there is a variant reading for *gajendra-jalendra* we would accept, against Abhinavagupta, the variant *jalendra*, for it makes the triad of wind, fire and water complete and through the word *indra* indicates also the general divine power above the three elements, which also may be counted among the non-sentient-in the terrestrial sense of the word-causes of the predicament. But in order to avoid needless repetition of the word *jala* and at the same time salvage Abhinavagupta's interpretation we would suggest replacing this word when it first occurs with the word *gaja*. This would bring two types of *cetana* causes together, i.e., *yuddha* signifying human opponent and *gaja* the most powerful among beasts that man has to face.

Now these three triple concepts understood as above clearly facilitate attempts at the analysis and the critical appreciation of a Sanskrit dramȧ. For-as it has already been stated-we can judge the behaviour of a particular hero only after determining whether his predicament is due to man's action, due to beasts, due to the elements or else due to both sentient and non-sentient causes. Further on, it has to be seen whether the intrigue is of his own making, or is caused by fate, or else is engineered by his antagonists. Our judgement also will depend on the way the play resolves natural conflict among the fascinations for the three *puruṣārthas*.

Here it may be added that possibly the particular configuration patterns of these nine notions could not be *a priori* settled for the different *rūpakas*. It is therefore not surprising that being not so much the differentiating factor as the general description of the modalities of the existential situation in a play, in a way similar to the description of the endroit of action, it has been put forth only once, but as a criterium of analysis it should be applied to all [28] *rūpakas* whenever we try to analyse their concrete specimens. It is apparently the compilatory character of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* which is responsible for placing this concept where exclusively it hardly belongs.

The following conclusion emerges out of what has been discussed above, i.e.,

that no judgement may be passed upon a Sanskrit play without first ascertaining its *rūpaka* character, which consists above all of :

a) the *vṛttis*,

b) the number of *dramatis personae*

c) and their general characteristic

d) and the *saṁdhi* structure.

Apart from that the ideological analysis of a *rūpaka* has to be conducted along the lines of :

a) the *trividrava* concept,

b) the *trikapaṭa* concept

c) and the concept of *triśṛṅgāra*.

The number of acts and the number and general characteristic of *dramatis personae* are simple criteria, which do not demand any special analysis. They are fairly precisely, as we have already mentioned, stated in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and consequently we feel free to abandon them at this point. On the other hand the notions of the *trividrava* and of the *trikapaṭa* have been already sufficiently commented upon. This leaves us with the necessity to investigate in their capacity of the analytical criteria the concept of *vṛttis*, the *saṁdhi* structure and the notion of the *triśṛṅgāra*.

Footnotes :

1. A. Nicoll, The Theatre and Dramatic Theory, London 1962 p. 88.
2. Op. cit., p. 89. (R. Peacock, The Art of Drama, 1957, pp. 190-2.
3. N. Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, New York 1969, pp. 247-8.
4. Among others H. H. Wilson, s. Levi, S. Konow, S. N. Shastri, 'D. R. Mankad.
5. D. R. Mankad, Types of Sanskrit Drama, Karachi 1936. This book presents an interpretation of the *Daśarūpaka* as a document of historical development of Sanskrit drama from simpler and more primitive forms (*bhāṇa*) to the more elaborate ones (*nāṭaka*).
6. The best example of this is the interpretation of the *niyatāpti-avasthā*; frustration in Bharata and certainty of success with later theoreticians.
7. This is according to the GOS and Kāvyamālā editions. In M. M. Ghosh's English translation it is Chapter XX.
8. I wrote about it in Pamietnik Teatralny, XXIV, 2 (94), 1975, pp. 179-185. To Professor Ludo Rocher of the University of Pennsylvania we owe an excellent philological assessment of the textual tradition of the Bhāratīyanāṭyaśāstra presented at the Sanskrit Drama in Performance Seminar at the University of Hawaii in 1974.
9. NŚ XVIII. 13ff. All references to the Nāṭyaśāstra (NŚ) when not specified otherwise should be referred to the Gaekwad Oriental Series edition.
10. NŚ (KM) XVIII. 182.
11. This is also the opinion of M. M. Ghosh in The Nāṭyaśāstra, transl. by, Calcutta 1950, vol.I, p. 371 f.
12. NŚ (KM) XVIII. 87-91 and 106-108.

13. NŚ (KM) XVIII. 4.
14. The *nāṭaka* and the *prakaraṇa* from five to ten. The *samavakāra*-three. The *īhāmṛga* and the *ḍima*-four. The *vyāyoga*, *bhāṇa* and *vīthī*-one.
15. The later practice seems to indicate one (the Mattavilāsa and the Bhagavadajjukīya, VII AD) and two (The Laṭakamelaka XII AD).
16. For instance the Ūrubhaṅga has eight plus three soldiers and the Bhagavadajjukīya has eleven. In M. M. Ghosh's translation we find as interesting couplet, which I could not trace elsewhere, saying that the *vyāyoga*, the *īhāmṛga*, the *samavakāra* and the *ḍima* have from ten to twelve *dramatis personae* (XX. 40, p. 361).
17. Of course the *bhāṇa* does not require special characteristics, for *viṭa* is a well defined figure known from elsewhere, for instance from the Kāmasūtra. Now the turn of the taste (*rasa*) should come, for it is the last important aspect of the definition of the ten *rūpakas* discussed in Chapter XVIII of the Nāṭyaśāstra. Yet, because it constitutes, in a way, the arrival point of all analysis, we cannot consider it an instrument of the analysis and therefore it will be excluded from the mainstream of our further argument. Nevertheless, before we continue it is better to know that a statement of extraordinary importance is made in the course of defining the *nāṭaka*. It is said there that the *adbhuta rasa* should invariably characterise the *nirvahaṇa-saṁdhi* (NŚ/KM/ XVIII. 94) which in turn is present, as we shall see, in each type of *rūpaka*. Positive statements concerning the *rasa* content of the ten *rūpakas* we find in connection with the *nāṭaka* and the *prakaraṇa* (*nānā*), the *utsṛṣṭikānka* (*karuṇa*) and the *vīthī* (*sarvarasa*). Negative statement we have regarding the *ḍima*, which should be devoid of the *śṛṅgāra* and the *hāsya*. The *īhāmṛga* in its turn is said to have the same *rasas* as the *vyāyoga* has. But regarding the later one we have only the enigmatic *dīptakāvyarasāśraya*. (M. M. Ghosh translates it as "having exciting sentiments as its basis." p. 370). For the *prahasana* and the *bhāṇa* no indication is available, although the *hāsya* and the *śṛṅgāra* are fair guess for both of them.
18. NŚ (KM) XIX. 44-49.
19. Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, ed. by A. Preminger, Princeton 1965, p. 860, col. 2.
20. We choose this rendering in order to underline, in this case, the technical character of the whole notion. But as a matter of fact the word love does express the meaning well.
21. It is also the opinion of M. M. Ghosh, op. cit., p. 366 f.
22. Here I accept the reading of GOS edition, preferred also by Abhinavagupta, who takes *vastugata* for *phala sādhaka* or *kartā*. Vol. II, p. 439.
23. NŚ (KM) XVIII. 20. It is said there according to M. M. Ghosh (XX. 20) that it should not be shown during an act. What might be implied here is that the very event lying at the bottom of the hero's predicament should not be shown. Yet both the Kāvyamālā and the GOS editions as well as Abhinavagupta do not support this reading.
24. NŚ (KM) XVIII. 131.
25. NŚ (KM) XIX. 60.
26. NŚ (KM) XIX. 62
27. NŚ (GOS), vol. II, p. 439.
28 Dramaturgical practice furnishes many an instance of almost literal application of these principles. War, siege of the city, fire and an infuriated elephant very often appear in different plays. Although the notion of the *triśṛṅgāra* I shall discuss in detail in Chapter V, it nevertheless can be mentioned here that my thesis regarding the universality of this notion finds a very strong support in the Amarakośaṭīkāsarvasva of Vandyaghatīya Sarvānanda (1159 A. D.) who says in commenting on the *śloka "śṛṅgāravīrakaruṇa"* that *"sarvadiśam ātmasātkartum Udayanasya Padmāvatīpariṇayorthaśṛṅgāraḥ svapnavāsavadatte, tṛtīyastasyaiva Vāsavadattāpariṇayaḥ kāmaśṛṅgārah.* "T. Gaṇapatiśāstrī, The Svapnavāsavadattā of Bhāsa, Trivandrum 1915, p. XXII.

II. THE FOUR DEMEANOURS *(VṚTTI)*

The *Daśarūpalakṣaṇa* chapter of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* seems to make much of the concept of the *vṛttis*, for one of the first statements it makes calls the *vṛttis* the matrixes of all poems out of which in the actual theatrical practice the tenfold typological division of all plays originates[29]. This enunciation makes it clear that the *vṛttis* are more fundamental categories than the *rūpakas* and by the same poses two basic questions : one about the exact nature of this fourfold concept and another one about its practical utility as the criterium of the analysis of Sanskrit drama. As it is the rule with the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, in the present case too mythology comes to our aid. And, since the account of the origin of the *vṛttis* has been couched in mythological idiom, we are entitled to suspect that this concept has some philosophical bearings or an existential import, which myths usually express[30].

The very mythological moment and scenery, in which the *vṛttis* originated, i.e., between the eons, when the discursive reality merged into one ocean of being, indicate that we face here some rudimental notions of existence. Especially so, since the direct cause of the appearance of the *vṛttis*-the attack of two demons upon Viṣṇu recalls to mind the everlasting *daivāsuram* conflict, one of the elemental notions of existence perceived as the sacrifice, i.e., as *yajña*. *Devas* and *asuras*, the children of Prajāpati stand for the basic duality inherent to the discursive reality. It is because of the interaction of these two poles of discursiveness that the world functions. The sequences of day and night, heat and cold, happiness and despair, etc., are just few of the many forms in which the *daivāsuram* manifests itself in creation.

Now our query can take the shape of a concrete question : what particular aspect of existence has been set in motion due to the *daivāsuram* confrontation, which took place at the beginning of our eon between Viṣṇu and Madhu and Kaiṭabha ? Like the mediaeval fights this one too started with the verbal taunting and abuse. The mute aspects of still latent existence heated up in conflict found Speech to express what they thought and felt. We may have here a later recast of the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* myth about a contest between gods and demons for the possession of Speech[31]. This contest never ends, it is ever enacted, when Speech manifests itself both in the everyday life and on the stage. To my mind, the present mythological account marks a moment in the

evolution of discursive reality at which the means of communication were established. Speech constitutes one such means. As Viṣṇu declares : "It will be the *bhāratī vṛtti* of the speaker, in which words will preponderate"[32].

Yet this was not the only means of communication brought into existence at that fateful mythological moment. For, in a sense, the kicks and fist-blows showered by the demons upon Viṣṇu, as well as his response in taking up the bow, after he had tied up his dishevelled hair, also have the value of communication media-partly violent that they were. The means of communication thus indicated is the gesture and because of its character it has been considered to be threefold. Let us then review what the *Nāṭyaśāstra* has to say about these three types of bodily demeanour.

The *sāttvatī vṛtti* or the conscious demeanour owes its origin, according to this treatise, to the gestures arising from wielding a bow and thanks to that, intense (*tīvra*), most splendid or clear (*dīptatara*), conscious (*sattvādhika*) and not confused (*asaṁbhrāṁta*)[33]. The factor which decides the peculiar character of this demeanour is wielding a bow. We are given to think, that stringing a bow has been singled out as a par excellence human action, i.e. an action propeled and controlled mentally (*sattvādhika*). This account seems to be a much more poetical and imaginative version of the western evolution theory, which says that the ape, which for the first time took a stick as an implement, became the forefather of humans. For most certainly stringing a bow requires the type of gestures which are the sole preserve of humans, having nothing in themselves of the animal physiological spontaneity. Such gestures result from or accompany mental activity, which precedes and determines them. This account also indicates that highly technical and precise gestures are meant, which should be well ordered too. Apparently some such reasoning must have prompted Abhinavagupta, when he interpreted the *sāttvatī vṛtti* as the preserve of the *manas*[34]. It is for this very reason that we propose to render the word *sāttvatī* as conscious and that we shall employ this term throughout the present study.

The *kaiśikī vṛtti* or the delicate demeanour has been created by Viṣṇu with the various *aṅgahāras* in sportive mood, while tying his hair[35]. The most important difference in comparison with the previous demeanour lies in the fact that the delicate demeanour originated while tying hair, i.e., as an action or gesture which does not require any premeditated intention, which is spontaneous like brushing off unruly hair from the forehead but shows grace and aims at beautification. It may also be provoked by sportiveness (*līlā*) and thus serves as an expression ot emotions, being subservient to them in a way similar to the conscious demeanour being subservient to reason-to consciousness.

The *ārabhaṭī vṛtti* or the violent demeanour requires as preconditions anger (*saṁrambha*) and agitation (*āvega*). Then it arises from the many steps (*cārī*) and from the different postures (*karaṇa*)[36]. In practiece, this description agrees well-so far as its substance

goes-with the description of the delicate demeanour, for both here, as well as there, the bodily behaviour is thought of as in the first place subservient to emotion. There it was that sportiveness (*līlā*) and all whatever it implies in the sphere of emotion. Here it is anger and agitation which found its bodily expression in those blows and kicks of the demons which in the theatre take the form of highly conventionalised steps and postures.

"*Vṛtti* is man's activity in the direction of achieving the four *puruṣārthas*. which is the theme of all literature"–writes V. Raghavan[37]. We can add that what should be meant here is the communication aspect of man's activity. An activity which is not witnessed and which communicates nothing to anybody cannot be called *vṛtti*. We should all the time remember that the fight of Viṣṇu with the demons was witnessed by Brahmā and this mythological pattern is in a way reenacted in each performance, to which in the classical tradition the main spectator is God.

There is one more interesting problem worth noting. The order in which the four demeanours are discussed is reminiscent of the *sāṁkhyan* type of thinking exemplified for instance in the cosmological account of the *Manusmṛti*. There also consciousness is listed first and emotion next. On this occasion we would suggest a somewhat altered interpretation of the opinion expressed by V. Raghavan that the *vṛttis* are only two : the *kaiśikī* and the *ārabhaṭī*[38]. To my mind there are indeed two types of the *vṛttis* : one–controlled by consciousness and another one– controlled by emotion. To the first type belongs the verbal demeanour, an *ex definitione* human and mentally guided way of communication. The conscious demeanour belongs also here because it includes all gestures which– in the way similar to words– exteriorise human thoughts. To the second type belong two remaining demeanours, to some extent at least, common with the rest of animal world. They are even, in case of men, comparatively less subservient to consciousness, more spontaneous and more directly exteriorising emotions of basically two types : the delicate and the violent or-to call them by their proper names-of love and hatred.

Having alluded above to the *sāṁkhyan* type of thinking let us bring in yet another concept which may be directly related to it, the concept of *traiguṇya*. This concept will help us to define still more precisely the exact character of the *vṛttis*. If we take *sattvaguṇa* for the ontic substratum of consciousness, *rajoguṇa* for that of emotion and *tamoguṇa* for that of physicality, we shall find it only natural and true to the Indian tradition to relate them to the *trivarga*-the three *puruṣārthas*. Consequently we shall obtain following equations : *sattvaguṇa*=*dharma*=consciousness, *rajoguṇa*=*kāma*=emotion and *tamoguṇa*= *artha*=physicality. We may add that in our view the three *puruṣārthas* are the axiological consequences of the three *guṇas* in the sphere of action. *Dharma* perceived as action could be termed *cetanavyāpāra*. *Kāma* in the same capactity could be termed *bhāvavyāpāra* and *artha vastuvyāpāra*. In the sphere of *dharma* one functions

prompted by reason. In the sphere of *kāma*-by emotion and in the sphere of *artha*-by material concerns. Of course these spheres are not tightly separated from each other as indeed rationality, emotionality and physicality are not separated as well. This can be best seen when we communicate.

Communication in the domain of reason has to be precise. Speech is the most precise means of communication known to men. Thus the verbal demeanour reigns supreme in the sphere of *dharma*. Yet even the most dispassionate speech will never be totally devoid of emotion. While the ratio of emotion grows words become inadequate executors of communication. Gestures have to come to their succour. Thus communication enters the sphere of *kāma* yet without abandoning the sphere of *dharma*. It becomes then the conscious demeanour. In as much as the conscious demeanour conveys with the help of *mudrās* precise, rational meaning in so much it remains in the sphere of *dharma*. But with the growing emotional charge it activates the sphere of *kāma* as well. When this process goes further on and the emotional content of the communication process becomes more intense then the delicate demeanour accupies the centerstage bringing this process almost completely within the sphere of *kāma*. The verbal and the conscious demeanours recede further less and less important and give way to song and spontaneous bodily movements in dance and dalliance.

Thus *bhāvavyāpāra* reigns supreme. It signifies less and less reliance on either verbal code or the code of gestures in communication and more and more on the direct expression of the body, costume and song. So the role of pure physicality in communication grows. Consequently the elements of *vastuvyāpāra* appear. Their importance increases with the increasing intensity of emotions. The last violent demeanour with its anger and passion finds the previous modes of communication decisively inadequate. Speech is replaced by roar of wrath and gestures are intensified by means of material props such as swords, bows, arrows and maces. *Vastuvyāpāra* of the *artha* sphere becomes dominant. The former three demeanours albeit present recede in to the background. Consequently communication enters the sphere of *artha*.

The coupling of these two concepts together is not only a scholastic exercise it has a practical utility. For as we shall see later the *triśṛṅgāra* concept is pivotal for Sanskrit theatre and drama. So the mode of communication with the audience will depend in quite substantial degree upon whether the play is *dharma, kāma* or *artha pradhāna*.

We believe that the above remarks answer our first question regarding the exact nature of the four *vṛttis*. So, we can try now to answer the second question about their practical utility for the analysis of drama.

The definition proper of the verbal demeanour underlines first what we already know from the mythological account, namely, that speech is its first and foremost medium (*vākpradhānā*). Afterwards information is given that this is the demeanour proper to

men (*puruṣaprayojyā*), that women should not be employed in it (*strīvarjitā*) and that the text in this demeanour should be couched in high literary language (*saṁskṛtapāṭhyayuktā*)[39] The most important general practical conclusion, which can be legitimately drawn from the above, is that in this demeanour word goes all alone without the help of the conventionalised gesture, otherwise the next demeanour would not have been explicitly defined as characterised by both words and gestures. Therefore, to determine whether the text or its portion is to be enacted in the verbal demeanour is of capital importance for the production of any play and may also contribute towards the better understanding of its literary composition.

The definition proper of the conscious demeanour states that it should be furnished with the characteristic feature of consciousness (*sāttvatā guṇa*), with the conventional mode of behaviour (*nyāyavṛttā*)[40], with great joy (*harṣotkatā*) and restrained feeling of sorrow (*saṁhṛtaśokabhāvā*)[41]. Our contention is that the conscious demeanour stands above all for a conventionalised or highly technical manner of gesticulation, as V. Raghavan's interpretation of the term *nyāya* indicates. It should be a manner, which so far as its precision is concerned, is comparable to a series of gestures required in wielding a bow. Now the following remark of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* makes it clear what type of gesture is implied and what it accompanies. "The demeanour in words and actions stemming from consciousness, consisting of verbal and bodily acting (*abhinaya*) governed by consciousness is called conscious"[42]. So we see here a certain escalation of the range of actor's expression. With the verbal demeanour it was just speech, with the conscious demeanour it becomes speech accompanied by bodily acting in the form of the *āṅgika abhinaya* i.e., conventionalised gestures and postures. This is how Abhinavagupta understood this problem when he stated *abhinayapradhānā sāttvatī*[43].

The definition proper of the delicate demeanour mentions in the first place that it is wonderful (*citrā*) due to fine costume and make-up of special type (*viśesa*). Next it should be in connection with women (*strīsaṁyutā*), should abound in dance and song and on the whole it should serve the creation of the enjoyment of love (*kāmopabhogaprabhavopacārā*)[44]. In what appears to be an alternate definition put in between brackets in the GOS edition of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, we additionaly find an information that this demeanour should be embellished with verbal compositions full of graceful words (*citrapadavākyabandhairalaṁkṛtā*) and should abound in laughter, tears and (feminine?) anger[45]. To put it differently, we can say, that this demeanour does not totally give up the verbal communication but that here it is subservient and serves rather ornamental ends[46]. Convenient analogy may be found in the sphere of the so called light music. In the popular songs words count less then tune, but they still have to be there. Thus, it is not accidental that song and dance play such an important part in this demeanour. With the presence of dance here a certain problem is connected. As we know the *āṅgika*

abhinaya does also characterise dance or at least some of its kinds. To define exactly the role of the *abhinaya* in dance we have to draw an analogy between a word and meaningful gesture. Like words in a popular tune similarly meaningful gestures in dance are indispensable but clearly subservient to the movement of human body as a direct expression of emotions. Nevertheless, if this does not suffice as a differentiating factor between the *abhinaya* of the conscious demeanour and of the delicate one, we can add that the *Nāṭyaśāstra* makes a distinction between *abhinayasaṁjñakāḥ karāḥ* and *nṛttasamāśrayāḥ karāḥ*[47]. Huge audiences sitting in rapture at the *bharatanāṭyam* recitals, while more than ninety per cent of them does not follow the "language" of the *abhinaya*, are an ample proof for the above thesis.

The definition proper of the violent demeanour tells us that in it there are long jumps with wielding of stage props like swords, shields and the like[48], (*pustāvapātaplutalaṅghitāni*), blows, feats of magic and manifold fights[49]. The preceding couplet adds to this picture some interesting information. Thus this demeanour should be full of intrigues and cunning and it should abound in bragging and false words (*bahukapaṭavañcanopetā, daṁbhānṛtavacanavatī*)[50]. Similarly the subsequent couplet connects this demeanour in a very interesting way with politics (*ṣāḍguṇyasamārabdhā*) and with gain or loss in the sphere of *artha* (*lābhālābhārthakṛtā*)[51]. Obviously this is the twin demeanour to the delicate one, for-as we remember-it is also prompted by emotion. In additon, it follows from the fact that in this demeanour the actor utilises stage props, that the meaningful gesture (*abhinaya*) here will have to be curtailed and made subservient to an overall emotional picture which it tends to create with all those violent movements, jumps, shouts, threats and impressive stage props. Consequently its verbal aspect may also be here limited mainly to abuse, bragging and lie. The Nā*ṭyaśāstra* in a very interesting way juxtaposes this demeanour with respect to the delicate one. For it connects the second with the sphere of *kāma* and the first with the sphere of *artha*. Yet the most important practical aspect of it, as well as of the delicate demeanour, is that plays or their fragments written with a view to be performed in one of these demeanours can resemble at times rough scenarios and most certainly used to be substantially elaborated in actual theatrical practice.

In order to make these demeanours still handier and their practical application easier, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* introduces the fourfold division of each one of them. The careful scrutiny of these sixteen categories yields interesting results, for they seem to indicate the particular moments of the theatrical action, which should preferably be couched in the given demeanour.

Thus the verbal demeanour should be employed in the laudation (*prarocanā*), which constitutes a part of the preliminaries (XX.28) and which-obviously, because of its laudatory and prayer-like nature, may best be expressed exclusively in terms of speech. The introduction

(*āmukha*) has similar requirements, since it is a dialogue which is supposed to introduce partly the main topic of the play. Additionally it is said in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* that any subdivision of the *vīthī* may be employed here (XX.30-31). Actually two out of the five subdivisions of the introduction are the *aṅgas* of the *vīthī* (XX.33) The remaining three have on the whole the same character, the only difference being their peculiar function of beginning the proper story by some sort of a wordplay. Let us see then what they are like. The elevating (*udghātyaka*) is the first. If men, out of respect, connect the utterances devoid of definite object with other utterances, it is called the elevating (XVIII.115-6). This, rather puzzling, formula appears to denote,in the light of Abhinavagupta's exemplification, a series of rhetorical questions put in such a way that they imply concrete problems or persons. The opening of the story (*kathodghāta*) is the second type of the introduction. It takes place when the protagonist enters the stage repeating what has been just said by the *sūtradhāra* (XX,35). The extra performance (*prayogātiśaya*) is, when the *sūtradhāra* arranges a play-within-play and only thereafter the protagonist enters (XX.36). The advance (*pravṛttaka*) is the entrance of the protagonist following and in connection with a description based on a suitable moment (XX.37). Finally the transference (*āvalgita*) is there where an action directed elsewhere achieves yet a different purpose (XVIII.116-7). In most of these categories word-play seems to be essential and in the remaining ones it certainly plays a very considerable part. As indeed it does in the remaining subdivisions of the verbal demeanour, which are the *vīthī* and the *prahasana*, NB. identical with the *rūpakas* of the same name. To my mind it is implied here that the *prahasana* and the *vīthī*, both in their capacity of an independent farce and sketch, as well as the farcical or sketchy scenes of larger plays should always be the domain of the verbal demeanour. For it is obvious that the witty conversation or monologue is the essence of both genres. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* itself acknowledges this interpretation, when it says in Chapter XIX.47 that the demeanour proper of the *prahasana*, the *vīthī* and the *bhāṇa* is the verbal one[52)].

The four subdivisions of the conscious demeanour seem to indicate that this demeanour should be resorted to in much tenser moments of the play than the moments when the verbal demanour is used. The first such moment is called the arousal (*utthāpaka*). It is the direct confrontation of the opponents, when they challenge themselves to show their prowess (XX.45). The second is the change of action (*parivartaka*), which occurs when one-due to some exigency-abandons the ends aimed at in the arousal and pursues another end (XX.46). I guess, this should be understood as stressing that all important moments of changing the decision as to the further action should also be couched in the conscious demeanour[53)].

The next subdivision of this demanour called the discourse (*saṁlāpaka*) consists of abuses and words full of passion. They might stem from agressievness, but not exclusively

(XX.48). Apparently all those emotionally highly charged moments are meant, when one speaks out one's mind and the words alone do not suffice. Their range has to be augmented by gesture but the situation does not yet reach the boiling point, when the words would actually lag behing the outburst of strong emotions and the violent demanour would be then required. The inserted couplet in the GOS edition of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (XX.49) brings in one more interesting and meaningful element of the situation by saying that it is also characterised by words arising from tension between *dharma* and *adharma*. Thus, all moments of profoundly ethical conflict would demand the conscious demeanour.

The last subdivision of it is called the breach (*saṁghātyaka* / XX.50), for it is that moment which brings in breach or separation either due to the force ingrained in a Vedic spell[54)] and in a command, or due to fate or else due to one's own fault[55)]. This subdivision practically means that the reflection span will predominantly be given expression to by means of the conscious demeanour. It is exactly at this moment that a breach, a separation and a dissension manifest themselves with full force. Such situations demand a verbalised expression, but as in the previous cases, it has to be intensified by means of the meaningful gesture, without which it would not have the sufficient emotional range.

The delicate demeanour is also subdivided into four categories. The first one is called the dalliance (*narman*). It should have three aspects : should be based on love, should be characterised by pure and virtuous behaviour averse to heroism (as the aesthetic taste-*rasa*) and marked by a lot of amusing utterances. Such dalliance is underpinned with jealousy and bad temper, full of acts of taunting, of self-reproach, while its characteristic feature is the separation (of lovers?) (XX.57-58). Structurally, this subdivision of the delicate demeanour would be mostly called for in the forehead-span (see p. 73) and also in the womb-span, which precisely furnish necessary circumstances for its application.

The next subdivision of this demeanour is called the outburst of dalliance (*narma-sphañja*). It is simply the first meeting and union of lovers. There are there the costumes and words exciting love, but it ends in apprehension (XX.59). As the example of the *Śākuntalā* of Kālidāsa indicates, this is the situation peculiar to both the forehead and the womb-span. The subsequent category of the delicate demanour is called the eruption of dalliance (*narma-sphoṭa*). It has a rather obscure definition, which says, that it is characterised by multifarious fractions of different states (*bhāva*) and by the insertion of the incomplete taste (*rasa*) (XX.60). What one may gather from this definition is, that the delicate demeanour should also be resorted to in all situations which are emotionally speaking nondescript. Such an interpretation could explain the fact that this definition uses altogether different categories in disharmony with the remaining three.

The covert dalliance (*narma-garbha*) is the last subdivision of the delicate demeanour. In it the hero characterised by intelligence, beauty, splendour and opulence, because

of some exigency acts *incognito* (XX.61)[56]. It is surprising that Abhinavagupta does not quote at this instance the example of the *Śākuntalā*. One would also be tempted to mention here the *Avimāraka* of Bhāsa where the covert dalliance has been given a very interesting shape.

The last is the violent demeanour and it has, of course, also four subdivisions[57]. The first one of them is called the compression (*saṁkṣiptaka*). It should have the adequate décor, should introduce many stage properties, variegated costumes and make-up, but its topic should be very brief or compressed (XX.68). This is, as a matter of fact, almost the definition of the violent demeanour proper and its most interesting point is the remark concerning the brevity of the topic (*saṁkṣiptavastuviṣaya*). We would understand it as referring to the brevity of the text actually elaborated through means of violent demeanour.

The description of the next subdivision of this demeanour sounds more definite. It says that the commotion (*avapāta*) is characterised by rising of fear or joy and consists of the behaviour peculiar to a predicament, to a calamity and to a confusion. Further, that it abounds in quick entrances and exits (XX.69).

The theme-raising (*vastūtthāpana*) subdivision is somewhat more cryptic. Its definition says that it is made of the composition of all aesthetic tastes, that it may be based on a predicament or not based on it and that it makes the theatre (*nāṭyam*) possible (XX.70). If the editorial preference of the GOS edition of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* could go unchallenged[58], we would have here indeed a very important element of theatre. One is tempted to say at this instance that according to the statement in question theatrical performance should begin with a bang not so much of a gong or a conch-shell, as in the Indian traditional theatre, but with the bang of the violent demeanour[59].

The last subdivision gives the description of all such situations, which resolve themselves into an open conflict and fight. This subdivision is called precisely the conflict (*saṁpheṭa*). It is supposed to give vent to anger and it is made of many fights, duels, intrigues and splits. Showering blows of weapons is the way in which it is exteriorised (XX.71).

When Manu lists those deserving honour and highest respect, he closes his list with the mother, saying that she deserves thousand times as much respect as the father (II.145). In the tradition, which accords to mother such an elevated station, the idea of motherhood cannot be used lightly. To say in India that something is like a mother to something else, means that it owes its very existence to the thing or the idea, which has been so called.

sarveṣāmeva kāvyānām mātṛkā vṛttayaḥ smṛtāḥ (NŚ.GOS. XVIII.5)

It is now obvious how justified is this enunciation. The very existential possibility of communicating through action lies at the root of all poetry. It is indeed *the communication*

incarnate. And this is so especially with reference to the so called poetry to be seen, i.e., the drama. The shape of this poetry depends on the particular means of communication that have been employed. Yet the fullest form of communication will be ensured, when all the means are yoked to a common cause, i.e., when a man speaks and behaves consciously and yet in accordance with the emotions felt, for the integrated man communicates best when he does this on the stage; it is then called a *nāṭaka* or a *prakaraṇa*.

The *vṛttis* are *par excellence* theatrical criteria. As we have tried to show, they are the fourfold way of communication through action and this is why they have been rendered by the word demeanour, contrary to the accepted practice of calling them the styles. From the point of view of their essence, they can be divided into two categories: rational and emotional. To the first cathegory the verbal and the conscious demeanour will belong. To the second-the delicate and the violent. The two aspects of human presence in action which make up these four demeanours are word and gesture. The first is basically an expression of reason, the second-of emotion. Yet due to changing mutual proportions, they form between these two poles a chiaroscuro pattern of the four demeanours. Altering the order accepted previously after the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, we submit that on the one hand the conscious demeanour represents this type of human action in which both the word and the gesture are prompted and controlled, above all, by reason. On the other hand, the delicate demeanour represents this type of human action in which both the word and the gesture are mainly controlled by emotion. The remaining two demeanours represent a less balanced state of things. In the verbal demeanour it is above all the word, that carries on the message of reason, the gesture being at the best spontaneous and hardly controlled consciously accompaniment of the word[60]. To the contrary, in the violent demeanour the gesture, as if intensified additionally by stage-properties, costume and decor is the most important transmission of emotion. The word (*vākya*) may even be-as Bhāsa puts it succinctly-*roṣāt pramattākṣara*, i.e., incoherent through anger (*Pratijñā*, IV.13). It will be then a gesture which-made more expressive with the help of weapon-will become the most adequate exteriorisation of emotions. Most obviously both in actual life and on the stage this pattern looses its sharp contours. The mutual ratio of reason and emotion fluctuates, but the absolute bearings are always there and one has to be conscious of them, when dealing with Sanskrit drama.

The fourfold subdivision of each one of the four demeanours describes in a rather practical way the main occasions for their application; occasions created by the development of action in its theatrical incarnation of the five spans. Much broader coordinates for their application emerge from corelating them with the three *puruṣārthas*. Thus *viṛttis* amply prove their pragmatic utility when a drama is analysed in order to be staged.

Footnotes :

29. The *Nāṭyaśāstra, Kāvyamālā* No. 42, Bombay 1943, p. 287 (XVIII.4). The word *prayogataḥ* of the text we render here "in actual theatrical practice". V. Raghavan in his article entitled The *Vṛttis* (JOR, Madras, vol N.VI, part IV, 1932, p. 354) discusses the import of the word also as interpreted by Abhinavagupta. He concludes that "*prayoga* is a comprehensive and fecund principle denoting the infinite passibility of creations of eternally varying types of dramas..." Here we feel that the application of this word, common in the NŚ, is to indicate theatrical practice of actual performance. This interpretation seems of fit well the present context.
30. Chapter I of the NŚ proves this well. We discussed this at length in our Concept of Ancient Indian Theatre, New Delhi 1974.
31. *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*, 3.2.1.18-23.
32. M.M. Ghosh, The *Nāṭyaśāstra*, transl., XXI.8-10, p.402 (NŚ. GOS. III, p. 86, XX. 9).
33. NŚ. GOS. III. p. 86 (XX.12).
34. Ibid. Also G.K. Bhatt in The origin of *Nāṭya* : Role of Śiva, Annals, BOR. Institute, vol. LVI, Poona 1975, p. 204 writes about this *vṛtti*-'that concentrated element of *abhinaya* where body and mind act in harmony'.
35. Op. cit., p. 87 (XX.13).
36. Op. cit., p. 87 (XX.14).
37. Raghavan, op. cit., vol. VII, part II, 1933, p. 96.
38. Op. cit., part I, p. 48.
39. NŚ. GOS. III. p. 91 (XX.26).
40. V. Raghavan (op. cit.) in his lucid study of the *vṛttis* discussed exhaustively the *nyāya* problem and concludes that this word must be taken "as the technical *paribhāṣā* (definition) of the dramatic world meaning the wielding of arms (*śastramokṣah*). (part I, p. 41) Further on he says : "Thus fight with and without arms but more especially with arms was being called *nyāya*" (p.42). We believe that this is exactly what the term meant originally. Yet, in the present context, it acquires the more generalised meaning of conventional gesticulation.
41. NŚ. GOS., op. cit., p. 96 (XX.41).
42. Op. cit., p. 97 (XX.42).
43. Op. cit., p. 70.
44. Op. cit., p. 100 (XX.53).
45. Op. cit., (XX.54-55).
46. The main message is communicated through extraverbal means and this is possible because this message concerns emotions.
47. NŚ. KM., op. cit., p. 168 (IX.175).
48. According to Abhinavagupta *khaḍgacarmavarmādi.* (NŚ. GOS., op. cit., p. 104).
49. NŚ. GOS., op. cit., p. 103 (XX.65).
50. Op. cit., (XX.64).
51. Op. cit., (XX.66). *Ṣaḍguṇa* according to Monier-Williams means the six measures to be practised by a king in warfare (viz. peace, war, marching, sitting encamped, dividing his forces and seeking the protection of a more powerful king).
52. The *Kāvyamālā* edition of the NŚ choses this reading. The GOS edition puts it in the footnote as a variant reading.
53. The inserted verse in the GOS edition of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (XX.47) adds that it is of three kinds: one which has definite topic (*nirdiṣṭavaṣtuviṣaya*), one which is put in the form of a ludicrous

dialogue (*prapañcabandha*?) and is furnished with three types of mirth (laughter ? *trihāsyasaṁyukta*) and finally one, which is made of some special rivalry (saṁgharṣaviśeṣakṛta).

54. The emendation of the *mantrārtha* into *mitrārtha* suggested by M.M. Ghosh seems to be uncalled for (The *Nāṭyaśāstra*, translated by, p. 406 (45, f.l.).
55. The inserted verse introduces the additional concept of the *kūṭasamghātya*, which contributes nothing substantial to what has been stated above (XX.51).
56. The inserted couplet (XX.62) in different words and in less clear manner seems to repeat the same thought.
57. It is interesting, why M.M. Ghosh persistently emends *aṣṭārdha* into *aṣṭārtha* and translates it as the eight meanings ?
58. Another possibility, actually chosen by M.M. Ghosh (XXII. 60, p. 409), is *kāryaṁ* (NŚ. GOS., v. III, p. 104).
59. The *Mudrārākṣasa* seems to be a good example here. Also the *Śakuntalā* with its first scene of the hunting chase may perhaps be quoted here.
60. The normal European practice exemplifies this well. The gesture on the European stage is not really much more than in everyday life. The traditional Indian theatre of Kerala interprets the verbal demeanour in a similar way. Mr. L.S. Rajagopalan from Trichur who has been taking very keen interest in the *Kūṭiyāṭṭam* wrote in a letter dated 9th of April 77 that : "The *vidūṣaka* in *Mantrāṅka* (Act III of the *Pratijñā* of Bhāsa)... does not use *mudrās* when reciting Prakrit passages or making any speech. I have confirmed this with Pandit Narayana Pisharoti also, but the Pandit wanted to make clear that the *vidūṣaka*-or for that matter any one using *bhāratī vṛtti*-used *laukika mudrā* (lay gestures), they do not use *śāstrīya mudrā* (scientific gestures as mentioned in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*)".

III. THE STRUCTURE *(SAṀDHI)*

The theatrical conception of action described in the form of the span (*saṁdhi*) theory is the result of a philosophical reflection upon action as one of the aspects of reality. Presenting here the relevant arguments necessarily couched in what may appear as a rather abstruse language, let me suggest a procedure of simultaneously reflecting upon any action, chosen at random, from our every day experience. Let it be for instance our going to the theatre to see the performance of the *Śakuntalā*.

Most obviously in order to embark upon the action, which will have as its purpose seeing the performance of the *Śakuntalā*, we need to be conscious of the fact that such a performance is actually taking place. Yet, simple registering of the relevant information does not belong to the process called 'an action', for even after having received the said information we may not feel sufficiently motivated to do anything about it, i.e., to act. Thus precisely feeling sufficiently motivated constitutes another element of the situation, which being the second precondition of action signifies at the same time its actual oncoming. Feeling is already an action, while knowing is not. Consequently we arrive at the point when we can say that it is consciousness (knowledge) activated by volition (feeling), which has the necessary potential to initiate an action. Starting from what appeared to be altogether different premises we have restated the main conclusion of our previous enquiry concerning the four demeanours, which as we did say it in so many words, function between reason ergo consciousness and emotion perceived in India as identical with volition[61)], We may repeat here that the four demeanours are as a matter of fact the four possible manners in which an action may express itself depending which of the two elements spoken above is dominant. Now, returning to our main topic we can say that the first phase of action lies in the sphere of feeling or volition. No action is possible without desire-one's own or somebody else's. This desire as we tried to demonstrate springs from consciousness. If an action ends at this phase it will deserve to be called a mere wishful thinking. What brings an action out of such an impasse is an effort on the part of the one who wishes. So an action enters its second phase of practical realisation thanks to an effort, which determines the character of this phase. If we wish to see the performance of the *Śakuntalā*, we have to go about securing tickets, transportation, etc. In a word we have to undertake concrete efforts

towards fulfilling our desire. Now, adequate efforts being undertaken, we can entertain a reasonable hope that our desire to see the said performance will bear fruit. Such a hope precisely makes the third phase of action, the dominating feature of which it becomes. We' have got our tickets, we have ensured the baby-sitter for our children, we' have told our friends that we shall be out tomorrow evening and we made sure that transportation will be provided for taking us from our home to the theatre. The situation is such that we may feel almost like already seeing the performance. But hope is only hope and when we reflect for a moment upon the nature of this notion and upon what makes it differ from the notion of certainty, we have to conclude that it is precisely uncertainty, danger and threat of nonachievement that are absolutely and invariably concommitant to hope. Hope and apprehension or frustration are the twin sisters, one cannot go without the other. The tickets bought and everything settled, the doubt persists whether tomorrow everything will be all right to permit us to go to the performance. This apprehension may remain in the mental sphere alone but it may also take a concrete shape of difficulties or hurdles, which will demand special efforts to overcome them. This is the fourth phase of action-the frustration phase at which our hopes may come to naught. The last phase coming after the difficulties are overcome is the phase of achievement at which the fruit of action is actually gained. This would be then the structure of action comprehended as a psycho-physical process. As we shall see, it is exactly in this manner that it was visualised by the ancient Indian theoreticians of theatre.

If we consider man as the central point of reference of reality-as indeed the Indian speculative thought always did[62)]-then his experience of action as outlined above has to be considered the very essence of human existence-the nature of man's world, outside of which in the sphere of transcendence there is nothing but inaction of the absolute plenitude.

In Chapter I of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* a verse is to be found which should be undoubtedly treated as the definition of the art of theatre. It says that the art of theatre is no more and no less than the nature of the world with its happiness and despair represented through acting (I.119). It should not come as a surprise then that the action becomes a pivotal notion of the dramatic theory, the more so as our discussion of the four demeanours has already anticipated this conclusion[63)].

The structure of action is considered in Chapter XIX of the GOS. edition of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*[64)]. The term used in this connection is the *itivṛtta*. Suggesting an interpretation of this word on the same lines with the well-known interpretation of the word "*itihāsa*" (history), we would render it in English as meaning "so it happened". Here it will not so much denote any particular event of the past as the essence of each happening-its inner structure or sequence[65)].

The elaborate structure of the plot, as from now on we shall call the "*itivṛtta*",

is built of two categories of elements. The first category is an idea of pure action called *kārya*. It constitutes the basis of a plot and it is divided into the five phases (*avasthā*). First comes the beginning (*ārambha*) with its most important feature of desire to act (*autsukya*) XIX.9). Next comes effort (*yatna*); as its very name indicates this is a phase characterised by a concrete effort undertaken as a result of the desire to act (XIX.11). It is now that due to earlier effort a hope of attainment of fruit is born. The final, fifth phase of fruition (*phalāgama*) XIX.13) is divided from that of hope with the fourth phase of frustration (*niyatāpti*) XIX.12)[66]. Concluding the description of the phase-scheme of action the *Nāṭyaśāstra* underlines that it is a universal concept aplicable to each and every action (XIX.14). Certainly there can be no action born of desire and aiming at its fulfilment which does not pass through these phases. The universality of this concept can be acknowledged, although to a Westerner its optimism might be somewhat presumptuous.

The idea elaborated above constitutes, as has been already said, a backbone of the plot, the flesh of which, if we may be permitted to continue this comparison, is described as the fivefold nature of the subject-matter (*arthaprakṛti*). The phase scheme describes action in its duration and the nature of the subject-matter scheme describes its texture of "thickness". In other words, the phase scheme underlines a purely linear aspect of action, which it acquires when seen in the perspective of time and space as a sequence of the five stages. On the other hand the concept of the nature of subject-matter takes note of the fact that the time factor, important as it is, should not falsify the true character of each and every action. For it would be naive to conceive of an action which lasts, for instance, five hours. The first hour would be dominated by desire, the second by an effort, the third by hope, etc. It is obvious that all these elements function simultaneously. Only at different stages different ones come to the forefront. It is precisely the elements of the nature of subject-matteṛ that express this idea. Strictly speaking the three out of the five of them, i.e., the germ (*bīja*), the drop (*bindu*) and the action (*kārya*). These are the correlative notions to the five phases. Naturally a question arises; how does it happen that the five phases found only three correlatives in the sphere of the nature of subject-matter ? Further, why the two other elements have been clumped together with the three ? Before we try to answer this query let us review briefly what the *Nāṭyaśāstra* has to say about each one of the *arthaprakṛtis*, as they are called in Sanskrit. The most important element of this scheme is called the germ (*bīja*). It is the germinal main matter of a plot, its clew, which at the beginning is as small as a seed and which grows or thickens until fruition while an action progresses (XIX.22). This is the most important aspect of the nature of subject-matter. The remaining four just describe it more minutely. A drop (*bindu*) is the second aspect of the nature of subject-matter which stands for the continuity of action or for its interrupted flow

(XIX.23). The next two categories to be described are, as has already been indicated, external to the germ in as much as they do not belong to it, but only help in its progression and development from outside. The first is the subsidiary plot (*patākā*) XIX.24) and the second is the episode (*prakarī*) or, maybe better, the chain of episodes, which may be inserted whenever necessary (XIX.25). The important stipulation of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* regarding the first one (subsidiary plot) is that if cannot last beyond the fourth phase of action (XIX.29). Finally there comes the last aspect of the nature of subject-matter with which we have already become familiar in its capacity of fivefold-phased action. The action (*kārya*) as the element of the nature of subject-matter stands for the continuous spirit of enterprise, an urge necessary to complete an action (XIX.26).

Scrutinizing closer the first two and the last one of them, we discover that the germ carries in itself, quite literally speaking, a very pregnant idea. A seed, in a way, is an epitome of the whole plant including its fruit, which it contains in *statu nascendi*[67]. The germ thus appears as the integrating factor of the whole action and since it is present, as we shall see, at each span of it, we can say that in a way it is an action outside time and space, an action which is at once the intention, the execution and the achievement. The germ, therefore, being the epitome of the whole action may be conveniently considered as a special correlative to its beginning and its end, i.e., to the first phase and the last one.

The action (the last element of the nature of the subject-matter) in turn consisting of the spirit of enterprise (*samārambha*) obviously is the correlative of the second effort phase. It would be rather an ungrateful task to show the exact moment during an action when desire ends and effort begins. It would be still more difficult-nay, imposible to show the moment when it ends, the very end of the play itself apart. The spirit of enterprise, of activity, the growth tendency ingrained in the seed is present right through the entire duration of action.

The third and the fourth phase find their correlative in the drop. As we saw, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* says that it is something which ensures continuity there where a breach comes in. This is quite clearly the situation when hope and frustration are alternately coming to the forefront. Evidently the greater an effort is, the stronger hope becomes and the more painful frustration proves to be. Yet both hope and frustration are already inherent in the very desire out of which the action springs. They are present there in the form of a drop of life-supporting fluid the necessary particle of humidity made of hope, which makes the sprouting of the seed possible inspite of all risks and hazards to which it is exposed.

The two remaining elements, i.e., the *patākā* and the *prakarī* have been added in recognition of the fact that there is no action which takes place in an absolutely sterile environment where it would not involve some parallel action (*the patākā*) or

would not criss-cross at different moments other actions, thus giving as the result the *prakarī* (or a series of them). The fact that the sum total of all these elements is five was certainly an additional reason of pooling them together and thus making good the sheer mathematical aspect of the whole theory so characteristic of the traditional Indian thinking[68]. Thus while the vertical division of the plot results in the phase-scheme, its horizontal division or rather its texture results in the fivefold nature of the subject-matter. The phase scheme projected unto the entire manifold nature of the subject-matter gives in effect a new category of five spans (*saṁdhi*) of the plot. The first span characterised by the variety of elements witnesses the origin of germinal subject-matter and is called the head span (*mukha-saṁdhi*) XIX.39) The second-a forehead span (*pratimukha-saṁdhi*) consists of the forceful manifestation of germinal subject-matter but with the reservation that it sometimes is visible and sometimes goes out of sight (XIX.40). The third span is called the womb span (*garbha-saṁdhi*) and its main characteristic feature is the flowering of the germinal matter and partial or rather transitory attainment of the fruit of action and repeated search for it (XIX.41). The reflection span (*vimarśa-saṁdhi*) follows. There is temptation, anger and disaster connected with the germinal matter inherent to it (XIX.42). In the last accomplishment span (*nirvahaṇa-saṁdhi*) all the elements of action including the germinal matter are brought together. The emotional integration inherent to a state of fulfilled desires duly ensues and the action ends (XIX.43). Even now, after the basic phase-scheme of action has been elaborated into the concept of the five spans, We can repeat out earlier conviction that it may be treated as an universal concept. At this stage its only explicitly Indian feature remains hidden in its total optimism a challengeable concept from the Westerner's point of view. Yet, once seen on a broader background of ideas current in the Indian world at that time it becomes an extremely interesting idea. Let me then at this turn risk a very short indeed exposition of these ideas. The *Ṛgveda* calls desire the first seed of mind (X.129). Simultaneous coming into existence of desire and multiplicity, between which there exists a sort of feedback relationship, is the basic presupposition of this mode of thinking. Prajāpati desired the second and so the second came into being. The very occurrence of Prajāpati's desire brought into being the second and consequently-multiplicity. That original eruption of energy plays in the universe of its own creation a very ambivalent role. For it is both *raison d'etre* of multiplicity and also the most powerful agent, which reintegrates it. Desire brought about the existence of multiplicity and desire brings about its merger. In the mechanistic vision of reality, which resulted, movement stemming from desire mysteriously (through the *tapas*) stirred itself up in the womb of Absolute. The centrifugal tendency started to operate keeping all innumerable particles of reality apart. At the same time that prime desire of Absolute to have Its counterpart, which lies at the bottom of the multiplicity of reality, found its own counterpart in the desire of all manifestations of reality to

marge with the Absolute. It is important to remember here that it is not conceived as any extra feeling, for instance, religious. All our desires represent it and the just fulfilment of them[69] releases us from the whirlpool of existence and brings back to wherefrom we emerged at the beginning of Time. There is no other way possible. Consequently an ultimate unity with the Absolute is our physically and otherwise determined destiny. This being so, still our experience teaches us that in actual life there may come about a situation so blatantly tragic that we cannot but be very suspicious about the palpability and logical coherence of the above proposition. This our reaction is inherent to those who represent a culture in which death is interpreted as a unique, irrevocable and final occurrence. In the Indian tradition death is repeatable. It simply separates different births, which constitute ever so many links in the chain of our existence. This existence will finally resolve itself in the fulfilment of all desires and in the perfect stasis achieved within the Absolute.

Now, the theatre is supposed to be the nature of the world-whole of it, complete and not circumscribed by one human birth. A spectator has to be shown on the stage in humanly perceivable form, the true shape of his complete existence including his innumerable reincarnations. He has to be shown what may be called a model action in its complete form. There is no way but to admit that with such a justification we hardly can call the integral optimism of the span structure presumptuous[70].

By now, let us hope, the particular Indian character of what we propose to call here action model has become abundantly clear. Yet, it is not all that the *Nāṭyaśāstra* has to say on the subject. After formulating the theory of spans it introduces still another category of span-elements (*saṁdhyaṅga*) (XIX.57-104), which in ever more precise and peculiar Indian way further defines Sanskrit drama as model action.

Sixty-four span-elements reflect faithfully the basic division of the five phases. Their character confirms whatever has been already said about the phases, including the controversial problem of the frustration phase. Broadly speaking, the entire sixty-four span elements can be divided in two categories. To the first all those will belong which do not directly define the psychological implications of existential situations but broadly indicate in technical terms the development of the plot. A poet is free to charge them with whatever emotional content he will. The remaining ones can be directly referred to existential situations and usually their emotional colouring is determined by their definitions. As it will be shown while analysing element-wise the *Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa*, the *Svapnavāsavadattā* of Bhāsa and the *Śakuntalā* of Kālidāsa they have not been understood by Sanskrit poets as single happenings following each other in the same order as they are discussed in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, but rather as motifs which may repeatedly reappear within one span or even occasionally outside it.

According to the span-element scheme the first element of the head span is the

suggestion (*upakṣepa*); it can also be rendered : the mention, allusion or hint. Invariably in the first span there has to be an allusion to the central problem, i.e., to the germinal matter of a plot and mostly it is to be found right at the beginning of the play. But it may also be repeated later on. Now, since action is a complex and diversified process, two further elements help a poet to remind us of it. These are the help (*parikara*) and the extension (*parinyāsa*). The first stresses the multiplicity and intricacy of coming events and the second the origin of this complexity. An element of the allurement (*vilobhana*) through a description of virtues of the subject-matter in hand makes action additionally attractive, forcefully enticing attention. During the course of the first span all elements of action should be sorted out and it should be decided how it is to proceed. This element of action is called the decision (*yukti*). The accession (*prāpti*) is another element of the plot-structure, which has to be taken care of during the head span. For it is precisely at this time that a suitable matter is determined, which should also be charged with optimism. This element is closely related to the following one, i.e., the settling (*samādhāna*) which marks the oncoming of the germinal matter of action. At this point the span-elements become less evidently connected with the technicalities of the plot-structure, instead they define more explicitly situations in terms of their psychological charge. For the arrangement (*vidhāna*) is supposed to infuse into an action an aspect of conflict consisting of happiness and despair. From the point of view of the definition of theatre quoted above this seems to be one of the most important elements of the plot. Natural in such condition is the element of contemplation or reflection upon the complexity of life called the contemplation (*paribhāvanā*), the effect of which should be-according to the *Nāṭyaśāstra* excitement followed by curiosity. Thus the said dual aspect of the matter of action obviously provokes an active attitude which makes the germinal matter grow or ascend and this constitutes an element of disclosure (*udbheda*). Now, an active attitude resulting from the element of contemplation fructifies in a concrete enterprise with regard to the matter of action, which there by makes up another span-element called the activity (*karaṇa*). Further fragmentation of action and deepening of divisions among its participants makes the element of dissension (*bheda*), which apparently is considered a natural concomitant of the span-element called the activity at early stages of action. Thus ends the head span. All the while we should remember that the main tendency of it is an ardent desire, eagerness and zeal (*autsukya*), but not without moments of anxiety and uneasiness.

The second span in accordance with its basic tendency which is the effort lists as the first element the manifestation (*vilāsa*) which means striving after love or any other satisfaction[71]. Consequently the twin span-element is introduced, that of pursuit (*parisarpa*) after an object of action, which at this stage most obviously cannot be in full view and alternately appears and disappears. Each pursuit tends to provoke the

resistance (*vidhūta*)-the next span-element mentioned in the *Nāṭyaśāstra,* which underlines that it is only an initial resistance. Yet, it is enough to cause perplexity (*tāpana*)-a span-element stemming from separation. This span-element with its aspect of separation ushers into the plot structure the delicate demeanour, which often characterises such situations. Therefore, the two following span-elements represent exactly this demeanour. The first is the dalliance (*narman*) introducing mirth or laughter for the sake of amorous pastime and the second is the splendid dalliance (*narma-dyuti*), which brings in the same as above, but in order to hide some mistake obviously in connection with love[72]. Another motif which the *Nāṭyaśāstra* considers characteristic of the span of the plot is conceived in the form of a span-element called the argument (*pragayaṇa*), which is construed as reply upon reply. Although at this stage no serious setback should take place, some hindrance (*nirodha*) may occur when some sort of mishap comes in the way. A following span-element called the pacification (*paryupāsana*) introduces into the plot a motif of conciliation of the angry and it anticipates quite clearly the womb span. The politeness (*puṣpa*) particularly of a verbal type should also characterise the second span of the plot. But by no means it should be the only note of this chord, which includes also a contrasting tune of obviously angry retort in the form of a span-element called the thunderbolt (*vajra*). The announcement (*upanyāsa*) being the result of a deductive process should also find its place within this span. The last element of the forehead span-the interconnection of characters (*varṇasaṁhāra*)-is of capital importance. As Abhinavagupta insists we should understand the term figuratively meaning, that all the protagonists and antagonists, i.e., the four *varṇas* of the play meet (XIX.32 commentary). The analysis of Bhāsa's *Svapnavāsavadattā* seems to point out to the fact, that what is meant here is not an actual scene in which all of them come together but rather a general tendency of this span to interconnect all the *dramatis personae* involved. Thus presents itself the forehead span of the plot built up on the phase of effort.

The middle, womb span should contain as its first (but by no means most important) element the fabrication (*abhūtāharaṇa*) consisting of deceitful words well balanced with a statement of truth in an element called the right way (*mārga*). Now, as if connected with these conflicting elements is an element known as the symptom (*rūpa*) which denotes a conjecture with regard to a collection of various matters. The exaggeration (*udāharaṇa*) is an element of rather ornamental value for it consists of exaggerated statements, but it does well express the high emotional charge of the middle span. Undoubtedly the apogee of the womb span as well as in a way of the entire plot is marked by a span-element called the chance (*krama*), for this element represents a motif of the attainment of what Abhinavagupta calls '*paramārtha*', i.e., the most coveted object of action, but in a sort of partial, illusory or mental way only. Such an optimistic note is most naturally accompanied by a motif of conciliation and generosity conceived as the element of

propitiation (*saṁgraha*). The atmosphere of this span is so charged with hope that desired shapes are readily inferred from surrounding shapes in a span-element called the inference *(anumāna)*. The element of supplication (*prārthana*) denoting a demand of love. joy and festive mood furnishes an excellent background for the happenings indicated in previous elements. The element of revelation (*ākṣipti*) of what has been so far hidden in the hearts of those particupating in the action also characterises the present situation. Hope of attainment appears in its full swing. But, after all, this is not yet the end of action-only its middle stage which is marked by a tinge of disappointment along with hope. Consequently the optimistic upward trend of action has to be marred with outbursts of heart-rending words in an element named the angry speech (*toṭaka*). This element marks the downward trend of the womb span expressed by the three remaining elements. The outwitting (*adhibala*) consists of overreaching through fraudulent moves and results in some dangerous situations, which in their turn cause fear of a king, an enemy or a robber in the form of the element of agitation (*udvega*). The last element of the womb span, the so called predicament (*vidrava*), links it with the subsequent span of reflection. For an apprehension caused by fear or terror makes it anticipate the events of the reflection span, the character of which is determined by the frustration phase.

Not unexpectedly the very first element of the reflection span is the reproach (*apavāda*), which is nothing else but proclaiming a crime or offence. Such an element is in harmony with the one that follows on the list. It is the confrontation (*saṁpheṭa)*, where angry words are exchanged[73)]. Next element in the same vein is that of an insolence (*drava*) shown even to those who normally would command high respect. Conflicting emotions seem to pervade this entire span. Thus the tense flow of action marked by the above elements is accompanied with conciliatory efforts aiming at the placation of opponents which make up the exertion (*śakti*). This in turn should be coupled with the perseverance or determination (*vyavasāya*) stemming from a vow. The conciliatory spirit, which might appear here and there in this rather tense span, is also expressed in an element called the reverence (*prasaṅga*), when those deserving praise are shown due respect. Yet elements of contention are by no means overshadowed by these peaceful efforts. The element of dazzlement (*dyuti*) full of words of contempt is closely connected with the element of distress (*kheda*), a natural concomitant of mental strain. This unrelenting pessimistic trend does not show signs of abating and the lowest ebb of action at the reflection span is marked with the forceful denial (*pratiṣedha*) of all that has been desired. It is accompanied by the effective blocade (*virodhana*) of action almost beyond recovery. Almost-for a concurrent stream of events so characteristic of this span makes action emerge from its tragic impasse by means of the effective grasping (*ādāna*) of the germ-oriented action. The rumblings of a just averted storm can still be heard in words of

contempt, but apparently they are used rather for the sake of the concealment (*chādana*) required by the exigencies of action. The last element listed anticipates with its optimism (*prarocanā*) the last span of action by representing an integration process of the so far rather diffused subject-matter.

The *Nāṭyaśāstra* has an injunction saying that of the five, three inner spans can be dropped because of some special reasons (XIX.18) Now the very first element of the accomplishment span seems to give substance to such a view being just a reappearance of the germinal matter in the same form as it had in the head span. It is for this very reason that this element receives the name of the span (*saṁdhi*). As we can see, the reflection span brings an abvious disruption of action. Therefore, one of the characteristics of the subsequent span must be to pick it up again and this is precisely formulated as the element called the awakening (*vibodha*). The element of assembling (*grathana*) to a degree runs concurrent to the former one, for it denotes setting about different tasks still ahead. This tendency of bracing oneself up for action which now emerges again from the low ebb of the fourth span is also connected with a certain retrospective tendency, which is expressed among other things in the narration (*nirṇaya*) in which past experiences are retold. Such an element, of course, furnishes an ample opportunity for the reprimand (*paribhāṣaṇa*) or censure apparently of those who have been responsible for what happened during the reflection span. At the same time this element marks an end to any tension which might have yet persisted. Now, everything calms and the matter achieved settles down in what may be understood as the element of final confirmation (*dhṛti*). A collection of such matters makes up another element called the joy (*ānanda*). A final passing of misery is indicated by the element called deliverance (*samaya*). The element of delight (*prīti*) which follows the *Nāṭyaśāstra* explains as manifesting itself in the form of kindness consisting of reverence. The apogee of this span from the point of view of emotional content has been conceived of as the element of mystery (*upagūhana*), which consists of an attainment of something wonderful (*adbhuta*). It we remember the stipulation of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* that the taste of wonder (*adbhuta rasa*) should always emanate from the acomplishment span (XVIII.43) then no more comments are required[74]. For this is undoubtedly the moment of a play when the audience should experience catharsis at its highest pitch. Whatever is left in the way of an action consists simply of winding up devices. As a matter of fact a proper action is exhausted with the element of mystery. The remaining sequence of action begins with the oration (*bhāṣaṇa*) having as its main theme conciliation, generosity etc. It is accompanied by the element of retrospect (*pūrvavākya*) reviewing in short the matter already dealt with. The bestowal of a boon makes up what is called an element of a termination (*kāvyasaṁhāra*) of the play[75].

The above analysis of man's functioning revealed what, at least from the Indian

perspective, seems to be unchallengeably universal in it, i.e., the concept of five-phased action, which became the very fundament of the plot division into the five spans. Since the spans appeared to be too general a notion, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* came out with a more detailed concept of the span-elements describing the regularities of the plot structure treated already as a homogeneous entity. This system is especially priceless as the *criterium* of the analysis of Sanskrit drama, for it betrays its specifically Indian provenience even more than the span structure itself does. Consequently it may well guide us in our attempt to draw the sinusoid of the hero's predicament and to pin-point exactly all ups and downs of the conflict, which involves him. It suggests where and for what we should look in a drama under analysis. As we can see, it may serve as a science of peculiar geometry or as a topographic chart of man's endeavour, or still better as the science of anatomy of action. Exactly as the anatomy says nothing about man as the creature subject to moral judgement, in the same way the span theory leaves out the entire moral or, more broadly speaking, ideological aspect of action which we-modern and alien recipients of it-are prone to judge from the stand-point of our own ethical principles (or their absence!), which more often than not are totally unsuitable for the task they are put to.

This is the reason for which we require a set of equally handy notions permitting us to analyse human action as presented in Sanskrit drama without imposing our own norms upon the behaviour of those who could have never been as much as aware of them; to say nothing about being motivated by them. The *trivarga* concept seems to supply this much needed key thanks to which we can have much deeper insight into the motivations of human behaviour represented in Sanskrit drama.

Footnotes :

61. This is apparent from the analysis of the semantic purview of the verb "*kam*". The phrase *Prajāpatir akāmayata* means both Prajāpati desired and felt, as indeed one can not desire without feeling.
62. We see the proof of it in the idea of the *ātman* and in that of Puruṣa-Prajāpati. In fact, in the exegetic literature we find countless references to man being a pivotal creature of the universe.
63. Here we owe a methodological explanation. Since the concept of action is so obviously central to the classical Indian theatre, we should have begun my enquiry by considering the action first and only then the demeanours. The reversed order in this case is an autcome of accepting as the starting-point the typology of Sanskrit drama, i.e., the *Daśarūpaka*, for which-according to the *Nāṭyaśāstra*-the demeanours constitute the matrix.
64. We have analysed this problem for the first time in Concept of Ancient Indian Theatre, Delhi 1974. Here we shall limit ourselves to a brief recapitulation of that analysis highlighting only some aspects of it, which we now see in somewhat different light (the *arthaprakṛtis*) and elaborating the span-element theory, which was barely touched in that book. The basic difference is that there it was a part of the general theory of the theatre and here it is supposed to serve as one of the criteria of the analysis of Sanskrit drama.

65. Op. cit., p. 102.
66. Op. cit., p. 104-112, where we have given reasons for this rendering of the term.
67. The meaningful phrase of the ascetics in the *Śakuntalā* : "*sarvathā cakravartinaṁ putram āpnuhi*" is, maybe, the finest instance, in the whole of the Sanskrit dramatic literature, of the germ. These words repeated twice by the hermits are indeed like a seed sown to bear fruit, which will become the true and the final fulfilment of Duṣyanta's desires.
68. A. Daniélou. Les quatres sens de la vie, Paris 1976, pp. 69-72.
69. The just fulfilment signifies the fulfilment in all three spheres of ethics simultaneously. See next chapter.
70. The *Śakuntalā* once again emerges as the most subtle and the clearest example of such an understanding of existence.
71. Not only in the case of the *vilāsa*, but also in some other cases we differ in our rendering into English of the terms in question from what M.M. Ghosh suggests in his translation of the Nāṭyaśāstra. The *vilāsa* for instance rendered "amorousness"-would unnecessarily be limited to erotic plays only.
72. These two span-elements rendered in English by M.M. Ghosh as the joke and the splendid joke are puzzling because of substantial terminological coincidence with the subdivisions of the delicate demeanour. In the case of *narman* demeanour and *narman* span-element their definitions differ. In the case of *narma-dyuti* there is certain similarity with the definition of *narma-garbha*, but the different epithets added to both cannot be superfluous. In order to make the picture complete we must say that Abhinavagupta does not comment upon this coincidence; apparently he does not see here any connection.

    To our mind the *Nāṭyaśāstra* would have invented absolutely different terms if it did not intend some connection here. In both the categories laughter or mirth (*hāsya*) is obviously playing a considerable part. But while in the case of delicate demeanour, the love aspect is underlined, in the case of two span-elements-at least as seen by Abhinavagupta-this aspect is absent. We would use then a following argument in order to come out of the impasse. First of all it seems that one of the variant readings *(krīḍāvilobhanārtham)* suggests that *krīḍā* 'should be taken here in its particular meaning of *ratikrīḍā*. In the case of the second span-element we have also a complementary variant reading *ratinarmkṛta*.... Thus both these variants introduce an erotic aspect present also in the delicate demeanour. It seems, therefore, obvious that the two spane-elements signify the presence of the delicate demeanour in the head span and that they should, therefore, be rendered by the expressions "dalliance" and "splendid dalliance". This interpretation is an improvement in the light of the concept of the *vṛttis*-of the one offered in the paper entitled: Sanskrit drama as an aggregate of model situations and presented at the Sanskrit Play-in-Performance Seminar at the University of Hawaii in 1974.
73. This element signifies the presence of the violent demeanour here, for one of the subdivisions of this demeanour is called the *saṁpheṭa*.
74. May-be only one, viz. that the *Nāṭyaśāstra* by assigning the taste of wonder to Brahmā, its highest deity and by placing it at the end of the list seems to attach rather exeptional importance to this taste.
75. To our mind the *praśasti* should not be considered a *saṁdhyaṅga*. The GOS. edition gives to it the same number as to the *kāvyasaṁhāra* (vol. III, p. 31 (XIX.104). See also V.M. Kulkarni, The conception of *saṁdhis* in the Sanskrit drama., Journal of the Oriental Institute, University of Baroda, vol. V, June 1956, No. 4, pp. 389-402.

IV. THE THREEFOLD SPHERE OF ETHICS *(TRIVARGAŚṚṄGĀRA)*

Practically speaking, after what has been already said, it is not necessary to argue specially that drama, or broader-the art of the theatre (*nāṭya*), is human behaviour reenacted on the stage. Nevertheless, let us, just in any case, adduce some other relevant arguments. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* says that the art of the theatre was created as a mimicry of action of men, good, bad and indifferent (I. 112-113). Earlier, among various aspects embraced by the art of theatre there are listed the three *puruṣārthas* interspersed with play (*krīḍā*), peace (*śama*), mirth (*hāsya*), fight (*yuddha*) and slaughter (*vadha*) (I.108), Although Abhinavagupta in his commentary on this passage does not explicitly identify these three with the *puruṣārthas*, yet, exemplifying it, he says that a *nāṭaka* is as a rule *dharmapradhāna* and a *prakaraṇa-arthapradhāna*[76]. Abhinavagupta has already said it is so many words that *nāṭya* directs the minds of men towards the fulfilment of the four *puruṣārthas*[77]. In Chapter XVIII he also employs this term profusely. Very interesting is, among other things, his comment in connection with the definition of a *nāṭaka*. He takes the *vibhūtis* of the hero of this type of *rūpaka* as denoting the four *puruṣārthas*. He also takes the *ṛddhi* of the same *śloka* for the equivalent of *artha*, while the *vilāsa* for the equivalent of *kāma* (XVIII.11). The next instance worth quoting in this connection is his comment on the concept of the *triśṛṅgāra* belonging to the definition of the *samavakāra* and already alluded to in Chapter I of the present study. There are four *ślokas* (XVIII.72-75) that interest us here. The first one is general and says that fascination (*śṛṅgāra*)[78], the purpose of which is determined through the application of different actions, should be made of three kinds, i.e., the fascination with Virtue, the fascination with Welfare and the fascination with Love. Then the *Nāṭyaśāstra* defines the fascination with Virtue, It says that the fascination where there is a lot of practices leading to Virtue and for the good of the self, full of vows, discipline and mortifications, is known as the fascination with Virtue. The fascination with welfare in turn is the desire of attaining welfare in all its numerous forms[79] or it is love for the sense-objects connected with the union with women which takes place for the sake of Welfare. Finally the fascination (the subject) of which is the passionate consummation either gentle or violent-of a man and a woman in union, involving seduction of a virgin is called the fascination with Love[80].

There is one observation which has to be made in connection with the above formulae. Although they are not the definitions of the three *puruṣārthas*, but only the descriptions of the ways in which the three *puruṣārthas* should be treated in a particular type of *rūpaka* called a *samavakāra*, yet, as we shall see later, they are fairly close to what can be considered their definitions proper. It is precisely the fact that they have been considered in such a comprehensive way only on the occasion of describing a *samavakāra* that has provoked our objections. In the light of what Abhinavagupta has to say on the subject these objections seem to be rather justified. For he writes : *anyarūpakānāṁ tu trivargopāyatvam nāsty ekāṅkatvāt*, thus indirectly acknowledging that this criterium should also be applied to other *rūpakas*, the only difference lying in the fact that a *samavakāra* has each of its three acts dealing with one of the *puruṣārthas*. Last but not least, there is one more statement of this illustrious commentator of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* which deserves to be adduced here. It is the very last sentence of his commentary of the *Daśarūpalakṣaṇa* chapter of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. *Tatraiṣāṁ pumarthopayogo nijanijalakṣaṇāvasare darśita eveti...* . *Tatra* refers to the chapter in question and *eṣām* refers to the ten *rūpakas*. Thus we can see that the utility of the ten *rūpakas* for the *puruṣārthas* is in the centre of Abhinavagupta's attention. Concluding, we can say that for Abhinavagupta the relation of *nāṭya* and the *puruṣārthas* was as good as granted in a way similar to that shared by S.N. Shastri. Commenting on one of Bharata's lines defining a *nāṭaka* he says that the several *vibhūtis* mean and include piety (*dharma*), wealth (*artha*), pleasure (*kāma*) and absolution (*mokṣa*)[81)] thus obviously sharing the opinion of Abhinavagupta without acknowledging it though. He also quotes the *Mandaramarandacampū*, which states that a *nāṭaka* should have for its main sentiment the erotic actuated by motives of *dharma*, *kāma* and *artha*[82)]. But undoubtedly the *Bhāvaprakāśa* makes the most of the connection between the *puruṣārthas* and drama. It sees a direct relationship between the *rasas* and the *puruṣārthas*. It insists that *śṛṅgāra* and *adbhuta* are useful for *kāma*, *vīra* and *raudra* for *artha* and *karuṇa* for *dharma*, while *bhayānaka*, *bībhatsa* and *hāsya* depending on the state of mind of the hero, pertain also to one of the three *puruṣārthas*. It concludes that the usefulness of the *rasas* for the *trivarga* determine their appearence in a play[83)]. Somanchi Ramulu, whose opinion we are quoting, adds elsewhere a very interesting definition of poetry (unfortunately he does not quote the source of it). According to this definition poetry is a word which in terms of *rasa* propounds the *puruṣārtha*[84)]. Apart from this it is perhaps needless to go thus far in apportioning more or less technical aspects of art to different *puruṣārthas*. But the attempt in itself is interesting. It proves beyond doubt the close relationship of the concept with literature in general and drama in particular. The whole problem is most pointedly summed up by K. Krishnamoorthy when he says that no human activity could be justified when there was no harmony of the other three values (*trivarga*) with that of *mokṣa*,

and it was precisely this harmony that literature and art endeavoured to bring home to every one in an appealing fashion[85].

Whatever has been said above justifies us in drawing a following conclusion : that as in actual life similarly on the stage, or in a literary work in general, human action can be judged in India exclusively in terms of its positive or negative relevance to one of the three *puruṣārthas* and in terms of its attunement with the theoretically postulated harmony of the three. Thus any attempt to evaluate ideological or better ethical import of a Sanskrit play without taking into consideration the *trivarga* and without pondering over conflicts among the demands of Virtue, Love and Welfare as Medhātithi teaches would lead us astray and would make us impute to these plays values or blemishes which they do not possess[86].

At this moment one can say that it is easier said than done, for the concept of *puruṣārthas* by no means belongs to those aspects of Indian tradition which have been properly and universally understood outside India and clearly defined within its boundaries. For in fact there possibly was no separate work giving a theoretical exposition of the concept of the threefold sphere of human existence, the so called *trivarga* or *puruṣārtha*[87]. It becomes even more puzzling, since this concept has been very often employed both in the ancient theoretical literature and in belles-letters, while compiling anthologies of poetry for instance[88]. Perhaps this has come about because the entire concept was so obviously natural to the Hindus that in their eyes it did not require theoretical justification. Yet, it might be more prudent to suppose that such work existed and later sank into oblivion. That it might have been so is supported by the undisputed fact of the Hindus being exceptionally keen on precise investigation and description of problems belonging to this category. Moreover, we find various remarks concerning the threefold sphere- or even longer deliberations on the subject in many a treatise[89]. It is exactly in one such treatise, the famous *Kāmasūtra*, that Chapter II, Part I and Chapter VI, Part VI give an exposition of the theory of the threefold sphere, i.e., Virtue (*dharma*), Love (*kāma*) and Welfare (*artha*)[90]. Despite it all, certain vagueness of this theory in India even in the most recent work on the subject by P.V. Tripāṭhī[91] is quite obvious. This situation has improved considerably since the publication of a very imaginative and profound study of Allan Daniélou. This book entitled Les quatre sens de la vie[92] is undoubtedly one of the best and the most comprehensive treatments of the subject[93]. We managed to secure a copy of it only after the present detailed view of the subject had already been formulated. It appeared that the basic contours of the problem have been drawn in both cases in a very similar fashion. This certainly proves the objective value of the concept of *puruṣārthas* as a criterium of analysing human behaviour. Yet, there is one considerable exception, i.e., the treatment of *mokṣa*. In this connection the criticism levelled against Daniélou's treatment by Philippe Lavastine in his lucid

paper on the *trivarga* may be quoted[94]. He writes : "... this idea that there are four "meanings of life" like four castes, four seasons, etc... although it has become "traditional", it is not an idea or a primary vision (Veda). This is not the Vedic notion." (p. 69). The idea of *mokṣa* has been omitted in this study because its altogether different character places it on the summit of the three *puruṣārthas* and never in one line with them. This somehow has been acknowledged by Daniélou, when he says that *mokṣa* may be reached via three ways corresponding to the three *puruṣārthas* (pp. 159-161). What is really meant here is reaching this goal through these three ways simultaneously and in concert. This, as well as some other differences,[95] would simply point to the fact that Daniélou is concerned with the modern Indian understanding of the entire notion, while it has been influenced and in a way "perverted"- as Lavastine would have it- by the ascetic tradition of *nivṛtti*, which is responsible for advocating *mokṣa* as the one and preferably the best of the four *puruṣārthas*. It is this *puruṣārtha*, according to this way of thinking, that should above all command our attention and energy to the obvious detriment of the other three. Now, since our concern is to find out a key to the analysis and evaluation of human action as presented in the classical Sanskrit drama, we have to concentrate on the earlier phase of the development of this idea as presented in the *Manusmṛti*, in the *Kāmasūtra* etc. We feel therefore justified in presenting below our own understanding of the *trivarga*.

Let us then begin by referring to Karl Potter, who suggests the word "attitude" as that which most adequately expresses the common connotation of what we call above the three spheres. Thus the attitude in the sphere of Welfare Potter defines as that of minimal concern usually adopted towards all these objects or persons, or even ourselves, which are manipulated in making a living[96]. The attitude in the sphere of Love, in turn, Potter describes as that of passionate concern toward anything in the world. According to him the most characteristic feature of this attitude is an element of possessiveness that one has for the object of one's attentions and dependance upon the object that is loved[97]. Finally, the same scholar defines the attitude in the sphere of Virtue as that of maximal concern and as that of treating things commonly thought of as other than oneself-as oneself and in a spirit of respect. In other words it is an attitude of concern for others as a fundamental extention of oneself[98]. The American scholar has made substantial and difficult step forward towards the interpretation of these extremely interesting concepts for the contemporary world. The way he propounds his theory makes the three attitudes fall into one coherent whole. Nevertheless, both the necessity of altering, without sufficient explanation, their traditional hierarchy (Love is the least important sphere, usually mentioned at the end) and his complete disregard in this connection of the Indian viewpoint which, contrary to Potter's assumption, is to be found in Indian texts[99], make that even accepting the basic premisses of his interpretation, one feels

justified to adopt different approach, which, it may be, will more precisely show the meaning of the threefold sphere concept.

The first lesson of the "Treatise on Virtue" (*Mānavadharmaśāstra*) contains a very interesting cosmogonic account. Unmanifest Absolute creates thought (*manas*), which related to the subject of creation, i.e., the Person (*īśvara*) is defined as self-awareness or self-consciousness (*ahaṁkāra*). This consciousness directed outwardly becomes the great self (*mahāntamātmānam*) or, according to Medhātithi, perception (*saṁjñā*) of all that, which consists of the three aspects (*guṇa*) and constitutes reality subject to sensory perception. After that, the five senses are created-the receptors of external objects. Finally an aggregate of perception, of five senses and particles proper of the Creator himself infused with life become flesh (*śarīra*)[100]. Consciousness in this image is an element which makes perception possible. We would even say that perception is simply active consciousness. It further follows from the cosmogonic portion of the "Treatise on Virtue" that consciousness already belongs to the immanent aspect of Absolute. It, is therefore, a category of discursive reality. Senses make contact between consciousness and reality possible. Life is the substratum of senses. Now, three aspects should be pinpointed in this sequence of creation : first-an aspect of consciousness, second-an aspect of emotion (senses) and third-an aspect of material existence (life). For these are the aspects which express human existence in its totality. But exactly because of being human they have to be characterised by incompleteness. In other words as categories of discursive reality they are characterised by a sort of positive or negative charge which awaits its neutralisation. This neutralisation is nothing else but rediscovery of fullness of the Absolute. Thus a question arises : how does this come about in the shpere of consciousness, how in the sphere of emotion and how in the sphere of material existence ?

Feeling somehow authorised by the cosmogonic vision of Manu, where the image of golden egg is introduced, let us imagine the Absolute reality as a circle. Its self-breaking into two is the basic and primary act of creation. It is the first phase of a process of further multiplication. As the result of it our circle changes into a sort of jigsaw puzzle. Scattering of this puzzle about is "the death" of the Absolute and is an archetype of each and every death. On the other hand, it is precisely the source of discursive reality. Yet, at the same time, the Absolute continues unchanged.

Man is one of the scattered pieces of this "puzzle". Consciousness deposited in him is yet another one. Perception of incompleteness of all pieces of this puzzle-reality brings home to consciousness its own incompleteness. Arranging this puzzle into one harmonious whole, through action determined by the vision of this whole, brings about fulfilment of consciousness, which manifests itself as its satisfaction. We feel satisfied, for we have discharged our duty, consequently we can say that we belong to reality for which we have consciously opted. Both we ourselves and all other pieces of puzzle-

reality mutually fit well, including our own consciousness.

As we have mentioned earlier, our consciousness comes in contact with discursive reality through the agency of senses. Consequently, under normal conditions, satisfaction of consciousness has to be accompanied by the satisfaction of senses. This satisfaction manifests itself as the feeling of delight (*prīti*). In this case too our action has to be in harmony with the vision of the whole reality. For true delight, i.e., such which delights consciousness as well, can come about as a result of satisfying senses in harmony with the true vision of reality.

Life is "the soil" on which senses grow. Thus the satisfaction in the sphere of material existence constitutes the last aspect of human existence. The pieces of puzzle-reality propelled by the centrifugal creative energy made active in the first act of division tend towards further multiplication and towards creating new beings at the cost of the former ones. Consciousness which in this chain of multiplication is present in sufficient measure only in man[101)], has to defend itself at the level of physical existence. Therefore, it tries to keep together these elements which constitute man. This precisely is the urge to live which also in man manifests itself as search for proper life conditions and, before all, in answering the challenge of hunger and thirst. The sphere of satisfaction of consciousness the Hindus call Virtue: that of satisfaction of emotions-Love and the one of satisfaction of material existence-Welfare.

Śankarācārya in his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* calls Virtue "a perceptible reason of the development and liberation of living beings"[102)] underlining by the same the role of this sphere in attaining ultimate human goal, which, above all, consists of the satisfaction of consciousness (*mokṣa* is just final and complete satisfaction of consciousness). Since from the point of view of chronology the Vedic concept of *ṛta* is antecedent to the concept of Virtue[103)], it will not be out of place here to begin the closer characteristic of the Indian conception of Virtue with the description of this earlier concept. According to Radhakrishnan the exact meaning of *ṛta* is "the course of things". "It stands for law in general and the immanence of justice. This conception must have been originally suggested by the regularity of the movements of sun, moon and stars, the alternations of day and of night, and of the seasons. *Ṛta* denotes the order of the world. Everything that is ordered in the universe has *Ṛta* for its principle"[104)]. One may remember here that from the etymological point of view speaking this word is connected with the Latin "ars, artem" which also implies harmony. We can safely conclude, therefore, that *ṛta* is harmonious *modus operandi* of reality. And further, since *ṛta* establishes moral norms, naturally enough it becomes morality itself. Good man tread the path of *ṛta*. Varuṇa, a perfect example of a follower of ṛta, is *dhṛtavrata*-one of fixed resolve[105)]. It is here that in connection with *ṛta* the verbal root *dhṛ* appears, which means to support, to preserve and from which the word *dharma* is derived[106)]. *Dhārayate lokam iti dharmaḥ*-

supports the world, therefore (it is called) *dharma*[107]. *Dharma*, i.e., Virtue, not unlike *ṛta* is "the fundament of the entire world. All people repair to the man of Virtue. One removes sins through Virtue. All is fixed in Virtue. Therefore Virtue is declared as the highest". These words are taken from the *Taittirīyā-āraṇyaka*[108]. Equally interesting is the definition of Virtue to be found in the *Kāmasūtra* according to which Virtue means following the precepts of science (*śāstra*)[109]. Here we touch upon the most important problem. For this definition describes Virtue as an attitude in action. If we add that in India. like in European culture, an equation mark was put between science and truth, we can safely say that Virtue means to live according to, and in harmony with, what is considered scientific, ergo true image of reality. It is exactly on this that the satisfaction of consciousness depends. Since I know that reality is such and such, I shall, therefore, consider myself just, rightful and virtuous, if I act accordingly. It is no lesser an authority than Manu himself who says that among men-brahmins are the best, among brahmins-learned men, among learned ones-those who hold strong convictions and among the last-those who act according to their convictions[110].

Here we could consider the issue to be finally clarified, had we not mentioned earlier the etymology of the word *dharma*. It ascribes to this concept a sort of independent existence and a function of supporting universe[111]. First of all it has to be stated that both *dharma* and earlier *ṛta* do not mean acting according to the universal order alone but, at the same time, define this order, or still better-are this order. If we add that, right from the Vedic period, there has been inherited and elaborated a conviction that fulfilling or failing to fulfil one's individual virtue has a direct bearing on the universal order, then we shall have a complete picture of this concept. Most obviously it has, for many of us today, a certain mystic taint. Although we would insist that nowadays it is already easier for us to approve of this. After all, the behaviour of an individual who finds himself in a sufficiently nevralgic point of our civilisation (proverbial button of nuclear missiles), undoubtedly will have an influence upon what from human perspective is already universe. Similarly it is now easy to accept a proposition that the sum total of individual behaviours will exert positive or negative influence upon the surrounding world. Our recent ecological problems supply many an eloquent proof of this. The mixing of castes (*varṇasaṁkara*) was in the Indian context understood exactly in this way. For Hindus in ancient India believed that mixed marriages and resulting mixture of castes would lead their society to a total ruin[112].

Summing up what has been hitherto written, we can say that satisfaction of consciousness within the framework of involved Virtue[113] means being "all right" in relationship to reality and its laws described in science (*śāstra*). The next query concerns characteristic features of this description and consequently a more precise analysis of Virtue itself.

The basis of the description of reality in ancient India and the source of the entire

science is Revelation (*śruti*) or Veda[114]. The basic category of Revelation is Sacrifice (*yajña*). According to the exegesis it is a perfectly adequate equivalent of reality; it is its archetype and it is reality itself. Various ritualistic forms of sacrifice signify conscious acceptance of such a vision of reality on the part of man. Therefore, the central problem of Virtue will be participation or cooperation in the harmony of reality through ritual. For ritual supplies consciousness with a chance to arrange properly its relationship with true reality. Now, since areas of conscious existence, so to speak, demarcate our humanness, therefore, the more areas of existence are ritualised, the more human we become. Thus, if our life is to be really human it has to be ritualised "from conception untill cremation"[115]. And of course it has to be virtuous, i.e., lived in agreement with the true vision of reality.

It is not easy to determine the hierarchy of various norms of Virtue. Nevertheless, it seems that the idea of man being born with three debts, i.e., the debt towards sages, the debt towards gods and the debt towards ancestors[116] can be made a point of departure. Manu says that man should not think about liberation unless and until he discharges these debts[117]. The debt towards sages is repaid by studies, the debt towards gods-by offering sacrifices and the one towards ancestors-by begetting progeny. All this is being done by an individual in a definite social and individual context, which in India was defined as *varṇāśramadharma*. Virtue is a differentiated concept depending on social order (*varṇa*) and on age (*āśrama*)-literally phase of life[118]. As a matter of fact the entire life is subordinated to these two basic criteria. Out of six categories of Virtue that are usually enumerated[119] only the universal Virtue, which consists in avoiding backbiting, jealousy, pride, egoism, unbelief, crookedness, self-praise, abuse of others, deceit, covetousness, delusion, anger and envy concerns all and always. To the contrary all what makes up the five remaining categories can be arranged according to these two criteria. For instance the individual sacraments[120], methods of study (*adhyayana*), purity (*śauca*)[121], purification (*śuddhi*)[122], charity (*dāna*), dietetical regulations (*bhakṣyābhakṣya*), Virtue of women (*strīdharma*), conjugal Virtue (*strīpuṁdharma*), legislation and courts (*vyavahāra*), Virtue in times of distress (*āpaddharma*), expiation for sins (*prāyaścitta*) etc. Now, generally speaking ritualisation of life as an expression of human consciousness does not provoke special resentment among Europeans. Yet, it looses some of its persuasiveness while confronted with concrete Indian examples, as for instance, cleanliness and purity (*śauca*). Still, we would insist that submitting personal toilet to ritualistic discipline has its profound justification. The description of the bath (*snāna*), which we can find in treatises on Virtue, shows that each aspect of it is either accompanied, followed or preceded by recitation of the appropriate text from the Vedic Revelation. Thus, for instance, rinsing the mouth, touching water with a finger, taking water into cupped palms, rubbing the body with earth (instead of unknown

soap), plunging in water, emerging from it and so on, take place to the accompaniment of recitations, even if nonvocalised only[123]. This type of procedure excludes unconscious functioning, spontaneous and uncontrolled reactions so characteristic of the world of animals. Consequently living our lives according to the norms of Virtue, i.e., as ritual, results in satisfaction of consciousness similar to the one which in our culture characterises the state of consciousness following well fulfilled duty. Most obviously one can challenge the vision of reality, which in India expressed itself in such-for us often incomprehensible-ritual. Here one can also, with much justification, point to a danger of pharisaical attitudes. Nevertheless, the proposition itself seems sufficiently viable and rather interesting. We want to be all right with respect to the true reality. We want to behave according to norms which express the true mechanism of reality, for then we feel that the jigsaw puzzle-as we have called it-falls into one whole, that its different pieces fit each other and that we ourselves have a share in the harmony of the universe.

It has already been mentioned that consciousness fulfils itself in harmony. Virtue is both the method and the expression of the fulfilment. The contact of consciousness with reality comes about through the agency of senses. Consequently in the sphere of sensorial contact with it there also has to come about a sort of fulfilment or satisfaction. Satisfaction in the sphere of senses, i.e., in the emotional sphere can simply be called pleasure or delight (*prīti*). Hindus call the sphere of this satisfaction-Love (*kāma*). The *Mahābhārata* says that delight, which five senses together with mind and heart find in the surrounding world of objects, is called Love and it is the highest fruit of action[124]. Very similar to this one is the definition to be found in the famous treatise of Vātsyāyana : "Love is a just inclination of the senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch accompanied by mind and prompted by heart, towards respective objects. Sexual pleasure results from a particular contact with the object of senses. It is full of joy stemming from love relationship and it fructifies in seed. Since it is the very first among other delights, therefore, this entire sphere of life has come to be known as Love"[125]. It hardly can be doubted that as much as we want to be "all right" towards reality, so much so-or even worse-much more so, we desire to sense this harmony as delight. Often-due to our ignorance-even against its norms formulated as Virtue. What in the sphere of Virtue, i.e., of consciousness is simply harmony, in the sphere of Love is beauty. It is not without reason that the etymological relationship between the word *ṛta* and the word *ars, artem* has been mentioned earlier. The first is the category of Virtue, the second-that of Love. Both are different "incarnations" of the same harmony.

The *Kāmasūtra* definition of Love convincingly justifies the erotic bias of this sphere. Yet, we should not forget that, practically speaking, this sphere is unlimited. Manu, for instance, stresses that although it is not praiseworthy to live prompted by desire, yet in this world nothing comes about that is not prompted by desire. Subsequently

he adds, as if invoking the formulae from the Ṛgveda about desire being the first seed of mind, that desire with its roots reaches imagination and it truly is the Sacrifice that is born of imagination[126]. It is necessary to explain here that in both cases the same word is involved (kāma = Love = desire). As a matter of fact it is the same idea and only because of its very broad semantic range this word has to be translated in different ways.

Concluding, it has to be said that from such point of view Love acquires on par with Virtue, importance and meaning. Later on, dominated by erotics, this concept was degraded to a role of the third and the least important sphere of human existence. For out of the three only the sphere of delight, i.e., that of Love-at least superficially judging-can be eliminated. It is, of course, possible only when we take it in its capacity of erotic delight and not of the function about which Manu speaks.

In the cosmogonic chain of elements, the element of material existence comes as subsequent to senses. It is, in our case, the last sphere, in which consciousness finds its satisfaction. "That is called Welfare (*artha*) what makes anything undertaken end in success"[127]. This is the broadest definition of the third-if we accept the cosmogonic order-sphere of human existence. A different definition-though only apparently-is given by the *Kāmasūtra*. "Acquiring and multiplying different skills, land, gold, cattle, riches, everyday utensils and friends is called Welfare"[128]. It is beyond doubt that success in an enterprise is the very condition of Welfare. Welfare in its turn is-as Kauṭilya (I.7) would have it-a root of both, Virtue and Love[129]. It is impossible to negate that in order to practice both, it is necessary to live decently, i.e., to fare well-not only exist in a way similar to that of animals but lead human life. Thus the need and will to live is the propelling factor of this sphere and its foremost characteristic feature is life in its very physiological aspect. Sustaining life, satisfying hunger and thirst, finding shelter from cold and heat-these are basic concerns in this sphere of existence. Not unexpectedly, therefore, land finds itself at the head of *Kāmasūtra* list and in the center of interest of this sphere[130]. For it is exclusively thanks to land that we can satisfy both hunger and thirst and that we can provide ourselves with shelter. The person among men *ex definitione* required to protect land is the king[131]. So, naturally enough, both the *Arthaśāstra* and the *Kāmasūtra* underline a connection between royal power and Welfare[132]. It does not come as a surprise as well that problems of kingdom, politics, administration, government, war and peace have dominated this sphere in a way similar to ritual dominating the sphere of Virtue and erotics-the sphere of Love.

Man achieves his plenitude in the three spheres : that of consciousness-Virtue, that of emotion-Love and that of material existence-Welfare. Because of the position of consciousness in the creation, it draws boundaries for action in the two remaining spheres. Therefore, one can almost endlessly multiply such dicta like one which we

find in the Manusmṛti " Let him beware of such Welfare and Love as would be forbidden by Virtue"[133]. The gītā also puts it in the mouth of Kṛṣṇa :"I am Love which goes not against virtue,[134] the *kāmasūtra* too stresses the same but with regard to all three spheres: "Let man undertake such action which brings about all three aims (in the three spheres) of life or two or even one. But never such action which for the sake of one will go against the two !"[135]. The *Arthaśāstra* strikes the same note when it says that each of these aims, if cultivated in excess, brings harm not only to the two others but also to itself[136]. Mutual conflict of these three spheres which stems from their very nature constitutes the basic ethical problem of a Hindū. This is underlined by Manu and his commentator Medhātithi. While describing the daily routine of a king Manu says that at midday or midnight, fresh and relaxed he should consider questions connected with Virtue, Love and Welfare and possibilities of fulfilment in these mutually conflicting spheres[137]. Elsewhere the *Mānavadharmaśāstra* divides all acts of men into three categories but unexpectedly takes as the differentiating agent the three *guṇas* and only subsequently ascribes to them the three *puruṣārthas*. It says that all these acts of which men feel ashamed are characterised by the quality of *tamas*. Further all those acts by which men desire greater fame not being deterred in them by failures partake of the quality of *rajas*. And finally acts which men wish to understand in all details and by doing which they do not feel ashamed, but to the contrary their hearts feel satisfied-are characterised by the quality of *sattva*. Now follows an equation drawn between these three kinds of human behaviour pervaded by the three *guṇas* and the three *puruṣārthas*. The *Manusmṛti* puts it in this way : 'Pleasure (*kāma*) is the distinguishing feature of *tamas*. Wealth (*artha*) is described by that of *rajas* and spiritual merit (*dharma*) is the distinguishing feature of *sattva*-each succeeding one of those being superior to the preceding'[138]. Medhātithi's commentary upon this verse makes it clear that the equation of *kāma* and *tamas* is of very particular nature and it concerns only 'an excessive craving for Pleasure'[139]. We might venture to add here that the three *puruṣārthas* when considered separate are ascribed to the three *guṅas* and consequently in this configuration *kāma* may acquire certain negative hue which seems inherent in *tamas*. Yet, as much as the three *guṇas* are conceived of as indispensable aspects of reality so much so the three *puruṣārthas* which are their counterparts in the realm of human behaviour clearly emerge as equally indispensable spheres of human activity.

The comprehensive study of the *puruṣārthas* mentioned above offered by Premvallabha. Tripāṭhī shows this very clearly. From profuse quotations with which he has supported his argumentation it follows that as there are many instances when each *puruṣārtha* is separately considered the most important, similarly there are repeated assurances that only all three of them together are conducive to the final goal of human existence. *Mahābhārata* for instance insists that among *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*, *dharma* is the

best[140]. On the other hand Kauṭilya holds that Welfare and Welfare alone is important inasmuch as charity (*dharma*) and desire (*kāma*) depend upon Welfare (*artha*)[141]. *Kāma* also has its partisans who can call to their support no lesser an authority then Ṛgveda itself (X.129). Tripāṭhī quotes an anonymous unhappily opinion that '*kāma* indeed is the one *puruṣārtha*'[142]. As we have already mentioned, at the same time there is a paralell current of thinking which insists on harmonious coexistence of the three and which makes a point that striving for just fulfilment of the three ensures man's success. The *Kāmasūtra* appearently repeats this argumentation basing itself on the *Mahābhārata* (quoted by Tripāṭhī) : 'Let the knower of the household undertake effort in attaining the *trivarga*, for in this success there is the success of the householder both here and yonder'[143]. This attitude is summarised very forcefully, indeed, in the English introduction to the *Kṛtyakalpataru*, where the doctrine of the *puruṣārthas* is called the central theme of Hindu ethics and where it is stated that only through the experience of the *trivarga* comes real capacity to focus one's thoughts on the Supreme[144]. With this opinion there concurs successfully that of M. Hiriyanna who, in his essay on Kālidāsa, says that 'wisdom consists in following all above aims with equal devotion, and making life a harmonious whole'[145]. Let the last word here belong to Manu, who says that it is held that Virtue and Welfare are the best or that Love and Welfare are the best or else that Virtue alone is the best or Welfare alone is the best. But the situation is that the three of them together are the best (II.224).

It is exactly here that we should look for the sources of the tensest moral problems of man in India. After all, all the three spheres are integral and positive aspects of reality. Though none should be forsaken, yet often satisfaction in one seems to ruin it in another one. These are exactly problems to which a king is supposed to attend during the best hours of day and night.

Lack of balance and conflict among these spheres results in formulation of their antitheses. Extremely interesting from this point of view is Chapter VI, Part VI of the *Kāmasūtra*. According to this text the three antitheses of the three spheres of human existence are : Ignominy (*adharma*), Repugnance (*dveṣa*) and Misery (*anartha*). What strikes one in this exposition is its bookkeeper's precision. There converge in these choices, options and possibilites the elements which from our angle are ethical with the elements of non-ethical calculation. This underlines the fact that the concept of threefold sphere transcends pure ethics, the way we understand it. Over and above, we have to remember, that this text concerns a special group of persons, i.e., public women for whom-according to the very same treatise-the sphere of Welfare is the foremost. May be this most clearly betrays one of the basic features of the Indian traditional ethics, namely the relativity of its norms which are subordinate, first of all, to social position and secondly, to the period of life of each individual-of course with notable exception of the universal Virtue.

"The aims of numan existence are accompanied by various miseries, concomitants and doubts. All these stem from stupidity, from excessive passion, excessive self-respect, excessive hypocrisy, excessive sincerity, excessive confidence, excessive anger, excessive contempt, excessive bravado, excessive reliance on fate. They result in useless expenditure, loss of future perspectives, withholding of approaching Welfare, loss of the one already gained, exposition to rudeness, loss of comeliness, hurting the body, shaving of tresses, downfall and branding by cutting off limbs. Therefore, right from the beginning, they should be eliminated and those which bring the aims of life closer should be attended to. Welfare, Virtue and Love-these are the three aims of human existence. Misery, Ignominy and Repugnance-these are the three miseries of human existence. If while serving them, there appears something else it is called a concomitant. On the other hand a simple doubt is when there appears a question : "Will it happen or not ?"-at a time when there is doubt regarding the obtainment of fruit. Further a complex doubt is when there appears a question : "Will this or that happen ?"-If striving for one thing two things appear-it is double consequence. If they appear from all sides-it is multiple consequence. We shall exemplify these. Thus the triad of aims of human existence has been characterised. Their reverse is the triad of miseries of human existence.

If from a liaison with some wonderful man very tangible Welfare follows, if comeliness augments, future becomes certain, property is acquired and if others begin to desire her, then this is the obtainment of Welfare with its concomitants. A liaison with somebody, exclusively for the sake of profit-is the obtainment of Welfare without its concomitants. If an acceptance of Welfare, caused by somebody else, will result in future separation with the permanent lover or in loss of Welfare or else in connection with a base and hateful man-it is the obtainment of Welfare with concomitants of Misery. A liaison with an influential and lascivious gentleman or a minister, although fruitless, may help in liquidating some trouble or mitigating some great peril to Welfare or else may bring some good prospects for future. In such case this is Misery accompanied by concomitants of Welfare. Exerting herself to win favours of a miser, of one who believes that he brings good luck, of an ungrateful and of an extremely lustful, does not bring any fruit at all it is Misery without concomitants. Similarly exerting herself to win favours of exactly the same type of men as above who, in addition, are exceptionally cruel and influential royal favourites, also does bring no fruit, while spurning them later on has many unpleasant consequences. This is therefore Misery accompanied by its own concomitants. Concomitants of Virtue and Love should be treated in the same way. Therefore, one should connect them according to this method. Here end the deliberations concerning concomitants.

Will he offer gifts or no, should I please him ?- such is the doubt concerning Welfare. Will it be Virtue, should I spurn him having squeezed him like a fruit and

expecting no more profit from him ?-such is the doubt concerning Virtue. Will it be Love, should I go to a menial or a niggard having attained what I coveted ?-such is the doubt concerning Love. Will this influential niggard bring misery over me, should I spurn him ?-such is the doubt concerning Misery. Will it be Ignominy or not, if the permanent lover who no more brings profit, spurned, goes to the abode of forefathers?-such is the doubt concerning Ignominy. Will it be frigidity, should I not get what I desire even upon declaring passions ?-such is the doubt concerning Repugnance. Here simple doubts end. Now complex doubts. Will it serve Welfare or bring Misery, should I adore an influential newcomer connected with my lover, about whom I-know nothing and only because he happened to be around ?-such is one doubt. Will it serve Virtue or Ignominy, should I, prompted by a friend or because of my own good nature, have a liaison with a Vedic priest, a brahmin student, a sacrificer, an ascetic or a monk who, having seen me, conceived such passion for me that they desire death for themselves?-such is another doubt. Will it serve Love or cause Repugnance should I have liaison with somebody, disregarding whether people consider him worthy or unworthy ?—such is yet another doubt. Mutually combining these doubts we obtain complex doubts. Where the permanent lover is also made to act for the same, there we have a case of two-sided Welfare. Where a fruitless liaison comes about at her own expense and at the same time a permanent lover mad with jealousy disowns her, there we have a case of two-sided Misery. Where doubt appears as to whether a new liaison contributes to Welfare or not and whether the permanent lover can be made to contribute as well, there we have two-sided doubt concerning Welfare. Where for the sake of a liaison she has to bear expenses herself and also where the doubt appears as to whether her former lover opposing this, in anger, does not harm her, as well as to whether her permanent lover, mad with jealousy, disowns her, there we have the two-sided doubt concerning Misery. These are then two-sided consequences according to Śvetaketu the son of Uddalaka.................... By combining these consequences, we got six mixed consequences: from one side Welfare-from another Misery, form one side Welfare-from another doubt concerning Welfare, from one side Welfare-from another doubt concerning Misery, etc. Accompanied by advisors, one has to ponder over these matters and choose those in which one perceives multiplication of Welfare or at least doubt concerning Welfare or else those which alleviate great Misery. The same method should be followed in case of Virtue and Love. Similarly one should combine and connect them"[146].

The ethical realism of this proposition is very pointedly summed up in the *Hitopadeśa,* which says that "one who knows the essence of Virtue, Welfare and Love will not exaggerate in charity. For such a charitable one will never eat, even what he has already got in his hand"[147]. This point of view is most evidently connected with the importance of sustaining life-a very practical accent, indeed-which according to the same source

is the basis of success in all three spheres of human existence and "there is no such thing which one would not protect while protecting life"[148]. This does not mean that the Indian ethics did not create an absolute ethical ideal not tainted by the present pragmatism. Such an ideal is present but rightly so elsewhere, i.e., within the framework of the uninvolved Virtue (*nivṛttilakṣaṇa*), where conflicting elements of human existence are reduced to minimum by ascetic discipline[149]. On the other hand, functioning within the framework of the involved Virtue (*pravṛttilakṣaṇa*) is-as we could see-unbreakably connected with conflict. The ethics of threefold sphere is not a *panacea* against this conflict. Far from that, it is rather an attempt at mastering it, at taming it. It is most probably from a conviction about unavoidable imperfection of human existence expressed in the conception outlined above that an attitude of reconciliation to reality, as it is, springs-an attitude, which still is valid in India today.

The threefold sphere of Hindu ethics emerges thus as the most coherent principle permitting us to see against itself human behaviour. In case any doubt persists, let us quote the following words of Kauṭilya (I.10) which have been noticed already after formulating this view of the *trivarga* as the criterium of evaluating human action in India.

"Teachers have decided that, in accordance with ascertained purity the king shall employ in corresponding works those ministers whose character has been tested under the three pursuits of life (*trivarga*), religion (Virture), wealth (Welfare) and love (Love), and under fear[150]."

We may read these words with profound satisfaction finding in them the most important and valid acknowledgment of our point of view. For it transpires from them that already then this triple notion had been used in similar capacity to that which is postulated on these pages. Consequently by applying it in the field of Sanskrit drama as the criterium of ethico-literary criticism we tread a perfectly certain ground indeed, for the *puruṣārthas* in this capacity have an advantage of not being subjective and not belonging to any alien culture. Therefore, anybody after familiarising himself with their nature, as it was formulated by tradition, can check and recheck any ideological appreciation of Sanskrit drama or any Sanskrit literary work for that matter ! In this manner the discussion will stop to be an exchange of subjective opinions, but will move forward our understanding of Sanskrit dramatic literature and of classical Indian theatre !

Footnotes :

76. The *Nāṭyaśāstra,* GOS., vol. L, p, 39.

77. Op. cit., p. 7. *dharmādicatuṣkopāyopadeyadhiyam...*

78. We have decided to render this word here into the English fascination. We think that the word fascination more adequately expresses the particular notion which is meant here. Apart from that in this way we avoid confusion in terms with the word *kāma* translated as Love. This is why we have chosen to differ in this respect from M.M. Ghosh.

79. We have selected here the variant reading of the GOS. edition. The one chosen by the editors appears to be inferior. So instead of *arthasyecchāyogād bahudhā caivārthato 'rthaśṛṅgāraḥ* We accepted *arthasyāptir yasminn-aikadhā bhavati so' rthaśṛṅgāraḥ.*

80. The *ramya* of the text being an adjective creates certain problem in comprehending the sentence. We, therefore, preferred the variant reading given both in the GOS and the *Kāvyamālā* editions-*rahaḥ.*

81. Shastri, S.N., The Laws and Practice of Sanskrit Drama, Varanasi 1961, p. 12.

82. Op. cit., p. 13. It is interesting to note that this text mentions the *puruṣārthas* in the same order as Potter does.

83. *Bhāvaprakāśa* quoted by Kumārasvāmin in his commentary to *Pratāparudrīya* (ed. by V. Raghavan, Madras 1970, p. 71) *'yathā kāmopayogy-atra śṛṅgāro dṛśyate rasaḥ / arthopayogī vīraḥ syād raudro' pi syāt kvacit kvacit / rakṣārūpeṇa dharmopayogī karuṇo bhavet / adbhuto' pi manaḥprītipradatvāt kāmasāhyakṛt / te bhayānakabībhatsahāsyāḥ kāvyeṣu yojitāḥ / tattannetṛmanovṛttivaśāt prāyas trivargagāḥ / ity anena śṛṅgarādīnāṁ trivargopayogitvam aṅgīkāra/*

84. Somanchi Ramulu, A critical study of the theories of Sanskrit Poetics, Unpublished thesis, Punjab University 1955, p. 146, *rasamayatve sati purusārthapratipādakaś śabdaḥ kāvyam.*

85. K. Krishnamoorthy, Essays in Sanskrit Criticism, Dharwar 1964, p. 291.

86. This is exactly the conclusion reached independently by S.D. Serebryanyi when dealing with the *Padāvali* of Vidyāpati, for he writes that the European type of judging in terms of worldly and religious or carnal and spiritual are not of much use with regard to the *Padāvali.* "A more complex system of coordinates is necessary which would take into account peculiarities of Indian culture." The above mentioned pairs of notions "...have to be translated into the language of the Indian tradition totally different from the European. The nearest Indian analogy to the dichotomy of the worldly versus the religious is the tetrad of *puruṣārthas (caturvarga)*—four aims (or purposes) of man, of human life. Here Serebryanyi enumerates *kāma, artha, dharma* and *mokṣa* underlining an altogether different character of the last. (Serebryanyi, Tvorchestvo Vidyāpati....Maskva 1937, p. 14-15).

87. *Varga* means category. *Puruṣārtha* means : aim *(artha)* of man *(puruṣasya).* Sphere seems to be the best description of the behavioral territory implicated in striving for each of these aims. Later on, to the triad mentioned above *mokṣa*, i.e., Liberation, was added. This concept is intrinsically superior over three remaining ones. It constitutes the final aim or result of proper conduct within the spheres. *Mokṣa* is the form of final arrangement of our relationship with reality, i.e., with the Absolute. In the history of different cultures we can see a tendency towards ascending from threefold to fourfold divisions. In India this tendency is well illustrated and explained in Manu's Treatise on Virtue *(Mānavadharmaśāstra)*, I. 81-82 and in corresponding passages of Medhātithi's commentary. Other arguments which make that *mokṣa* should not be treated as one among the spheres of human existence have been adduced

in an essay by V.A. Sarma entitled "Is *Mokṣa* a *puruṣārtha*", Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal, vol. VII, pts I-II, 1969, p. 95-99. Much has been written about *mokṣa*. The review of Indian traditional view-points has been well done in (The concept of *mukti* in Indian Philosophy) by R. Shamasastri, Jha Commemoration Volume, Potter's book (see below) may be mentioned.

88. Many works dealing with *dharma* in general have titles related to the said concept. For instance : *Puruṣārthaprabodha* of Brahmānandabhāratī (Kane, HD, vol. I, p. I, p. 562), *Caturvargacintāmaṇi* of Hemādri (op. cit., p. 357), *Puruṣārthacintāmaṇi* of Viṣṇubhaṭṭa, Nirṇayasāgar Press, Bombay 1927. Furthermore, there were compiled special anthologies comprising instances from epic and puranic literature of proper or improper behaviours in four spheres of human existence and indicating penalties and penances as well as rewards in these cases. The best known work of this type is *Puruṣārthasudhānidhi* of Sāyaṇa, Madras 1955. Also in the field of belles-letters these criteria were applied in the arrangement of anthologies. For instance *Sūktiratnahāra* of Kaliṅgarāja (probably XV A.D.) and Sāyana's *Subhāṣitasudhānidhi* have an inner order according to four spheres (*mokṣa* included). In 1969 there was published at Hoshiarpur in the Vishveshvaranand Ideological Series, No. 44 (as a supplement to VIJ, vol. VI, 1968) the *Puruṣārthopadeśa* of Bhartṛhari, which is the famous *Śatakatraya*, only in different arrangement. According to its editor, K.V. Sarma "...the object of the compilation in the present case being the grouping together of the verses which are related to the prime *Puruṣ*ārtha (Objective in life), viz., *Mokṣa* (Emancipation) and its accessories like virtue, renunciation and penance." (p. XII). As one can see, it is not a clear-cut application of the criterium of the three or fourfold sphere. Yet, undoubtedly this concept furnishes an obvious background here. As indeed is the case with the arrangement of the original *Śatakas* of Bhartṛhari. Besides the *puruṣārtha* concept determinens the content and its arrangements of various other poems and antologies as for instance the *Śatakas* of Dhana(da)rāja Janārdana and Narahari. Also Jagannātha Paṇditarāja owes allegiance to this concept. 'The aim of (reading) the book is to attain (*dharma, artha, kāma* and *mokṣa*." (*sūtra* 10). Even as late as in 1882 A.D. Rādhāmangalam Nārāyaṇaśāstri wrote *Caturvargasāra*.

89. The *Mahābhārata (Śāntiparvan*) LIX. 80-85) says that Brahmā had written a treatise in one thousand chapters dealing with Virtue, Welfare and Love which later on was abbreviated (Kane, HD, vol. I, p. I, p. 308). Here also MBh. stresses that *mokṣa* is an altogether different idea. In addition it is MBh. (Ādiparvan II. 383) that speaks about itself as *Dharmaśāstra, Arthaśāstra* and *Kāmaśāstra*. (Kane, HD, op. cit., p. 301).

90. We hope that in the course of these deliberations it will become obvious why we do consequently use English equivalents of these terms. Yet, in any case, we would like to add that to our mind European culture will be able to absorb this concept only when it stops to sound exotic, which it will never do as *dharma, artha, kāma* and *mokṣa*. Our choice of the equivalents in this case follows more or less generally accepted Indological English language practice.

91. P.V. Tripāṭhī, *Puruṣārthacatuṣṭaya*, Varanasi 1970. This hook, in Hindi, cites abundantly Vedic, epic and puranic literature, as well as classical and even mediaeval one, not always with precise references though. The book by Bhagavāndās entitled *Puruṣārtha* and published by the Hindī Pracārak Saṁsthān, Varanasi 1972, may also be mentioned here.

92. A. Daniélou, Les quatres sens de la vie, Editions Buchet / Chastel, Paris 1976.

93. Here the contribution to the *puruṣārtha* studies of two Russian scholars : S.D. Serebryanyi and A.J. Syrkin should be mentioned. The first devoted to this problem few pages (14ff) of his excellent dissertation concerning *Vidyāpati* (Tvorchestvo Vidyāpati Ṭhākura ibengalskaya

viṣṇuitskaya poezziya, Maskva 1973, typescript). The second, A.J. Syrkin wrote about the *puruṣārthas* in his "K systematizacyi nekatorih ponyati v sanskrite" (Towards systematization of certain notions in Sanskrit) in a volume entitled "Semiotika i vastochnye yaziki" (Semiotics and estern languages) Maskva 1967, pp. 147ff. The conclusions of the present study reached independently corroborate the views of both scholars. Especially all what S.D. Serebryanyi writes could have been almost verbatim repeated here.

94. P. Lavastine, Trivarga, (Les Trois Valeurs), in René Guénon at láctualité de la pensée traditionnelle, Actes du Colloque International, Éditions du Baucens, Braine-le-Comte 1977 (Belgique), pp. 69-78.

95. For instance Daniélou's ascription of each *puruṣārtha* to the respective *guṇas* (p.85) does not quite agree with the opinion of Manu regarding this problem (XII.38); he does not comment upon this divergence of opinions.

96. K.H. Potter. Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1963, p. 6-7.

97. Op. cit., p. 7.

98. Op. cit., P. 8. It might not be out of place to add here that according to Potter the attitude of *mokṣa* is an attitude of universal concern which stems from the total identification with the world, possible because of nonattachement to its particular aspects either in manipulatory way of *artha*, or posessiveness of *kāma* or even partial identification and respect of *dharma*. (p.10).

99. Op. cit., p. 6, footnote a.

100. *Manusmṛti* with the *Manubhāṣya* of Medhātithi, Calcutta 1932, I. 12-17, p. 14-15, vol. I.

101. Manu says that among creatures with the faculty of thinking, man is the best (I.96). What he probably means here is that only man can free himself from the circle of rebirths. Being born in other forms makes this perspective rather distant.

102. *Prāṇīnāṁ sākṣāt abhyudayaniḥśreyasahetuḥ*. Tripāṭhī, p.30.

103. A.B. Keith in The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads, H.O.S. 1925, vol. I, p. 249 writes : "Law is denoted by *Dharman* which denotes that which supports and that which is supported; it applies like *Ṛta* to all aspects of the world, to the sequence of events in nature, to the sacrifice and to man's life;". Yet J. Gonda in Change and continuity in Indian Religion, The Hague 1965, p. 198 underlines that these are not synonyms.

104. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy London 1941, vol. I, p. 78-9.

105. Op. cit., p. 77.
The word *ṛta* can be traced back to the indo-european root denoting "joining" or "fitting together" from which also the Latin word *ars, artem* is derived and although literally it menas knowledge, skill and art yet, in general, all those products of men which come to be regarded as art objects are being apprehended as achievements in perfection and harmony. All their components fit well together. We could say they are joined together perfectly to make one harmonious whole and thus the etymological roots of the word art which denotes the skill of making them are recalled. (Cf Klein, A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, 1966, pp. 108-9; Mayrhoffer, A Concise Etymological Sanskrit Dictionary, vol. I, 122/123)

106. H. Willman-Grabowska wrote quite extensively about the etymology and meaning of this word in Évolution sémantique du mot "*dharma*", Rocznik Orientalistyczny, vol. X, Lwów 1934, pp. 38-50.

107. Tripāṭhī, p. 42.
108. *Dharmo viśvasya jagataḥ pratīṣṭhā. loke dharmiṣṭham prajā upasarpanti. dharmeṇa pāpam apanudati. dharme sarvaṁ pratiṣṭhitam. tasmād dharmaṁ paramaṁ vadanti. op. cit.*, p.38.
109. *Kāmasūtra*, I. 2.7. Literally this definition runs as follows : "Vedic sacrifices which have supernatural character and the effects of which are beyond perception, are being offered because of the injunctions of science (*śāstra*). Science also forbids eating meat, although it is a natural phenomenon and has altogether perceivable effects. This is what we call Virtue.". Also the *Mahābhārata* says : *dharmārthāv ādhruvau tasya yo na śāstraparo bhavet.* (*Śāntiparvan,* 71-3). Tripāṭhī, p. 194.
110. Manu, I. 96-97.
111. Tripāṭhī, p. 38ff quotes MBh. *(Karṇaparvan,* 59-69?) : *dhāraṇād dharmam sa dharma iti niścayaḥ.*
112. The *gītā*, I. 40-42. It sees the source of a total catastrophe of the society and culture in promiscuity of women, which leads to mixed marriages between representatives of different *varṇas*. It is by the way the view of egalitarianism completely different from our own, for it sees in it the greatest danger to continuation of culture.
113. The involved Virtue (*pravṛttilakṣaṇadharma*) as different from the uninvolved Virtue (*nivṛttilakṣaṇadharma*). This is a kind of opposition corresponding to monastic and lay life. Renunciation and ascetic discipline is the foundation of the univolved Virtue. See also M. Yamunacarya, The Ethics of *Pravṛtti* and *Nivṛtti*, Siddha-Bharati, (Feliciation Volume of Dr. Siddheshwar Varma), part II, Hoshiarpur 1950, pp. 129-131.
114. Manu, II. 9-12.
115. Manu, II. 16.
116. Kane, HD, vol. II, part I, Poona 1941, p. 560ff.
117. Manu, VI. 35.
118. I. Lazari-Pawowska writes about this problem in "Patterns of Indian Perfectionism" (in Polish), Etyka, Nr 12, 1973, p. 38ff.
119. These six categories are : *varṇadharma*-social Virtue, *āśramadharma*-age Virtue, *varṇāśramadharma*-social and age Virtue, *guṇadharma*-position Virtue, *naimittikadharma*-circumstantial Virtue and *sādhāraṇadharma*-universal Virtue. Kane, op. cit., p. 2-3.
120. Here are more important individual sacraments : *garbhādhāna*-conception, *puṁsavana*-causing male offspring, *sīmantonnayana*-parting of hair of the mother, *jātakarman*-delivery, *nāmakaraṇa*-naming ceremony, *niṣkramaṇa*-first steps outside, *annaprāśana*-first feeding of rice, *cuḍākaraṇa*-tonsure, *karṇavedha*-piercing the earlobes, *vidyārambha*-beginning of study, *upanayana*-initiation, *vedārambha*-beginning to study Veda, *keśānta*-first shave, *samāvartana* (*snāna*)-completion of studies, *vivāha*-marriage and *antyeṣṭi*-cremation. R.B. Pandey, Hindu Saṁskāras, Delhi 1969.
121. *Śauca* means both ritual and hygienic cleanliness.
122. *Śuddhi* denotes both ritualistic and hygienic purification of objects.
123. Kane, HD, vol. I, part I, p. 662.
124. MBh. (*Vanaparvan*) : *Indriyāṇām ca pañcānāṁ manaso hṛdayasya ca viṣaye vartamānānāṁ yā prītir upajāyate. sa kāma iti me buddhiḥ karmaṇām phalam uttamam.* Tripāṭhī, p. 290.
125. The *Kāmasūtra,* I. 2. 13.
126. Manu, II. 2-3. *Ṛgveda* X. 129, 4.
127. *Nītivākyāmṛta* (*Arthasamuddeśa*) : *yataḥ sarvaprayojanasiddhiḥ sa arthaḥ*. Tripāṭhī, p. 221.
128. The *Kāmasutra*, I. 2. 11.

129. *Arthamūlau dharmakāmau*. Tripāṭhi, p. 221.
130. Op. cit., p. 223.
131. The following are some very common epithets of a king in Sanskrit : *bhūmipāla, mahīpāla, pṛthvīpāla, bhūmipati, bhūpa*. They all mean : one who protects the land (earth).
132. The *Kāmasūtra*, I. 2.11. "Welfare is the most important for a king for it is the basis of human existence."
133. Manu, IV. 176.

Some other instances of expressing similar opinion may be found in the *Viṣṇusmṛti* 91.84, the *Āpastambīyadharmasūtra* 2,8,20.22-23, the *Yājnvalkyasmrti* 2.21, and the *Nāradasmṛti* 1.39.

134. The *gītā*, VII. 11. *dharmāviruddho bhūteṣu kāmosmi*.
135. The *Kāmasūtra*, I. 2.51.
136. Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*, transl. by R. Shamasastry, Mysore 1956, p. 12 (VII. 12).
137. Manu, VII. 151-151 : *madhyaṁdinerdharātre vā viśrānto vigataklamaḥ. cintayed dharmakāmārthān sārthaṁ taireka eva vā. parasparaviruddhānāṁ teṣāṁ ca samupārjanam.* Medhātithi adds : *dharmādīnāṁ parasparavirodhaṁ cintayet.*
138. *Manu smṛti*, the Laws of Manu with the *bhāṣya* of Medhātithi, transl. by Ganganatha Jha, Calcutta University 1926, vol. V, discourse XII. 35-38.
139. Op. cit., p. 588.
140. P.V. Tripāṭhī, op. cit., p. 196, MBh. *Śantiparvan* 91/52. *'dharme cārthe ca kāme ca dharma evottaro bhavet'.*
141. Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*, transl. by Shamasastry, R. Mysore 1956, p. 12 (I.).
142. P.V.Tripāṭhī, op. cit., p. 312, *'kāma evaikaḥ puruṣārthaḥ'.*
143. Op. cit., p. 17, *'trivargasādhane yatnaḥ kartavyo gṛhamedhinā tatsaṁsiddhau gṛhasthasya siddhiratra paratra ca.*
144. Lakṣmīdhara Bhaṭṭa, *Kṛtyakalpataru*, GOS CVI, Baroda 1948, p. 20.
145. M. Hiriyanna, Sanskrit Studies, Mysore 1954, p. 23.
146. The *Kāmasūtra,* VI. 6.1-35 and 41-43.

We are quoting in extenso this fragment, for it is, so far as we know, the only comparatively detailed text known today which presents options in conflicting situations within the framework of the threefold sphere. Analogical exposition can be found in the *Arthaśāstra* (IX.7) but it concentrates on options concerning Welfare-Misery even in more pronounced way than the *Kāmasūtra* does.

147. The *Hitopadeśa, Suhṛdbhedaḥ*, 179.
148. Op. cit., *Mitralābhaḥ*, 43.
149. See. I. Lazari-Pawowska, op. cit., p. 25.
150. Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*, op. cit., p. 17.

trivargabhayasaṁśuddhān amātyān sveṣu karmasu adhikuryād yathāśaucam ity ācāryā vyavasthitāḥ.

V. THE ANALYSIS OF THE *PRATINJÑĀYAUGANDHARĀYAṆA* AND THE *SVAPNAVĀSAVADATTĀ*

The crucial moment of putting the above described criteria to actual use and testing their utility and efficacy has finally arrived. The acceptance of the *daśarūpaka* notion as the starting and in a way, central point of reference has two important consequences for the critical part of this study. The first lies in the postulated necessity to review examples of all ten types of dramas in order to show a complete palette of possibilities. Initially such was our intention which we had to discard soon for a very simple reason that all types of dramas cannot be exemplified with texts of acknowledged literary and artistic value. The other argument against such proposition, even in case suitable examples could be found, is that the detailed analysis of them could result in unnecessary, at this stage, prolixity obscuring the main argument. Consequently it was decided to abandon this idea in favour of analysing only the two most representative types of *nāṭaka* and the *prakaraṇa* (XVIII.5-7). For this analysis Bhāsa's *Svapnavāsavadattā* and his *Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa* have been chosen because of the following reasons :

1. These dramas are most probably contemporary or almost contemporary to the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. We can assume then that the principles discussed in the preceding four chapters of this book express the living practice of the Indian theatre of those days. Our hope is that they had not yet become a dead set of rules which resulted in stereotyped productions.
2. Since both dramas written by one playwright have a common subject drawn from one source, they can be studied conjointly and such a study may reveal reasons why one was conceived a *nāṭaka* and another one a *prakaraṇa*.
3. One of them styled in the prologue a *prakaraṇa* does not fulfil the requirements of its definition so far as the number of acts goes, thus offering an additional chance to show the utility of our criteria in explaining this fact.
4. Last but not least, both of them, at least in part, are still in the repertoire of the traditional Sanskrit theatre of Kerala called the *kūtiyāṭṭam* and their fragments occasionally can be witnessed there performed by the *cākyārs*, the hereditary actor-custodians of this art.

Besides these two plays in the chapter that follows the analysis of the *Śakuntalā* of Kālidāsa has been attempted for the simple reason that this nāṭaka is considered the best in the whole range of Sanskrit literature.

The second consequence of accepting the *daśarūpaka* notion as our basic premise results in the way the typological point of reference brackets the entire analysis. We make it here both the point of departure as well as the point of arrival. In this manner it will encase the analysis, the back-bone of which will be the span structure supplemented with remarks concerning the demeanours and the three triple concepts of predicament, intrigue and fascination.

The succession of events in the original story of king Udayana makes it convenient to discuss first the *Pratijñā*, for the happenings described there help to understand better the *Svapna* which, being a *nāṭaka,* should normally have been discussed first, it we accept the order in which these two types are defined in the *Nāṭyaśāstra.*

Bhāsa's *Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa* termed by the author himself in the prologue a *prakaraṇa,* in the colophons of some manuscripts, followed most obviously by he first editor of the text Paṇḍit Gaṇapatiśāstrī, is called a *nāṭikā.* This is an interesting problem. If we take Bhāsa's opinion for the right one, we shall find that it is an irregular type of *prakaraṇa,* lacking at least one act. If in turn we consider *nātikā* as the proper designation of this play, we shall have to resort to a very strained interpretation of the text in order to show that it may fit the definition of *nāṭikā* as it is to be found in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (XVIII,58-60). For most obviously this play does not have a king for its hero (although some insist that it is really Udayana who is absent from the stage), it does not relate to music or affairs of the harem and it does not contain an abundance of female characters, many dances, songs and love's enjoyment, as the *Nāṭyaśāstra* would postulate. Thus we are left with the riddle which - judging from the sources accessible to me in Poland - has not been solved [151]. The problem would not deserve attention, had there not been a suspicion that it bears considerable weight with regard to the interpretation and understanding of the play. This, so long as the play is theoretically described in the histories of Sanskrit literature, may be treated in partial or brushing way, as for instance by A.B. Keith in his "The Sanskrit Drama". The situation diametrically changes, if the play is considered for actual production and analysed by a director well aware of the traditional structural aspects of drama in Sanskrit. Let us therefore see what the *Pratijñā* looks like when analysed along the lines of the criteria discussed above.

The structural analysis of a Sanskrit drama has to begin with the determination of the germinal matter *(bīja)* of the play. In the *Pratijñā* it undoubtedly is the solemn vow of Yaugandharāyaṇa to release the treacherously abducted Udayana. The next step to be made is to form a rough idea about the perimeter of the first span. Here the

idea of the phases of action is of help. In our case it seems that the first act corresponds to the head span, for the desire to act towards the attainment of the fruit of action (release of Udayana) culminating in Yaugandharāyaṇa's vow with the end of Act I goes, as it were, underground permitting an opposite tendency to come to the forefront in Act II. Having thus mapped the main contours of the head span we can try to pursue our analysis in a more direct fashion, trying to point out various span-elements *(saṁdhyaṅga)* used in its actual construction and while doing so trying also to keep in mind the triple concepts of intrigue, predicament and fascination concerning the circumstances and motives of action as well as the concept of the four demeanours.

The most characteristic span-element of the opening scene is contemplation (*paribhāvanā)*, especially visible in the reaction of Yaugandharāyaṇa to the story of Haṁsaka, when he says for instance that fate is stronger than vigilance. The span-elements of help (*parikara),* extension *(parinyāsa)* and allurement *(vilobhana)* can also be traced in the different moments of the story, which anticipates the multiplicity and intricacy of coming events as well as points to the sources of the complexity of the present situation and also makes the subject-matter additionally attractive. Verse 3 together with an information that it is Yaugandharāyaṇa who should be approached directly by Haṁsaka on the implicit order from Udayana constitute the span-element of suggestion *(upakṣepa)* by making it clear that it will be the minister himself who is going to bring about the release of Udayana. The reaction of the womenfolk of the palace (verse 15) headed by the queenmother, deepening and dramatising the conflict, constitutes the span-element of dissension *(bheda).* In the stanzas 14, 17 and 18 we find both the span-element of activity *(karaṇa)* and that of accession *(prāpti).* The said stanzas are full of optimism being at the same time declarations of concrete enterprise so far as liberating of Udayana goes. The span-element of decision *(yukti)* can be traced both in the words of the queen-mother suggesting a stern action against Mahāsena and in verse 17 in which Yaugandharāyaṇa seems to give his proposal as to the steps to be taken in the future. The fateful vow-taking of the minister is most obviously the span-element of settling *(samādhāna)* for at this moment the germinal matter of action is in full view. The episode of Dvaipāyana, to my mind, constitutes the span-element of disclosure *(udbheda),* for by pushing substantially forward the whole business it makes the germinal matter ascend and thus constitutes a sort of an epilogue to the element of settling. Although it may be difficult and may be even unnecessary [152] to point any concrete text place as the element of arrangement *(vidhāna)* - one has to agree that the conflict is well outlined and provides ample scope for both happiness and despair. The abduction of the king created for his minister a predicament which Abhinavagupta would certainly call *cetana,* i.e., man-made and consequently conscious. But at the same time Yaugandharāyaṇa is convinced that the intrigue itself is due to fate. Such attitude can be traced in verse 3, but it is clearly manifested

when the minister repeats the already quoted words : *jāgrato pi balavattaraḥ kṛtāntaḥ*. This attitude does not have a paralysing effect normally expected in such circumstances. On the contrary, the minister demonstrates his will to exert himself to the utmost. His vow amply testifies to it, as well as verses 14 and 18. In this conflict Yaugandharāyaṇa represents the fascination with Welfare. This is implied in the very office he occupies. By discharging his duties while serving his king and the Welfare of his kingdom he also fulfils his duties pertaining to Virtue. The minister preocupied with the Welfare of the state is contrasted with his master Udayana and his fascination with Love. Bhāsa must have been well aware of broader implications of the sphere of Love, so right from the beginning he creates an image of Udayana as given body and soul to his passion of hunting and taming wild elephant, listed as one of the aspects of Love by the *Kāmasūtra* (II.1.40). The play thus opens with an ethical problem of confrontation between those acting mainly because of Love motivation and those acting because of the motivation of Welfare.

Act II presents the germinal matter of the release of Udayana in a way characteristic of the forehead span of plot. On the whole it disappears from our view, but the very considerate treatment of Udayana by Mahāsena, as well as the obvious hint at a prospective betrothal of Vāsavadattā to Udayana, result in creating a feeling that though the release may be complicated, yet it should be possible. Bhāsa has in a very interesting way conducted the action of his play in the second phase of effort to which Act II corresponds, for the effort is shown as being actually undertaken by the antagonists. Mahāsena makes a series of decisions regarding his prisoner, which certainly represent an effort of securing the goodwill of the last and clearly indicate that he is not averse to the positive solution of the whole problem. At the same time he expresses three times a strong conviction that those who should do something for the release of Udayana certainly do their utmost (verse 6 and 9 and a phrase that if Yaugandharāyaṇa is not dead the king of Vatsa cannot be considered imprisoned), thus indicating that the mainstream of effort takes place off the stage.

Now already the interlude of Act II, mentioning the arrival of envoys being sent by different suitors to the court of the father of princess Vāsavadattā, marks a span-element of manifestation *(vilāsa)*, for undoubtedly the whole situation represents a tendency to strive after satisfaction, although at this particular moment it is not yet a direct expression of this tendency. It is only in verse 3 that it is expressed more explicitly showing the true perspective of Mahāsena's endeavours, which is the subjugation of the king of Vatsa. The twin element of pursuit *(parisarpa)* finds expression in the dialogue of Mahāsena and the queen, as well as in the words of the *kañcukin* relating to Vāsavadattā's marriage, for here the problem of Vāsavadattā's betrothal appears in the most pronouced way. Its second characteristic feature is the difficulty to choose the best course of action

and this clearly constitutes the element of perplexity *(tāpana)*. Pursuit, perplexity and resistance *(vidhūta)* are related concepts. In the case in hand the very fatherly attachment of Mahāsena seems to offer such resistance. Verse 5 with its declaration of the duties of fatherhood seems to mark the span-element of announcement *(upanyāsa)*. It is a sort of deduction from general practice which allows Mahāsena to state that it is usually the father who tries to find a suitable groom for his daughter. We can also consider the subsequent remark about Śālankāyana's return from his mission as belonging to the same element, because it also results from deduction. The dialogue between Mahāsena and the *kañcukin* regarding the identity of Udayana seems to be the span-element of argument *(pragayaṇa)*, if this is the way that the cryptic reply upon reply of its definition should be understood. The span-element of announcement appears once again in the words of Mahāsena (verse 9), in which having recourse to deduction, he disbelieves the news about the capture of Udayana. The reaction of the queen to the news of Udayana's arrival at the court of Mahāsena, in the form of an outright suggestion that Vāsavadattā might be given as wife to him, evidently mollifies the attitude of Mahāsena towards his prisoner and thereby constitutes the span-element of pacification *(paryupāsana)*. Although one, not knowing the story from elsewhere, is slightly surprised by the rapidity of the change in Mahāsena. This is even so despite the initial impatient retort of his which makes up the span-element of thunderbolt *(vajra)*. The span-element of politeness *(puṣpa)* seems to have been given expression in the words of the queen about the capture of Udayana being so utmostly pleasing to Mahāsena. Further on, her question as to the reason of Udayana not sending his envoys is a recurrence of pursuit and Mahāsena's answer makes up the span-element of resistance which in verse 11 and in preceding words turns into the span-element of thunderbolt when Mahāsena says with temper that his power ended at the frontiers of Vatsa kingdom. The last element of this span is very ingeniously executed in the form of the lute episode. The appearance of the beloved musical instrument of Udayana and its handing over to Vāsavadattā interconnects two main characters of the play - despite their absence from the stage. This bond bounds irrevocably all other participants of action and thus the span-element of interconnection of characters *(varṇasaṁhāra)* is introduced. The following polite words of Mahāsena, as well as the very last stanza (14) that he recites, make a span-element of pacification reappear.

Since Bhāsa conceived this span as reflecting only indirectly the germinal matter of the play, therefore, both the predicament and the intrigue are not very pronounced here and we see them from he opponent's point of view. He, of course, does not hide his joy. Having subjugated Udayana he has achieved his aim in the sphere of Welfare and now a perspective opens for him to fulfil the aspirations of his family in the sphere of Love, harmonising it so well with the earlier political achievements.

The germinal matter in Act III once again comes to the forefront. During the conversation of the two ministers and the *vidūṣaka* the hope of the final release of the king of Vatsa is built up first in the form of a very precise masterplan prepared by Yaugandharāyaṇa, then it suffers a great setback when the *vidūṣaka* informs his interlocutors about newly conceived passion of Udayana for Vāsavadattā. It is regained in the second vow of Yaugandharāyaṇa, who promises to carry off from Ujjayinī both the king and his beloved. Thus the conclusion that Act III corresponds to the womb span is perfectly legitimate. Let us see, therefore, its structure from a shorter distance of span-elements.

The entire scene of the quarrel over a bowl of sweets is the span-element of fabrication *(abhūtāharaṇa)* consisting of words with double meaning and contributing to the build-up of the intrigue. This is well proved by the *Kūṭiyāṭṭam* theatrical tradition of Kerala which preserved a double interpretation of the text in a special commentary printed by Paṇḍit Ganapatiśāstrī in his first edition of Bhāsa's plays. Yet this part of the wombspan *(garbha-saṁdhi)* also bears features of other span-elements such as the exaggeration *(udāharaṇa)* and the outwitting *(adhibala)*. The second half of the womb span contrasted with the first one consists of the span-element called right way *(mārga)*, though it is of course enriched with different other span-elements. We can take this entire portion for the element of right way because the truth shrouded so far in the obscurity of fabrication is now, during the conversation in the Fire temple revealed. Verse 2 recited by Yaugandharāyaṇa is a sort of conjecture regarding the difficulties and tensions which the coming days are bound to bring and therefore may be taken for the span-element of symptom *(rūpa)*. Words of Rumanvant (verse 3), in their turn, bring in the span-element of agitation *(udvega)*. Verse 4 recited by Yaugandharāyaṇa, because of the sarcastic remark which precedes it, can be taken for the span-element of exaggeration, to which Rumanvant answers with the element of symptom expressing a conjecture that the efforts of Yaugandharāyaṇa will bring positive results. The longer monologue of Yaugandharāyaṇa addressed to the *vidūṣaka*, being the span-element of right way, is here intensified into the span-element of revelation *(ākṣipti)*. - He reveals, so far secret, his master-plan of Udayana's escape. The *vidūṣaka*, in his turn, infuses the span-element of right way with the characteristics of the span-element called angry speech *(toṭaka)*, for his are truly heart-rending words to both ministers, who having learnt about the new passion which Udayana conceived for Vāsavadattā see their plans of his liberation thwarted. The *vidūṣaka's* story ends in what could be considered the span-element of supplication *(prārthanā)*, when he indicates the demand of love and joy on the part of Udayana. The same span-element reverberates in the words of Yaugandharāyaṇa as well (verse 6). Earlier in his enunciation about the probability of their changed identity lasting for a long time, the minister introduces the span-element

of deduction *(anumāna)*. The words of Udayana repeated by the *vidūṣaka* are both revelation and angry speech. The span-element of propitation *(saṁgraha)* is ushered in with the words of Yaugandharāyaṇa addressed to the *vidūṣaka* (verse 7) in which he implores the jester not to abandon his master while in trouble and to show his magnanimity towards him. The *vidūṣaka* reacts in the form of the element of deduction suggesting that Vāsavadattā too has to be kidnapped from Ujjayinī. This sequence of events resolves itself in the span-element of chance *(krama)*, when Yaugandharāyana takes his second vow and thus causes the final fruit of action to look quite obtainable. All difficulties and complications have been taken into consideration. The determination and reliability of Yaugandharāyaṇa, as well as the fact that all of his party are already in enemy's capital, where Udayana is imprisoned, permits hope to spread its wings. The scene ends in the span-element of agitation *(udvega)*, though resolves again into the span-element of fabrication which in this way brackets this structural portion of the play.

Here it should be added that both the element of fabrication and the element of outwitting constitute, as a matter of fact, a sort of ground-work for the entire span. Since their definitions connect them with the idea of *kapaṭa* - the term given a special meaning in the concept of the *trikapaṭa* discussed in Chapter I of this book - consequently the third span emerges as the one which normally should contain the building up of the intrigue proper of the action actually represented on the stage. The *Pratijñā* seems to be a classical example of such notion. It may be interesting to note that Yaugandharāyaṇa now does not betray the attitude of being only a tool in the hands of fate, while with respect to the intrigue which resulted in Udayana's capture he was not, as we have shown, averse to a thought that it were workings of destiny. In this span Bhāsa seems to dispense with the notion of predicament and as a consequence with the span-element of the same name. But if we remember the way an effort was presented in the second span, we can legitimately assume that the antagonist would not remain inactive and that expecting and anticipating Yaugandharāyaṇa's move he will try to counter it by some stratagem which actually involved the *vīṇā* of Udayana - as we are told in verse 17 of Act IV. Nevertheless, it seems that the span-element of predicament, although placed in the womb span, will mainly affect the subsequent span of reflection.

The germinal matter, i.e., the release of Udayana in Act IV does become on no account a subject of reflection. Udayana is already free. This information we get right at the end of the interlude. So something is amiss here. Let us then submit this situation again to a test using this time the concept of the frustration phase. Obviously there is no place for frustration either. Thus we are bound to conclude that the fourth span of reflection and consequently at least one act, is missing from the play. To my mind an attempt to analyse the present Act IV from the view-point of span-elements corroborates the above conclusion. Let us thus see whether these elements can be fitted in the extant

Act IV of the play. We could trace the span element of reproach *(apavāda)* in the mutual recriminations of the two opponent ministers. The same concerns the confrontation element *(saṁpheṭa)*. With insolence *(drava)* we tread upon much less sure ground. For even amidst recriminations both ministers show to one another some respect. The placation of opponents could be seen in the gesture of Mahāsena towards Yaugandharāyaṇa at the very end of the play and this could be considered the span-element of exertion *(śakti)*. The determination *(vyavasāya)* stemming from a vow could be pointed out in the attitude of Yaugandharāyaṇa being ready even to face death. The reverence may be traced in the attitude of the captive minister towards Mahāsena, had it not been for the fact that it comes in a standard phrase at the very end which usually terminates each play. The element of dazzlement *(dyuti)* we could find in contemptuous words exchanged by the ministers, already as the third element to be attributed to this conversation. Here apparently ends the possibility of fitting the elements of this span upon the act in question. Neither the distress *(kheda)*, nor the denial *(pratiṣedha)* nor the blockade *(virodhana)* can be convincingly traced in it, for as we know the accomplishment of main action has already taken place in the form of successful escape of Udayana and Vāsavadattā. Moreover, if we remember that, considering the nature of this span determined by the frustration phase *(niyatāpti-avasthā)*, these three elements are absolutely indispensable to it, then it is immaterial whether the preceding six or following three (the grasping *(ādāna)*, the concealment *(chādana)*, the optimism *(prarocanā)*) can be traced somehow in this act. So we have to uphold our former conclusion and repeat that the reflection span is missing or else Bhāsa is a very poor and negligent playwright.

The germinal matter of the play obviously resolves itself in Act IV into a fruit of Udayana's liberation. Apart from that, the second concern of the play (or indeed the very first one - as will be shown later), i.e., the fulfillment of Udayana's and Vāsavadattā's love also, is positively resolved in this act. Last but not least, the chief protagonist, though imprisoned and in danger of death, is evidently triumphant - having done his duty. The situation is unmistakably that of the accomplishment span. This is well exemplified and proved by the span-element analysis of this act.

Both the jocular interlude of the conversation with the drunken elephant-keeper, as well as the voice from space declaring that Udayana has run together with Vāsavadattā bring back the germinal subject matter and constitute the span-element called the span *(saṁdhi)*. The following enunciations of the elephant-keeper (verses 2,3), by describing the fight that ensued upon Udayana's flight, draw our attention to the resumed main action and thus make up the next span-element of awakening *(vibodha)* which, in the very last sentences of the introductory scene, evolves into the span-element of assembling *(grathana)*. For both participants of this scene set to their tasks still ahead. Act IV proper begins with the element of narration *(nirṇaya)*, when one of the soldiers describes

heroic deeds of Yaugandharāyaṇa. The minister continues in the idiom of this span-element adding to it a clear note of satisfaction, thus enriching it with the span-element of joy *(ānanda)* (Verse 5). This element grafted, as it were, upon the element of narration (verse 6) is continued further on. Yugandharāyaṇa's monologue (verse 7), in which he speaks about the advantages and the shortcomings of his ministerial office, could be considered the span-element of oration *(bhāṣana)*. Verse 8 partly continues the element of narration and partly the element of confirmation *(dhṛti)*, when Yaugandharayaṇa asserts that now his deeds can be seen. At this turn Bhāsa transposes from the womb span the element of outwitting making the soldier tell Yaugandharāyaṇa that the king has been once again captured. This transposition apparently was required in order to introduce once again the element of confirmation but even in a more forceful way. Besides, this time it is grafted upon the span-element of narration of past events. This comes about in the shape of a conclusion that someone who has effected such an escape could not possibly let himself be caught again. In verse 11 Yaugandhārayaṇa censures the ministers of Mahāsena for their negligence thus introducing the element of reprimand *(paribhāṣana)*; it is intensified in the subsequent verse when Bharatarohaka is said to have lost his political authority. The span-element of joy, may be even of delight *(prīti)*, because of achieved victory, runs in this stanza concurrently. The words of Bharatarohaka in verse 12 are an obvious oration, for they unmistakably show his generosity towards his captive enemy Yaugandharāyaṇa. The last one's attitude in turn is expressed in terms of the span-element of confirmation and also of joy when he compares himself to Aśvatthāman who stands calm after fulfilling his duty. This statement of Yagandharāyaṇa provokes Bharatarohaka's reprimand and the counter-reprimand of Yaugandharāyaṇa follows; it makes up at the same time the element of retrospect *(pūrvavākya)*, when he recounts what happened to Udayana thanks to the machinations of the ministers of Mahāsena. These elements tend to repeat themselves until verse 20, In verse 21, when the *kañcukin* repeats the message of Mahāsena, out of which it transpires that this king is favourably inclined towards the captive minister and in the comment full of surprise made by Yaugandharāyaṇa there meet four span-elements, viz. the element of delight and last but not least that of mystery *(upagūhana)*, for surely this is a wonderful turn in Yaugandharāyaṇa's life. It is interesting to note that at this moment Bhāsa brings in a slight touch of the element of distress, characteristic otherwise of the reflection span. This he does supposedly in order to make the impact of the element of mystery more intensely felt. For after the sound of lamentation of women is heard, news comes that Mahāsena has consoled the lamenting queen saying that he considers the marriage of Vāsavadattā and Udayana a lawful affair and that the proper ceremony should be performed with the painted replicas of the bride and the groom. Now Yaugandharāyaṇa knows that his life will be spared and he accepts the golden cup offered to him as token

of respect by Mahāsena. Thus the element of mystery is transformed into the element of termination, which duly ends the play.

The last act brings to a close the intrigue and marks the final disentanglement from the predicament, showing clearly the chief protagonists staunch adherence to the cause of Welfare of the kingdom, where he occupies the elevated office of the chief minister. But the very last sentence of Yaugandharāyaṇa when he exclaims : 'so Mahāsena has recognised their union!' - gives testimony to the fact that all the efforts finally served the fulfilment of love and thus endeavours in the sphere of Welfare brought the fruit in the sphere of Love. The passionate attitude represented by Udayana (despite his protestations that he should not be considered *kāmapradhāna* (Act III) gets an upper hand putting in subservient position Welfare-oriented action of Yaugandharāyaṇa.

There can be little doubt left as to which span with its elements fits better Act IV of the play, which undoubtedly represents the accomplishment span. Now the question arises whether, by any chance, this might have been intended by Bhāsa in accordance with the tendency, formulated much later, to interpret *niyatāpti-avasthā* (the base of the reflection span) as the phase of certainty of success and not as the frustration phase. In such case the tense import of the reflection span would have been obliterated. The careful textual analysis of the play bespeaks against such a possibility. First of all there seems to be a certain symmetrical pattern intended in the particular content and arrangement of acts. Act I is - so to speak - Yaugandharāyaṇa's, i.e., belongs to the protagonist. Act II belongs to the antagonist, i.e., Mahāsena. Act III once again is the preserve of the protagonist, so one would exepct that before the final act, where the conflict will be resolved and where the antagonist meets the protagonist, there should be one more act belonging to the antagonist[153]). If this does not suffice let us direct our attention towards the end of Act III. We find there a remark of Mahāsena about Bharatarohaka's unkind attitude towards abruptly softened behaviour of Mahāsena in his treatment of Udayana. Mahāsena says there that he will have to convince the minister of the propriety of such behaviour, which he never does! Another interesting evidence is found in verse 9 of Act III. There according to some interpreters Yaugandharāyaṇa speaks about liberating Udayana, kidnapping Vāsavadattā and taking back the lute Ghoṣavatī, which he never does. This lute does not reappear in the text until verse 16 of Act IV, when Yaugandharāyaṇa says that the betrayal of Udayana had two shapes : one was the artificial blue elephant and another one was the lute. While the first reference is obvious, the second one hangs in mid air. For we do not know of any stratagem involving the lute. Equally incomprehensibly sounds the remark concerning the teaching of lute playing by Udayana to Vāsavadattā. Still more mysteriously sounds verse 19 from which it transpires that Udayana had Mahāsena at his mercy and spared him!

Thus it seems quite clear that the present Act IV is in reality Act V and the

true Act IV is missing, in the way similar to the missing portion of the *Daridracārudatta* and to the missing fragments of the *Svapnavāsavadattā*.

The criterium of the four demeanours is not specially revealing as regards the *Pratijñā*, although here and there one can have interesting insights thanks to it. According to the rules, the introductory scene of this play should be performed in the verbal demeanour. Technically speaking it will be the transference *(āvalgita)* subdivision of the introduction *(āmukha)*. The rest of Act I represents a case of the conscious demeanour and taking the particular situation of Yaugandhārayaṇa who braces himself up for further action by taking a vow, we may justifiably suppose that the whole of this act represents the first category of the conscious demeanour - namely, the so-called challenge *(utthāpaka)*. Act II is, in a way, a repetition of Act I. It presents the opponent's view of the situation and continues in the same demeanour as hitherto. The delicate demeanour is conspicuous by its absence, though, as we know, it is structurally postulated here. The simplest answer, of course, is that considering the particular character of the play it has been purposefully omitted. Still, it is not impossible that taking clue from the conversation of Mahāsena and queen Aṇgāravatī about musical lessons being taken by Vāsavadattā some music and signing might have been introduced in actual performance. The womb span from the point of view of the demeanour seems, at least in its Prakrit part, to represent one of the thirteen types of the *vīthī* called the *trigata* (we would have in it an example of the tenth *rūpaka* also!) and therefore the verbal demeanour will be proper here, as indeed is the practice of the *cākyārs* of Kerala who to this day stage this act of the *Pratijñā* under the name of the *Mantrāṅka*. The Sanskrit portion of this act (at least so far as Yaugandharāyaṇa and Rumaṇvant are concerned) should be staged in the conscious demeanour. The particular situation seems to correspond roughly to the change of action *(parivartaka)* subdivision of this demeanour. The introductory scene of the last act again seems to be the *vīthī* (probably the deception *(chāla)*) and as such represents the verbal demeanour. Although the Sanskrit portion of it might have been partly performed in the violent demeanour. The conscious demeanour makes certainly the proper idiom of scenic action for the rest of Act IV and roughly corresponds to the discourse subdivision of this demeanour *(sallāpaka)*. The play seems to be singularly deficient in both emotional demeanours, i.e., the delicate and the violent failing to fulfil in this respect the stipulation of its definition. The *Pratijñā* emerges from its structural analysis as an exemplary composition : Practically speaking only four span-elements are missing in it - if we do not count the missing Act IV. These elements are the two dalliances, the hindrance of the forehead span and the predicament of the womb span. Some arguments have already been adduced which should explain the absence of all of them with the exception of hindrance, of which is also justified, since the second span concerns the antagonist for whom this is a moment of triumph and introducing

hindrance here would have been an obvious *tour de force*. Of course, this description of the structure of the *Pratijñā* may be challenged in details. But even then it will hold good as a very well done play with its smooth flow of both action and narration and with its events captivating attention. One can say it now, with much more conviction, that had the play been complete it would have to be considered as belonging to the best specimens of Sanskrit dramaturgy.

The *Svapnavasāvadattā* of Bhāsa is called in the colophon of its manuscript a *nāṭaka*[154]). Since it has six acts, a famous king as its hero and since his amorous pastimes constitute its subject-matter, we can accept the colophon description of it as the point of departure for a more detailed analysis. Let us then first try to determine the germinal matter of this play. It is hinted at in verse 4 when Yaugandharāyaṇa assures Vāsavadattā that through the victory of her husband she will regain her former position. This victory is to be ensured by the alliance with the king of Magadha, whose sister Udayana should marry. This aspect of the germinal matter is recalled to the minds of all spectators (who must have obviously known well the story from elsewhere) in the brief exclamation of Yaugandharāyaṇa following verse 6, when on hearing the words of Padmāvatī's chamberlain he says that this is then the daughter of the king of Magadha about whom the astrologers predicted that she would become the wife of the king of Vatsa! So the germinal matter has two interlinked aspects : one is victory associated with the person of Padmāvatī and another is a return of Vāsavadattā to her former position of the most beloved wife of Udayana. It is, therefore, a case of utilising passionate attitudes of the sphere of Love in furthering political ambitions and gains belonging to the sphere of Welfare.

Act I undoubtedly shows the sprouting of this germinal matter and the moment Vāsavadattā disguised as Āvantikā becomes entrusted to Padmāvatī's care, it is well planted indeed with many implications for subsequent events. Let us see then whether the detailed description of span-elements of this act will confirm this contention.

The introductory scene sounds a certain note of apprehension when the *sūtradhāra* informs the audience of a rather high-handed treatment bestowed on the inhabitants of a hermitage. This seems to somehow anticipate the dominant conflict of the play which appears to be the unavoidable clash between two traditional aims of life : namely Welfare and Love to the detriment of the third one, i.e., Virtue. The first scene ends with the entrance of the chamberlain of the king of Magadha. The main protagonists of it are two : Yaugandharāyaṇa and Vāsavadattā. The last one in her dejected frame of mind brings up to the surface very crucial problems which elucidated upon by Yaugandharāyaṇa become a veiled yet quite apparent suggestion *(upakṣepa)* as to the germinal matter of the play. Vāsavadattā asks her companion on hearing the crude order of the two guards : - who is it that turns us away in this manner? It is someone who turns himself away from Virtue answers Yaugandharāyaṇa. Now, we should remember

that the *summum bonum* of the Indian idea of human life is an attainment of the three ends of life *(trivarga)*. Yaugandharāyaṇa perhaps is aware of the conflict which his actions have provoked. The conflagration of Lāvāṇaka and faked widow hood for Udayana had only one aim of reinstating the paramount power of Kauśāmbī and thus Love sphere in the form of Vāsavadattā had to yield to the Welfare of Kauśāmbī. A conclusion might follow that this infringement upon Love sphere puts the action in question also in conflict with Virtue, since we know that the three should be harmoniously striven for. But if we remember that the love of Udayana and Vāsavadattā has not been legalised so far, as well as the dictum of the *Kāmasūtra* (1.2.15) that Welfare is the main aim of the king, then we cannot unreservedly condemn Yaugandharāyaṇa's and Rumaṇvant's machinations. The next scene in which we come to know princess Padmāvatī and the vedic student is of help *(parikara)* in delineating the composite texture of the whole happening. Here we learn about the prohecy regarding Padmāvatī's and Udayana's matrimony, we witness the growth of her love for him and we come to know the details of the conflagration at Lāvāṇaka. Here also in verse 13 there is once again the suggestion to be found that Vāsavadattā might not be really dead. The same portion of the story makes a sort of extension *(parinyāsa)* into the past, for from what happens on the stage we can infer that the present uneasy situation is due to Yaugandharāyaṇa's efforts to rebuild the Kauśāmbian empire. There can be no doubt that by the same token the plot becomes alluring *(vilobhana)*, for by now its virtues are obvious. Bhāsa takes, may-be even too much, care to develop in the first span his plot in such a way that there can be no misgivings as to how it is going to proceed on. The decision *(yukti)* is taken by Yaugandharāyaṇa the very moment he entrusts Vāsavadattā to the care of Padmāvatī. From this, as well as from the prohecy which he mentioned, we know that Udayana and Padmāvatī have to become man and wife and we can infer that this will also bring the amelioration of Vāsavadattā's fate. From our point of view this may appear a singularly non-thrilling technique of story-telling. Yet in India what is attractive about a well-known story is not what will happen, but how it will happen? All these elements quite obviously determine the subject-matter of the play infused with an optimism stemming from the fact that all protagonists through a series of initial moves might hope for an accession *(prāpti)* of their aims Thus main features of the entire action are settled *(samādhāna)* and the germinal subject-matter presented, for out of the predicament of the conflagration of Lāvāṇaka, out of the disguise of Vāsavadattā and out of her sojourn with Padmāvatī the subsequent action will sprout. It is certainly very exciting to see how Bhāsa takes care of one of the most important elements of the head span, i.e., the arrangement *(vidhāna)*. How does he present it as a conflict of happiness and despair? Padmāvatī - the repository of Virtue, of whom it is twice said 'dear to Virtue' and 'dear to those who are agreeable to Virtue' - represents harmony and happiness.

Yaugandharāyaṇa in his turn seems indirectly to acknowledge that what he has done might appear as not quite in tune with Virtue, for removing, more or less forcibly, someone from his or her place in a society, even if there is certain irregularity about the right to this place, and assuming incognito means 'to turn oneself away from Virtue'. The fruit of such a deed has to be insult added to injury, which Vāsavadattā so clearly experiences as a more or less willing or consenting party to the plot. Inspite of what has been said above, the division of happiness and despair is not only external. It does also colour the frame of mind of both Vāsavadattā and Padmāvatī. Padmāvatī's happiness is tarnished by apprehension regarding Udayana himself and also his feelings, while Vāsavadattā's misery is brightened by proofs of Udayana's great love for her. The contemplation *(paribhāvanā)* of the complexity of life which naturally excites curiosity reverberates in the stanzas recited by Yaugandharāyaṇa (3, 4, 15), by the chamberlain (10) and by the student (13). The disclosure *(udbheda)* should be considered a general tendency of the first span. Bhāsa skilfully unveils the most important elements of the plot beginning with a rather symbolical disguise of Yaugandharāyaṇa and Vāsavadattā, through the appearance on the stage of Padmāvatī up to the revelations of the vedic student. The activity *(karaṇa),* of course full of enterprise and endeavour, throbs right through the first span but its most pronounced moment is when Yaugandharāyaṇa requests Padmāvatī to accept Āvantikā-Vāsavadattā's guardian-ship. The head span should, like on a chess-board after initial moves, leave the situation fairly well outlined, the particular interests of all the protagonists and antagonists determined and the degree of dissension *(bheda)* defined. Partly the ingenuity of Yaugandharāyaṇa and partly fate create such a situation in which conflicting interests of the two heroines are bound together. Yet, this seems to be a problem of secondary importance, for ploygamy was a more ar less normal thing. The political undercurrent also runs concurently and it is rather harmony then dissension which finally emerges from the situation. Unless we take the account of the past events, i.e., the conflagration of Lāvāṇaka and the disappearance of Vāsavadattā to be a part of this span, we shall have to admit that the last span-element is not much pronounced conflict-wise.

No doubt the wedding of Udayana and Padmāvatī uncovers substantially the germinal matter and constitutes the most important effort in bringing about the achievement of the ultimate fruit. Yet, it is good to remember that it is only mentioned in the second and third acts and not actually shown on the stage. Bhāsa's conception of the forehead span, therefore, appears to be rather unorthodox. This is a little surprising for it could be seen that the first span has been conceived in what can be considered an orthodox way. Yet, all the unusual deviations in the structure of this drama will become more justified, if we acknowledge that un undercurrent of a political intrigue engineered by Yaugandharāyaṇa is of major importance in this play. We would say that in a way

the four inner acts representing the three inner spans of the plot show only certain outer manifestations of a process which has been initiated by Yaugandharāyaṇa, while the first span lasted. The vehemence and ruthlessness of the political intrigue has uprooted Vāsavadattā, in whose fate it is reflected. Bhāsa seems to show how Love deprived of the clear sanction of Virtue fares when it has to yield to the exigencies of the sphere of Welfare. Vāsavadattā's love for Udayana first of all was not legalised with the formal nuptial ceremony, but even had it been so, anyway she would have had to agree to sacrifice it for the sake of forging an alliance with the kingdom of Magadha and thus reestablish Kauśāmbian paramouncy. But while such reason may explain her behaviour it cannot absolve her from its ill effects. This is what Yaugandharāyaṇa indicates when he tells her that even gods when not recognised suffer privations.

But let us return now to the span-element analysis of the two acts of the forehead span. Aiming at love's fulfilment is the abvious manifestation *(vilāsa)* of this part of the plot. The actual effort has been probably done behind the scene possibly by minister Rumaṇvant who must have made Udayana visit Magadha. What we see on the stage is just an aftermath of those happenings. While Padmāvatī is carried towards the fulfilment of her dreams, Vāsavadattā's grief augments but at the same time she too finds herself quite close to her husband, although still bound by her tragic incognito. Thus the pursuit of an object of action is in this case rather an element of resistence *(vidhūta)*. Undoubtedly, one of the major motifs of this span is the perplexity *(tāpana)* stemming from separation, which appears by the end of Act II and is developed in Act III, The opening scene of Act II might be considered the argument *(pragayaṇa)*, provided we do not expect too much of it. The element of hindrance *(nirodha)* followed up by the pacification *(paryupāsana)* ends Act II when Vāsavadattā learns about Udayana's decision to marry Padmāvatī and derives comfort from the knowledge that it was not at his initiative. The verbal politeness *(puṣpa)* is an elusive element. We can, of course, insist that there are traces of it in the dialogue of Act II, though neither the *Nāṭyaśāstra* nor Abhinavagupta sufficiently define this element to draw any firm conclusion. Considering the easy flow of action in this span it would be an obvious *'tour de force' to* indicate here the thunderbolt *(vajra)* element. There is no place for a realy angry retort and Padmāvatī's *'apehi'* at the beginning of Act II does not suffice. The only moment of this span where we could point an announcement *(upanyāsa)* are the words of Padmāvatī right before the entrance of the nurse - for here a deduction concerning the possibility of Udayana being seen by the inhabitants of Ujjayinī is concluded with an announcement that it is good luck to be agreeable to all. While the first span usually ends with a presentation of all participating in the plot, the second gives a chance to fasten the ties that bound them together in an element of interconnection of characters *(varnasaṁhāra)*, Thus the wedding of Udayana and Padmāvatī both literally and figuratively brings together main

protagonists although the hero himself is absent from the stage and his minister is even a more distant figure. As a matter of fact whatever happens in the subsequent portions of the play happens strictly as a consequence of what has taken place in the forehead span.

The wedding of Udayana with Padmāvatī created a situation in which the germinal matter of Udayana's victory and of Vāsavadattā's restoration to her original position seems to be in sight and thus a very strong hope is generated of the imminent and not very distant fulfilment of action. Of course, for those who remember the political undercurrent, the final fulfilment may only come after the actual victory of the thus forged coalition over Āruṇi. This happens after Act V ends. Nevertheless, Act IV certainly represents the womb span and this is born out well by the following detailed analysis of this act.

The *praveśaka* or the introductory scene in Act IV is a humorous *'alter ego'* of the womb span. The jester finds himself in a similar situation to that of Udayana. Having united in happy 'marriage' with comfort he is missing his first and foremost beloved, i.e., good digestion. Act IV proper begins with apparently meaningless conversation regarding flowers in the garden, which in its course brings the confession of love of both ladies taking part in it. This revelation *(ākṣipti)* of their feelings constitutes a harmonious accord with a similar scene which takes place between the king and his jester. Put before it, comes the entrance of Udayana and Vasantaka abruptly interrupts the conversation of the ladies with a note of exaggeration which is rather characteristic of this span of action when the hopes are high but danger still in view. The sixth arrow of Kāma symbolises well Udayana's state of mind. And the background to Udayana's exaggerated words furnished by Vasantaka's description of the locale still enhances further this note of longing. The sequence of events which follow appears to consist of two similar waves, one built of an element of inference *(anumāna)* and outwitting *(adhibala)* and the other of inference and fabrication *(abhūtāharaṇa)*. Both times the king infers the proximity of Padmāvatī from various traces. But while the first time the ladies acting upon the advice of the maid-servant give a slip to the king and his jester, thus outwitting them, the second time it is Vāsavadattā who outwits through the element of fabrication the inquisitive maid when she asks for the reason of Vāsavadattā's tears. As it has been already indicated, there, once again during the conversation of the king and the jester, comes about the revelation of what both of them really feel about the ladies. Both moments of revelation are crucial to this span of the plot, for it is then that Udayana and Vāsavadattā alike declare their satisfaction blurred by the continuing separation. A humorous confession of the jester which terminates this element provokes not so much angry speech *(toṭaka)* as a heart-rending one when Vasantaka once again drives home the sad truth of Vāsavadattā's death. His words also terminate a situation which

lasted right from the entrance of the king. It was precisely the first chance *(krama)* of the meeting of Vāsavadattā and Udayana. Although Udayana does not participate consciously in it - like Vāsavadattā - yet somehow subconsciously he yields to the atomosphere and his spontanous reaction to Vasantaka's confession with the words : 'All this I shall tell the queen Vāsavadattā!' brings the highest pitch of this span. It finally ends in what seems to be a delicate attempt at outwitting Padmāvatī who witnessed unobserved the entire conversation and now can well appreciate the courteous behaviour of both the jester and his master.

The reader may remember that it is exactly in this span that the intrigue should appear in the span-element of fabrication and of outwitting and the predicament should be present in the span-element of the same name. Now, while the first two of them have been pointed out it seems they have rather ornamental value of no consequence for the subsequent development of action. On the other hand the element of predicament is entirely missing. This is so because whatever happens in this play is an aftermath of the intrigue engineered by the ministers earlier and resulting in the make-believe predicament of the conflagration of the village of Lāvāṇaka. Bhāsa's treatment of this span - if this analysis is accepted - proves that in his time the theory of structure was by no means exerting a stiffling influence upon the creative imagination of playwrights and in no way limited their freedom.

Act V presents a situation which is dominated by Udayana's sad reflection concerning his erstwhile wife Vāsavadattā. By bringing them dangerously close together it also threatens the execution of Yaugandharāyaṇa's political plan. Of this Vāsavadattā is well aware. Probably the entourage of the king was afraid that if Udayana discovers Vāsavadattā before subjugating Āruṇi with the help of his brother-in-law-, he may well send back Padmāvatī and the coalition will break. Or else the news will reach king Darśaka, the brother of Padmāvatī and he himself may back out from such an unwanted alliance. As we see, the germinal matter is in grave danger and therefore Act V constitutes a reflection span. Structurally speaking this span is an obvious repetition of the womb span, though the elements used for the actual construction of this span might be different. Both the hero and the heroine are brought near each other even in a more striking way than previously. So much so that they rest upon the same couch. The king dreams and dreaming talks to Vāsavadattā. Then comes awakening and once more the jester with his cruel words. It is the degree of intensity which makes out of what could have been a phase of hope - a phase of frustration. The same degree of intensity is responsible for the choice of the distress *(kheda)* element as a leit-motif of the reflection span. It is once again anticipated in an introductory scene. The headache of Padmāvatī is symbolical of the deficient happiness which has become Udayana's share. The distress which has overcome him already is expressed in the very first stanza that he recites.

It rises to the highest pitch in the first stanaza and lasts till Udayana's awakening when it changes into an element of denial *(pratiṣedha).* the executor of which - as mentioned before - is the jester. Gaining in intensity this element by the end becomes the element of blockade *(virodhana)* when Vasantaka calls the whole mental preoccupation of the king with what he believes was a dream - a vanity *(anartha).* With the entrance of the chamberlain of the king the germ oriented action is effectively grasped *(ādāna)* again when he announces readiness of the entire army for the final battle with Āruṇi. The optimistic *(prarocanā)* note transpiring from the spirited words of the king bracing himself up for the fight ends the fourth span of the plot and at the same time Act V of the play. One of the most interesting aspects of this span is the element of grasping which brings to the surface - if only for a while - the political undercurrent of the play to which the fate of Vāsavadattā is linked very closely. A success in politics means after all her reunion with the husband. The element of distress lasting rather long is interspersed, as if in continuation of the previous span, with some of its elements. This is the agitation *(udvega)* at the sight of an imaginary serpent and the inference regarding Padmāvatī's supposed presence in the lake-bower (V.4). Apart from that the king twice adresses to the jester the words of contempt, although it hardly can be considered the dazzling *(dyuti)* contempt and in stanzas 5 and 6 narrates *(nirṇaya)* his past experiences, thus introducing an element of the subsequent span.

In the last Act VI the germinal matter undoubtedly resolves itself in the attainment of the fruit of action. The kingdom has been regained and Vāsavadattā recognised and reinstated as the queen, but only after the news had arrived that the nuptial ceremony was duly performed, though only by proxy of painted images. Thus certainly Act VI constitutes the accomplishment span. The subsequent analysis of it from the point of view of its elements strengthens further this conviction.

The supporting scene *(viṣkambhaka)* of this act recalls the spirit of distress so characteristic of the preceding span. The entrance of the envoys of the queen Aṅgāravatī, the mother of Vāsavadattā anticipates the most important aspect of the last span, i.e., the element of mystery *(upagūhana).* The entrance of Udayana opens Act VI with a reprimand *(paribhāṣaṇa)* addressed to the ungrateful lute of Vāsavadattā. This reproachful spirit in the next stanza evolves in to the narration (nirṇaya) of past experiences. Now, this element will be coming up again many times untie stanza 13. It can be heard in stanzas 4, 5, 8 and it is picked up also in the prose passage in which the nurse of Vāsavadattā relates the message of her mother. Finally it transpires from the sad words of the hero when watching the picture of his dead wife. Major as the narration element is, it is not the sole master on the stage. The entrance of the envoys spans *(saṁdhi)* the events of the last span with those of the first and it also constitutes an awakening *(vibodha)* with regard to those aspects of action which after the lapse of

the first span have been more or less dropped..An admixture of the reprimand element reverberates in the words of the king, when he wonders what might be the reaction of her father Mahāsena (VI.4) to the news of Vāsavadattā's demise and it also can be felt in the extremely interesting pronouncement of the chamberlain of Mahāsena which is a tirade against fate. For it is the only instance at which somebody in the play voices a doubt which most obviously is at the back of everybody's mind. Namely: is it correct to play so ruthlessly with human beings and their feelings just for political ends? The chamberlain does not blame wicked politicians and he even does not revolt against fate. But the doubt is there, though the chamberlain in a true Indian way tends to consider the entire problem unavoidable, betraying his attitude in the optative mood he employs.

The next element which is as it were - superimposed upon the narration element is that of a delight *(prīti),* which is expressed in the words of the king enquiring with great reverence about the well-being of his "erstwhile" in-laws (VI.6 and 9) and also in those of the chamberlain adressed to the king (VI.7, 10). When the king acknowledges the message of queen Aṅgāravatī, the element of delight changes into one of oration *(bhāṣaṇa),* bringing in the spirit of conciliation and generosity. Now, the main motif of the last span sets in, i.e., the element of mystery. It begins when Vāsavadattā's portrait brought by the envoys from Ujjayinī is unveiled and lasts till the revelation concerning the identity of an ascetic who appears to be Yaugandharāyaṇa himself. It can be called the element of mystery, for along the true identity of the so-called Āvantikā it reveals the fact that she has never been formally betrothed to Udayana, so their love has never been brought into the sphere of Virtue. In what impresses us as a very meaningful way, the fact of the performance of required nuptial rites on the painted substitutes of the bride and the bridegroom is - through these very Substitutes (i.e.,portrats)- conected with the final act of amelioration in Vāsavadattā's fate. For only when the sacramental ceremony had been performed around the nuptial fire-altar it was possible to recognise the heroine as the wife *par excellence* of the king. Otherwise she was just Āvantikā. It also sheds additional light on the attitudes of all concerned, which at first glance seems to us today so unacceptable, for purely love relationship when deprived of the ritualistic sanctity proper to the sphere of Virtue has to give way to the demands of Welfare of the empire. Further on while this element lasts there again appears an element called the span when the germinal matter of the head span is picked up by the announcement of the arrival of Yaugandharāyaṇa in the garb of ascetic. In the retrospect *(pūrvavākya)* which follows he wonders what will possibly be the reaction of the king (VI. 15) and it is exactly this reaction which makes Yaugandharāyaṇa answer in the form of the oration (VI. 16). Now with great joy *(ānanda)* the king discovers the true identity of the ascetic and of Vāsavadattā. The final deliverance *(samaya)* from all miseries comes,

Vāsavadattā's oration addressed to Padmāvatī follows and then comes a reprimand with which the king speaks about minister Rumaṇvant. An element of termination *(kāvyasaṁhāra)* is apparently missing from the play and the final laudation *(praśasti)* follow directly.

While in the case of the *Pratijñā* the demeanours helped us to discover little of extraordinary importance (may-be with the exception of the *vīthī*) here the situation changes diametrically. Act I opens up as usual with the introductory scene representing the verbal demeanour and in particular its opening of the story *(kathodghāta)* subdivision. The rest of this act seems to have been meant for performance in the conscious demeanour, for it represents the changes of action subdivision of this demeanour. Acts II and III yield the most interesting results when considered in the light of demeanours. The two span-elements representing the delicate demeanour in the second span are conspicuous by their absence from our analysis of this span. This has been done on purpose, for if we consider these elements as marking only the presence of an outright humour in the play, as M.M. Ghosh would suggest, then we shall have to admit that it is either completely absent or slightly pronounced. It seems that these two acts of the *Svapna* are instances of the element of splendid dalliance understood also as representing the delicate demeanour. Act II corresponds to the element of spendid dalliance, for there is a bit of hide-and-seek in it. From the point of view of the delicate demeanour it could be taken for the eruption of dalliance, since it does suggest many feelings which do not resolve themselves into a fulfledged *rasa.* Act III, structurally speaking, is also the element of splendid dalliance representing with its characteristic self-reproach in separation the first subdivision of the delicate demeanour called dalliance. Now the practical consequence of this conclusion - if it is accepted as valid - is important, for as we already know, the delicate demeanour is characterised by plenty of music, song and dance. The two acts in question are from the literary point of view evidently less elaborate than the other acts. The absence of stanzas stands out prominently. Brevity of these acts constitutes another similar element. Besides, the dialogues and soliloquies seem to be rather skeletal and sketchy. The only possibility to explain the lack of balance is that they were substantially elaborated in actual theatrical production with music, song and dance.

The delicate demeanour in the same. configuration is repeated in Acts IV and V. Act IV is an obvious amplification of Act II. In Act II it were the ladies alone. In Act IV they are joined by Udayana and the jester. Further, in Act V, once again, is a similar amplification of Act III. As in the *Pratijñā*, Bhāsa betrays here also his musical feeling for rythm in the arrangement of acts. The last accord of the reflection span (Act V) is the conscious demeanour of the chamberlain and the violeut demeanour of Udayana himself, who in the last verse that he recites pictures, as it were, the entire fight with the hated Āruṇi. The *cākyārs* of Kerala perform this stanza in a manner

which corresponds exactly to the violent demeanour, as it has been described in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Finally the last act after the verbal demeanour of the *viṣkambhaka* introduces the delicate demeanour in the scene with the *vīṇā* which later on changes into the couscious demeanor that duly ends the play. The *viṣkambhaka* presents most probably the advance subdivision (pravṛttaka) of the introduction. The *vīṇā* scene is without doubt the dalliance and the conscious demeanour is represented here probably in its change of action subdivision.

The span theory presents an ideal image of action as conceived by Indian thought. The way it has been considered by playwrights will betray either their creativity or their mere slavishness. Here we shall risk a general opinion that Bhāsa does not treat the span theory, especially in its detail of the sixty four span-elements, very rigidly. The smooth flow of his language and the miniaturesque quality of the scenes rather well knit together make of this drama quite attractive material for performnce. Yet, his disregard of some of the span-elements cannot always be counted to his advantage. The omission of such elements as the resistance, the argument, the thunderbolt, etc. deprives the play of quite a lot of dramatic tension. Also the fact that some of them have a more or less formal character and are related to the germinal matter in a very insignificant way, as for instance the dissension of the head span, the announcement of the forehead span and the dazzlement of the reflection span, does not contribute positively to the play. An omission of the termination element of the last span at least in its full fledged form is responsible for the rather abrupt way in which the play ends. In this respect it has to be noted that Bhāsa does not skilfully resolve the element of mystery. The trivial - Go inside, queen, together with Padmāvatī - is not sufficiently balanced by the following orations. Consequently the play makes an impression that somebody has tampered with it - the only way to absolve Bhāsa of its shortcomings. The absence of the termination element, the problem of missing verse found only in the *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*[155] and certain abruptness with which some of the motifs of the play end, indicates this possibility quite strongly. Especially, since we positively know that the *cākyārs* who have preserved this play do not perform the dramas they have in their repertoire following strictly the text.

Summing up we have to say that while eliminating totally the political undercurrent from the three inner spans of the play - it is brought back in what strikes us as a sudden and artificial way by the end of the reflection span - Bhāsa has shorn it of a great deal of its dramatic appeal. What we mean can be well exemplified by a comparison with the *Mṛcchakaṭika* where the political motif lends to the story of Vasantasenā's and Cārudatta's love quite a lot of excitement. All this granted we still should remember that the elimination of political undercurrent was most probably quite consciously intended by Bhāsa.

Now the *Pratijñā* being a *prakaraṇa* has a minister for the hero. The *Svapna*

being a *nāṭaka* has a king for its hero. The *puruṣārtha* of the first is Welfare and this would also be in harmony with it being a *prakaraṇa*. Similarly Love is the *puruṣārtha* of the second play, as it indeed befits a *nāṭaka*. All this granted, a moment of further and deeper reflection will reveal that Bhāsa intended here a kind of comedy of pretences. Indeed the true hero of the *Pratijñā* is - as some suspect rightly, though on different grounds - Udayana and the proper *puruṣārtha* of this play is Love and its fulfilment, although as reflected in the mirror of politics. The *Svapna* on the other hand seems to be a reversed proposal. The true engineer of the plot and its real hero is Yaugandharāyaṇa (practically absent from the stage in the way Udayana is absent in the *Pratijñā)* and its proper *puruṣārtha* is the Welfare of the paramount lordship over the kingdom of Kauśāmbī and over the world, but as reflected in the mirror of Love of the two women towards Udayana. This is why these twin plays have to be a *prakaraṇa* and a *nāṭaka* and nothing else.

The basic question connected with this analysis should be answered now. Do the results of the critical examination of the two plays of Bhāsa conducted with the help of the criteria reformulated on these pages following the *Nāṭyaśāstra* justify the amount of time and labour invested in their reformulation? To this question the answer is in guarded affirmative. Guarded - because so for the tools have been applied comprehensively to these two dramas. So it would be preposterous to assume equally optimistic results in all other cases. Nevertheless, present results are highly encouraging. Let me repeat the most striking of them in order of their relative importance :

a) the description of the ethical content in the terms of Love -Welfare *(kāma-artha)* correlation,
b) pointing out of the missing act of the *Pratijñā* and determination of its being a *prakaraṇa* and not a *nāṭikā*,
c) pointing out of the inner harmony in the distribution of acts of these two plays,
d) the indication that the *vīthī* is to be looked for within the dramas of larger types[156)] and finally
e) the conclusion that the missing of important span-elements which cannot be explained by some internal considerations may indicate that the text has been tampered with.

Promising results of the analysis of the two plays of Bhasa encourage us to take up for similar analysis the magnum opus of the sanskrit dramatic literature - the *Śakuntalā* of *Kālidāsa*.

Footnotes :

151. Among other important sources we consulted Pusalker's Bhāsa, knowing from the footnote in the English translation of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* by M.M. Ghosh (p. 365, vol. I) that he touched upon this subject. By the way M.M. Ghosh himself is sure of the *Pratijñā* being a *prakaraṇa* (p. 363), but he does not say why it has only four acts. Pusalker says nothing that would contradict our opinion.

152. It should be stressed at this place that *saṁdhyaṅgas*, i.e., span-elements represent aspects or trends in the development of plot. They may be at places visible as concrete situations, but this may not always be so.

153. It is tempting to try to reconstruct the missing act. Unhappily contrary to the expectations the *Kathāsaritsāgara* does not succour us here, for this moment of action is not delved upon there too. This may be interpreted as an argument against our thesis. Yet, one should not forget that Bhāsa on the whole quite freely improved upon the source of his inspiration, which after all was not the *Kathāsaritasāgara* in its present form.

154. That it is not proposition of the editor is clear from the fact that the first edition of the *Svapna* notes some variant readings of the colophon.

155. Nāṭyadarpaṇa of Rāmacandra and Guaṇacandra GOS XLVIII, Baroda 1959, p. 74 :
Pādākrāntāni puṣpāṇi soṣmaṁ cedaṁ śilātalam,
nūnaṁ kācid ihāsīnā māṁ dṛṣṭvā sahasā gatā.

156. This result constitutes a practical confirmation of V. Raghavan's point of view expressed in a paper entitled :
A Note on the Name *"Daśarūpaka"*, Journal of Oriental Research, vol. VII, pp. 277-290. Madras 1933.

VI. THE ANALYSIS OF THE *ŚAKUNTALĀ*

The *Śakuntalā* of Kālidāsa reveals unexpected layers of meaning when it is analysed according to the principles of traditional criticism.

Let us then see what we can gain by analysing the *Śakuntalā* while taking recourse to the traditional analytical instrumentarium. The task in the case of this play is somewhat complicated for we have to identify five spans in a play of seven acts. Yet, it may be a fair guess that the head span corresponds to Act I. It is in this act that the germ of the subject-matter is sown in the span-element of suggestion */upakṣepa/*. It is there in the form of the blessing of the *vaikhānasa* hermits who say that the king may become the father of a son. The *Śakuntalā* is not only a love play. Before all it is a drama of /un/fulfilled fatherhood. Love here is instrumental in bringing about the fruition of the germ. The span-element of allurement */vilobhana/* opens the play with the hunting scene - *a mṛgatṛṣṇa par excellence*. Stopped in his hunting spree by the hermits Duṣyanta decides to stay at the hermitage /the span-element of decision/*yukti/*. The span-element of accession */prāpti/* follows when the king meets Śakuntalā and learns that she belongs to *kṣatrīya varṇa* in the span-element of disclosure */udbheda/*. It seems that the head span and consequently Act I end with the span-element of arrangement */vidhāna/* in which the hero describes his state of mind as comparable to a silk banner which while moving forward as if tries to fly back with the wind. True to the definition of this span-element happiness and sorrow vie with each other for the better here.

Since the leading note of the forehead span is an effort, Act II seems to betray features which make it correspond to this span. The king does not spare an effort to remain at the hermitage. Striving after love's fulfilment which constitutes the content of the span-element of manifestation */vilāsa/* is quite prominent here. Similarly the span-element of pursuit */parisarpa/* of the main aim of efforts of the hero stands out clearly. The span-element of perplexity */tāpana/* is discernible in the first couplet of this act, as well as in king's reaction to the news about the queen mother wishing to see him /verse 17/. Of course, his efforts of extending his sejour at the hermitage meet with resistance / the span-element of *vidhūta/* precisely when the orders of the queen mother to return to the palace reach him. This event may also be taken for the span-element of hindrance */nirodha/*. *Vidūṣaka* - the jester not only salvages Duṣyanta from this predicament

but also introduces the span-element of dalliance */narman/* and of splendid dalliance */narmadyuti/*. The way in which by the end of this span the main protagonists of the play are posed in relation to each other indicates the oncoming of the span-element of interconnection of characters */varṇasaṁhāra/*. All what is going to happen further on is determined here by the particular - also emotional - interconnection of main *dramatis personae*.

The womb span which follows, being central to the entire plot, plays most obviously from an emotional point of view an ascending part and a descending one. The upward trend of this span is marked at the beginning of Act III when Śakuntalā confesses to her friends her love for the king, who overhears their conversation in the span-element called revelation */ākṣipti/*. Now the very apex of this span is marked by the span-element called chance */krama/* for at this stage the *paramārtha* of the play is attained albeit true to the definition of this span in a momentary or partial way. Such moment comes at the end of Act III in verse 21 where Duṣyanta insists that the *gāndharva vivāha* is perfectly legitimate and in the next verse 22 he says that he will not let Śakuntalā go untill he does not drink the essence of her lips. It is actually after these words and before the entrance of Gautamī, the nun, that their very physical union takes place. Their love is duly consumated and Śakuntalā conceives thus bestowing upon Duṣyanta the much desired fatherhood, very true to the blessings of the hermits. Act IV constitutes the other half of the womb span characterised by a descending trend ushered in by the span-element of angry speech */toṭaka/* which actually consists of the irate pronouncements of Durvāsas. The span-element of supplication */prārthana/* duly follows and as a result of the entrieties of the two friends of Śakuntalā Durvāsas mitigates his curse. It is interesting to note that one of them shares her name with the mother of Durvāsas! Yet for the time being this does not prevent the situation from deteriorating further and Anasūya in what appeares to be the span-element of agitation */udvega/* voices her apprehension because the king has not even sent a letter after abandoning Śakuntalā at the hermitage. The downward trend of this span is somewhat mitigated by the span-element of inference */anumāna/* in which Kaśyapa learns from the god of fire himself that Śakuntalā married Duṣyanta and conceived. In what seems to be the span-element of propitiation */saṁgraha/* he generously accepts the news, blesses Śakuntalā and sends her off as a lawfully wedded wife to the court of Duṣyanta. There are yet two span-elements of consequence here. One is predicament */vidrava/* when anticipating the events of the next span the two friends of Śakuntalā remind her that in case Duṣyanta will not recognise her, she should show him the fatal ring. Śakuntalā reacts to this with great apprehension and fear. But inspite of this sombre tone, the womb span leaves us with an optimistic note when in what might be the span-element of right way */marga/* Kaśyapa answering the question of Śakuntalā when is she going to return to

the hernitage says that she will come back together with her husband after her son is annointed as the king. Thus he makes a solemn statement of truth. In this way it becomes also a conjecture as to the course of future events /the span-element of symptom, i.e., *rūpa/*.

As if to augment the shattering impact of future events the span of reflection begins with conciliatory efforts aiming at placation of the king in the span-element of exertion */śakti/*. In the same run of action of this span the perseverance of the party of Śakuntalā is clearly evident in the form of the span-element of determination */vyavasāya/* which stems not so much from a vow as from the injunction of Kaśyapa supported by the authority of the god of fire himself. Further on the span-element of reverence */prasaṅga/* is also clearly discernible in the course of the opening scenes of Act V. Yet this somewhat placid flow of action ends abruptly with the words of Gautamī / V. 16/ which announce the oncoming of the span-element of reproach *apavāda/*. This will gain in intensity to assume a character of confrontation in the span-element of the same name */saṁpheṭa/* in the form of an angry dialogue which takes place and heralds the span-element of insolence */drava/* obviously shown here to those like the king himself who commonly commands highest respect. These words of contempt usher in the span-element of dazzlement */dyuti/* and the span-element of distress */kheda/* which will underpin the entire span of reflection until the end of act VI when the king departs to the realm of gods. Indeed this span is punctuated by all those span-elements which characterise deep crisis. Thus forceful denial of Śakuntalās's wifehood by the king in the span-element of the same name */pratiṣedha/* evolves into an effective blocade (*virodhana*) when Śakuntalā is whisked away from this earth by her nymph-mother. The span-element of distress */kheda/* appears in full view again when, after the ring had been recovered from the fishermen the king remembers Śakuntalā and realising what he had done sinks into the abyss of despair which grows upon him until he exclaims in verse 10 /Act VI/ that what is happening to him must be either a dream, an illusion or the fruit of this past misdeeds and that his yearnings crumble like washed away banks of a river! The king continues to bewail his fate in the very true spirit of distress */kheda/*. Yet the loss of Śakuntalā is not the only reason of his sorrow. Even more acutely he is pained by the loss of his progeny whom Śakuntalā carried in her womb. The case of a merchant called Dhanamitra who perished at sea childless, brings to his tormented mind the whole tragedy of his own childlessness and the anguish which it causes makes him to faint /Act VI.25/. It is only the arrival of Mātali, the chariteer of Indra who like in a dream brings the invitation of gods to abandon the earth and join them in their world to wage the eternal war upon demons. Thus ends the reflection span.

The last span of accomplishment */nirvahaṇa/* is not controversial. It corresponds to Act VII of the play and the climax of it in the form of the span-element of mystery

/upagūhana/ comes about when Duṣyanta touches the amulet-string of young Sarvadamana which does not turn into a serpent and in such miraculous */adbhuta/* way the king is recognised as the father of the child and consequently Śakuntalā, the mother of the child is restored to him as his wife. Thus true to the injunction of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* the play ends with the taste of wonder - *adbhuta rasa*!

In this case too one could carry on a very meticulous span-elementwise analysis. But by now - we trust - the utility of the scheme has been amply proved. Since the accomplishment span as we see does not hide special secrets, we have therefore refrained from equally precise as above procedure so that reader's patience may not be overtaxed. Instead let us now try to interpret the results thus obtained.

The fact that the germ of the play is the blessing of the hermits regarding the birth of a son to Duṣyanta changes diametrically our perception of the entire drama.

Wrathful Durvāsas, the Naked-one the son of Atri and Anasūya identical with Śiva himself curses Śakuntalā. His curse represents the continuation of the same feud between gods and men which made Indra to sent Menaka in order to thwart Viśvamitra's bid for paramouncy. Now the story repeats itself. Śiva - Durvāsas standing at the gate o the hermitage is spurned by Śakuntalā like Viṣṇu by Urvaśī for the sake of mere mortal. Was it in the case of Śakuntalā only lack normal hospitality as we understand it today? Durvāsas must have known the state of her mind. This is implied by the content of his curse. In love with Duṣyanta she was not able to surrender herself soul and body to the god who stood at the treshold of Kaṇva's hermitage. He might have not accepted *talpadāna*[157)] but he certainly expected comparable spiritual surrender of which Śakuntalā was incapable. Such an interpretation gives an unexpectedly sharp edge to the conflict and the deeply hurt pride and ambition of the god explains well the unusual severity of his curse. It required the namesake of the mother of Durvāsas to mitigate the devastating force of the curse.

The next important event of the play comes with the verse 22 Act III which denotes consumation of Śakuntalā's and Duṣyanta's love and marks the highest peak of the span of hope. Śakuntalā legally married a *kṣatrīya* according to *gāndharva* rite and received her husband's ring as the token of recognition. She also conceived giving Duṣyanta his much coveted son and heir. Of course all along we are aware of the tragic curse of Durvāsas and actually we anticipate the moment when Śakuntalā facing the doubting king touches her finger looking for the ring in vain. Now the mood deteriorates rapidly and as Act V ends Śakuntalā parts with this earth. Today having been firmly held in the grip of *kaliyuga* we could have said that Śakuntalā dies. She returns to her mother's abode radically changing the mode of her existence - she parts company with mortals! But it all takes place within the context of reincarnation, so there is no finality about what happens to her. Of yore the treshold of life and death

was crossed easily and both ways, since both life and death are categories of perceptible reality. After all within the circle of *saṁsāra* death is but an interim *svargavāsa* /sojourn in heaven/[158]. And not only for Śakuntalā: the despairing king is also invited to heaven by the gods and the symbol of final departure that we know so well from elsewhere[159], a chariot of the gods - is despatched to fetch him. Mātali, the charioteer of Indra whom the king greets as a dear friend - a deliverer from his tragic predicament, for *Vidūṣaka* is an invisible deadly menace who is about to break his bones and kill him! Ordinary mortal cannot see him. But the king who in his deep swoon, like in a coma, has already put one foot over the treshold of death, not only can see him but also welcomes him with great enthusiasm. Thus boarding the chariot of gods, like so many heroes before him, the king leaves behind the world of mortals and follows his beloved. It will be only there that Śakuntalā and Duṣyanta together will enjoy the fruit of their union. It is from there that they will return to the world of mortals as if reborn to complete their cycle of existence.

The germ of the play is *putralābha* /getting male progeny/ and thus discharging one of the three fundamental debts with which each man is born into this world[160], i.e., the debt one owes to the forefathers, is its main objective. It is therefore obvious that the play is an expression of the fascination with Virtue */ dharma śṛñgāra/* and as such may be termed as having virtue as its first objective */dharmpradhāna/.* Consequently verbal and conscious demeanours will predominate in it. But it is equally evident that the fascination with love */kāmaśṛṅgāra/* is of no much lesser an import in the drama. After all the basic objective of Duṣyanta's endeavour can be fulfilled only through love, so we can also term the *Śakuntalā* as based or rooted in love */kāmāśrita/* play with a liberal application of the delicate demeanour.

In the light of what has been written above can we endorse the opinions quoted at the outset of this study? Can we repeat after A.B. Keith that Kālidāsa shows no interest in the great problems of life and destiny? Or can we reduce this drama to an edifying victorian story about a maiden who only too willingly and without permission of elders offered herself to a wandering aristocrat and had to undergo chastisement through suffering in order to be recognised as a wife lawfully wedded ? In both cases the answer is an emphatic - "no!"

In the European sense of the word the *Śakuntalā* would have been a tragedy, was it not because of the notion of reincarnation. But it would be a grevious error to believe that reincarnation makes human predicament less painful or acute. Yet, it certainly infuses men with some sort of overall optimism which might be difficult to trace in Europe. To my mind the *Śakuntalā* bears superbly well a comparison with Shakespear's Romeo and Juliet. The only shortcoming of this masterpiece of European drama is that it is bereft of the accomplishmment span! Therefore from the traditional Indian point of view it is obviously an incomplete picture of human existence because

existence in its entirely transcends births and deaths. However long would the sojourn of human soul within the shackles of perceptive reality last it will finally resolve itself in complete integration with the Absolute and consequently in perfect fulfilment of all desires. The fate responsible for the intrigue */kapaṭa/* of the play like in a Greek tragedy here is personified by Durvāsas-Śiva incarnate. Consequently the predicament */vidrava/* belongs to the nonsentient category. The king obviously is a victim of gods jealousy exactly the way Pururavas was. Should we then surmise that Kālidāsa might have had his own score to settle with the gods? Was there anything in his personal life that might have prompted him to give vent to his feelings and to take so obviously the side of mortals in his two dramas? Was he one of those who were wronged by the jealous gods?

Now, time has come to draw a general conclusion. Thus it has to be said that in order to judge responsibly a Sanskrit drama a critic, taking as the starting point its typological description, has to find out first whether the text he is investigating has all the five spans or less depending on the particular type of the play. Then by analysing it from the point of view of span-elements he has to determine more precisely the span structure of the play, as also the particular demeanours which should be employed, i.e., whether acting should be purely verbal or verbal accompanied by meaningful gesture or limited verbal but full of songs, dance and music occasionally also with the meaningful gesture or else also limited verbal but full of violent pantomimic dance and gestures as above involving also the use of stage props (weapons etc.). Further on he has to see what consequences for the drama in question has the type of predicament, which may be either due to man or beast, due to the forces of nature or else due to both. He should also find out whether the intrigue is the result of protagonist's own doings, of fate or of his enemies doings and see in this light the behaviour of the hero. Finally he has to determine which sphere of human endeavour is in the centre of attention and how is solved the postulated harmony of the three sphere of Virtue, Love and Welfare. Only then our own criteria may be employed and the final conclusion drawn.

Footnotes :

157. *Talpadāna* was a token of highest hospitality extended sometimes in the days of *Mahābhārata* to the most revered guest in which one of the ladies of the house would offer herself to him.
158. Heaven in the Indian tradition is part of created world in the same way as the gods are. It is not the final destination of human existence. This is liberation */mokṣa/.*
159. E.g.. the dying Duryodhana of the *Ūrubhaṅga* has a vision of a heavenly chariot coming to fetch him to heaven, and Daśaratha of the *Pratimānāṭaka*, having heard rumblings of a chariot, takes it for the chariot of death.
160. The other two are : the debt that one owes to gods and the debt owed to the sages.

VII. *"KĀNTAḤ KRATUḤ CAKṢUṢĀM"*-THEATRE : THE *YAJÑA* OF THE *KĀMAPURUṢĀRTHA*

The homogeneity of the ancient Indian world-view is a fascinating phenomenon and there can be little doubt that the pivotal idea of this world outlook is the Vedic sacrifice. This is evident for each and every one who undertakes a systematic study of the Vedic exegetic literature, i.e., the *Brāhmaṇas*. But this is not the only argument – obvious enough if the nature of this literature is considered. The Vedic sacrifice remains the keynote also of later speculations. The notion of the interiorised sacrifice *dhyānayajña* is the backbone of the *Upniṣads*. The *brāhmaṇic* formulas such as *sarvam etad yajñaḥ* or *eka eva yajnaḥ*, reverberate through the entire realm of the ancient Indian intellectual enquiry in its multi-faceted aspects. The pursuit of art and art perception was not an exception to this rule.

But before we consider one such case : namely the theatre, let us for a moment ponder over the idea that is also intimately connected with the sacrifice and which constitutes natural background for any aspect of ancient Indian civilisation. Here we keep in mind the threefold nature of human existence – or its threefold context. *Kāma* is termed in the Ṛgveda the seed of mind (*manaso retaḥ*). Almost all accounts of the manyfold activities of Being that are found in the *Brāhmaṇas* begin with the key word *akāmayata*. Prajāpati desired and he entered upon the sacrıfice, (*ayajata*). The one without the second desired to become many. It entered the golden egg where it spent one whole year and then with the might of his thought (*maṇas*), whose seed is desire it divided that egg. The upper half became heaven and the lower, the earth. The space in between the two was filled up with *kāma* which, in the form of *rajas*, keeps them apart : heaven is *sattva* and earth is *tamas*, and, as the *Bṛhadaraṇyakopaniṣad* would have it, heaven-Dyaus becomes the Father-Pitṛ and earth-Pṛthivi becomes the Mother-Matṛ while *kāma* once again assumes its ambivalent role of binding the two for the sake of creation and yet at the same time keeping them apart if only for the sake of securing the space in which the bodyless, the *anaṅga*, can operate.

This threefoldness of reality once translated into the categories of the human value system becomes the *trivarga*. *Sattvaguṇa* as the category of value becomes *dharma*. *Rajas* which indeed is *kāma*, the first seed of mind incarnate, in the form of a *guṇa*

becomes the *kāmapuruṣārtha* and *tamoguṇa* becomes *artha*. Here we have to add that none of the three is totally separated from the other two. They permeate each other as indeed the *guṇas* do and as heaven, space and earth do. So it is easy and legitimate to see all three in one and one in all three. This explains the divergences of interpretation that we come across in different texts such as the *Gītā* and the *Manusmṛti*. The first associates *rajas* with *kāma* while the second associates it with *artha*.

Now the sacrifice originally transcendent to the existence becomes immanent, i.e., enters existence in order to bestow upon it the semblance of order and sense. Gods offered the sacrifice and, as they did of yore, they indeed, viz the brahmins do it now by making their sacrifices into the exact likeness of the sacrifices of the gods. The primeval sacrifice in which the gods offered Puruṣa-Prajāpati became the *raison d'etre* and the *modus operandi* of existence – the World and life that fills it. *Dhārayate lokaḥ iti dharmaḥ* – isn't this definition of the sacrifice that is also *ṛta* the order that emerges from chaos or the *anṛta*? Thus to us *dharma* becomes the embodiment of sacrifice as value. It is the sacrifice translated into the language of norms that regulate the entire existence of sentient beings. Innumerable forms of ritualistic sacrifices built up the rich texture of *dharma*. Initially the *sūtras* and later on the *śāstras* embody all that men could deduce from this original truth, and this precisely explains the wealth of the *smṛti* tradition. Thus the sacrifice and its ritual is the central point of reference for the sphere of *dharma* notwithstanding the present day *mūrti-pūja* and the fact that in the Lakṣmīnārayaṇa temple of Delhi the shrine that encases the *mūrti* dominates over an unassuming modest structure called *yajña-śālā* found behind it, in the garden.

For reasons that will become obvious later, we now bypass what normally should be treated as the second *puruṣārtha: kāma*, though usually nowadays it is not treated as such, and consider very briefly, and rather tentatively *artha*, the *puruṣārtha* which we have seen already associated with earth, *tamas*, i.e., with the gross material aspect of existence. This aspect may be termed *bhūta* and consequently beings that are determined by their material shape are called *bhūtāni*. The *Gītā* (II. 14) says *annād bhavanti bhūtāni*. Food and feeding seem to be compelling facts of existence on the material plane. Now we find very often in the *Brāhmaṇas* the equation of food with Soma and the eater of food with Agni. Since offering Soma to Agni is the *yajña par excellence* we cannot escape conclusion that the act of eating must be considered the *yajña* in which food, the fuel, is offered in the Vaiśvānara Agni that burns within man. This noble truth reverberates in the lines of a medieaval Marathi prayer sometimes ascribed to Eknātha:

> *"Vadani kavala ghetāṁ nāma ghya śrīharīce*
> *sahaja havana hote nāma ghetā fukāce*
> *jīvana karī jivitvā anna he pūrṇa Brahma*
> *udarabharaṇa nohe jāṇije yajña karma"*

This is a prayer often recited before meals. Thus we may conclude that as the central notion of *dharma* is the *vaidika jñānayajña* or *dhyānayajña*, the *yajña* in course of which our consciousness finds fulfilment and plenitude, put at rest with the awareness of having discharged one's duty by repaying the three principal debts that man is born with: the debt towards the gods, towards the sages and towards the forefathers. The last aspect belongs also to the sphere of *artha*. For begetting progeny is alongside with eating the central notion for this sphere. Both these forms of sacrifice are *dravyamaya* sacrifices, where food and semen the *dravya par excellence*, are offered and they do not have any symbolic connotation but are used as such and from both beings arise.

Now, we return to the *kāmapuruṣārtha*. Let us begin by quoting the the *Gītā*. It calls *kāma, rajoguṇasamudbhava* (III.37). The frustrated *kāma* becomes *krodha*, anger (II.62) on the other hand, when satisfied is joy and thus we enter the sphere of emotions. For whatever belongs to the world of feelings or emotions, the seat of which is *manas*, the feeling mind and or the discerning heart, all this constitutes the sphere of *kāma*. The sphere of *kāma* is as it were the space between the poles of a magnet or between heaven and earth, continually illumed with the lightenings of fulfilled desires (joy) and the thunders of frustrated ones (despair).

If, taking the lead from the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, we put an equation mark between heaven and man and earth and woman and if we remember that their union was conceived by the same *Upaniṣad* as a *yajña*, then we can easily conclude that such union should be considered the *yajña* proper *of kāma*. Yet, there is doubt of a very serious kind. The sexual act indeed does belong to the category of *dravyamaya-yajña* where the *dravya* of *vīrya* or semen is offered into the heat of the womb – again the same Vaiśvānara Agni that keeps the human body warm. As such, the sexual act, in a similar way as eating, belongs to the sphere of *artha* and is also responsible, as we have remarked earlier, for generating beings just indeed as *anna*, food is. On top of this comes an emotional involvement of a very definite, very individual and personal character. In the sexual act the *viṣaya rati* is at its highest. Here of course we keep in mind the ordinary human practice and not the tantric ways where it may become free from *āsakti*. This very definite emotional involvement precludes experiencing it, on a broader plane, as an enlarged or amplified awareness of the basic oneness, unity and homogeneity of reality.

The question thus arises which of the human pursuits that unṃistakably belong to the sphere of *kāma puruṣārtha* can be singled out and pointed as the sacrifice *par excellence* of the second of the three *vargas*?

The specific character of the sphere of *artha* standing for the gross aspect of existence as we have shown above cannot help us here, for the components of the sacrifice are basically determined by the Vaiśvānara Agni on one side and by the *dravya* of *anna* or of *vīrya* on the other.

Let us therefore look for the needed hints at the first *puruṣārtha*, that of *dharma*. It was the *Aitareya* and the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*, quoted by Ananda Coomaraswamy in one of his essays on art found in a volume entitled The Transformation of Nature in Art (p. 8) that introduce the very meanigful idea of *śilpa*. To cut the matter short, we shall say that *śilpa* means an imitation of the angelic works that seem to denote nature itself. But as the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* indicates [SB 3.2.1.5] it may also denote an object which is considered a symbol of something, be it *ṛc* and *sāman* or "these three worlds". For instance the black and white antelope skin on which the *yajamāna* is consecrated is precisely considered a replica, an image or an icon of the three worlds and is their symbol. The conclusion of this enquiry will probably have to be worked out in detail further on but we hope that even at this stage it can already be formulated. Namely that the ritualistic *yajña* is just a *śilpa* of *etad sarvam* – of the entire universe, reality, cosmos and existence put together. How often do we encounter in the Vedic exegetic literature formulas that this or that the priests do for this or that was done alike by the gods. Isn't it a perfect example of *anukaraṇa*, the imitation, or *śilpa* itself? To this we have to add one more element : *ya evam veda*, "he who knows thus", yet another formula of the exegetic literature which indicates that the entire process of this peculiar *Śilpikaraṇa* of Being in the form of the innumerable ritualistic *yajñas* happens on the plane of consciousness or pure knowledge. The precondition for successful entering upon the sacrifice and attaining its fruits is to know, to be aware and to be conscious of the fact that by imitating the universal sacrifice of Puruṣa-Prajāpati we acquire sway over it, we control it like the Cro-Magnon man when he painted buffaloes on the wall of the cave and pierced them with painted spears.

So if we want to find a *kāma* counterpart of such a notion we would have to shear the act of human love of its individual immediacy and its *dravya* element, so that only pure feeling remains – the refined emotional sensation that would have only a very distant relationship to the psycho-physical act of love - its material cause.

The ritualistic sacrifice of *dharmapuruṣārtha* is then the delight of consciousness– if the word delight can at all be coupled with consciousness. Is there any such form of sacrifice that can be called a delight of psyche – the other equally indispensable component of *manas*?

Enough has already been said to draw the final and inescapable conclusion : it is the sphere of art towards which we have to look for this type of sacrifice.

"With the exception of taste (*rasa*) the objects of senses turn away from the embodied one that does not eat. And even taste turns away from him upon seeing the Supreme. (*Gītā* II.59)

Taking clue from the *Gītā,* while insisting that the notion of *rasa* used there is identical with the aesthetic concept of the some name, we want to submit that aesthetics

tantamount to art maps this territory of existence which is covered by the sensation of "the non-eater from whom the objects of senses have turned away with the exception of taste" and which extends up to where the awareness of the one that sees the Supreme (*param draṣṭṛ*) begins. It is the territory over which *rasa* reigns supreme.

"*Trailokyasya asya sarvasya nāṭyam bhāvānukīrtanam*" (N.S.I. 107)

Theatre is the imitation of the three worlds in the sphere of feelings (*bhāva*) i.e., of psyche. It is thus a perfect *śilpa* but pertaining to the domain of emotion (psyche) and not reason (ratio) . Therefore theatre, the queen of arts, should be analysed precisely from this point of view. In this context it is not difficult to draw a conclusion that since all that is, i.e., the nature of the world, its proper being (*svabhāvo lokasya*) and the entire three worlds, is nothing but a sacrifice (*sarvam etad yajñaḥ*), then its imitation (*anukaraṇa, anukīrtana*) will also reflect the very same truth, but which will be perceived emotionally exactly in the same way as in the sphere of *dharma* the ritualistic *yajña* is perceived by reason. This condition is met by the theatre on two planes. Firstly as a happening (*itivṛta*) and secondly as an act of aesthetic perception. If we were to describe as briefly as possible what the sacrifice is about we would say that it is the dismemberment of the Lord of Creatures for the sake of multiplicity of creation and His reconstruction or resurrection, so that He may again and again, as it were, forgo His plenitude and bring diversity into existence. For us men immersed in diversity, the centripetal tendency aiming at the restauration of plenitude is of paramount importance for it promises the final liberation (*mokṣa*). The white horse in the *aśvamedha* sacrifice is an eye of Prajāpati, by offering horse in the sacrifice they restore his eye to Prajāpati and thereby make Him complete. (SB XIII. 3.1.1.). Now, the question may be asked how this plenitude is achieved in theatre?

The first *sandhi*, or span of the play, stands for multiplicity. In its definition the meanigful word "*nānā*" (manifold) is actually used. Now this multiplicity, that is reflected in many characters, problems, emotions etc., is step by step brought to integration through five stages (*avasthās*) of action : eager anticipation, effort, hope, frustration and attainment of fruit where the initial multiplicity is integrated (*samānayana*). Since the first and the last span, are obligatory for each and every play, we can safely conclude that this aspect of integration of the multiple constitutes the backbone of the theatrical performance.

This theatrical reality is characterised by one more feature which may be described as departicularisation for this is the meaning of the well known term *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*. This concept was elucidated by Abhinavagupta but must have been there even earlier. It means that whatever happens on the stage, in spite of it being a very tangible happening indeed, belongs neither to the real life of an actor "xyz" nor to that of the hero of the play, neither more to the real life of a spectator. Thus what happens on the stage of theatre is reality departicularised. It cannot feed our senses with objects of perception

that have the nature of *dravya* – the nature of everyday hard reality. The spectator is the *nirāhāra* of the *Gītā*, and yet he can taste ! The sacrifice of performance, *prayogayajña*, lies precisely in between the exercise of pure consciousness, *dharmayajña*, and the gross experience of matter *arthayajña*. The *kāmayajña*, or as Kālidāsa would have it, the *kāntaḥ kratuḥ* is a sacrifice where an eye and other faculties of perception are fire and the *sādhāraṇikṛta viṣaya*, the departicularised objects of senses, are fuel. This is exactly the meaning of the *Gītā*.

"*śabdādīn viṣayān anya indriyāgniṣu juhvati*" (IV. 26b)

The sense perception of a *nirāhāra* is precisely a sacrificial act and is the essence of aesthetics. All this oprates in human beings regardless of their state of consciousness but is evident only to the one that knows thus (*ya evam veda*). It is for him that the senses become fires of a sacrifice only when they are kindled by knowledge (*jñānadīpita*).

In the context of what has been said above such enunciations as one quoted above form Kālidāsa, and the other that Abhinavagupta made while discussing a minor problem of the way an actress adresses a *sūtradhāra* saying *Ārye*!, become very meaningful. Abhinva explains that an actor deserves such an appellation since he is "*nāṭyavedamahā-sattradikṣita*" – purified and sanctified for the great sacrificial session of the Veda of theatre. It is also in this context that the last line of the example of *nāndī* quoted in *Adhyāya* V of NS should be understood :

"*ijyayā cānayā nityaṃ prīyantāṁ devatā iti*" (V. 111)

The exhortation that the gods may be gladdened by this sacrifice should not be taken as merely alluding to the rites of the consecration of the stage alone, although these do include *homa*. Over and above that, these rites stand in a direct relationship to the performance, the sacrificial character of which they anticipate and determine. This is why the stage is called *vedikā* and Agni is made its presiding deity. This is why the gathering of performers and spectators is called *sadas* – a term normally used to denote a sacrifical assembly. And, last but not least, this is why Bharatmuni speaks of *nāṭyaveda* which he considers the fifth one and why the *Nāṭyaśāstra* promises the same goal to those that listen to the Veda of theatre, those that stage a play and those that watch if attentively as is promised to those that are learned in the Vedas proper, those that offer sacrifices and those that are generous.

"*ya idam śṛṇuyāt proktaṃ nāṭyavedam svayaṁbhuvā*
prayogaṃ yaє ca kurvīta prekṣate cā-vadhānāt
yā gatir vedaviduṣām yā gatir yajñakāriṇām
yā gatir dānaśīlānām tām gatim prāpnuyāddhi saḥ.

(NS. XXXVII. 27-8)

VIII. *NĀṬYOTPATTI* : MYTH OR SOCIO-HISTORY

The *Nāṭyotpatti adhyāya* similarly to other such mythological accounts to be found oft and on in the corpora of Sanskrit literature is a multifaceted text. There can be little doubt about the philosophical import of it. This we did elaborate elsewhere[161]. Apart from it this text has also a socio-historical layer that so far has not attracted attention. Some of these views have been published already but rather in an unorthodox way and without much of a discussion which neither preceded the publication nor followed it.[162] It therefore seems justified to present the problem again in an enlarged form.

In our opinion the kernel of the *Nāṭyotpatti adhyāya* was formulated around the middle of the first millenium B.C.[163] This is a very important presupposition of the present argument.

Out of the whole sequence of events constituting the *nāṭyotpatti* account we would like to pinpoint the following :

1. The time of the *nāṭyotpatti.*

When Jambūdvīpa was overrun by gods (sic.), demons, *gāndharvas, rākṣasas* and huge serpents, when people were lost in jealousy, anger etc., and given to desire and greed, then precisely arose need for a special type of entertainment.

2. The formulation of the need of such entertainment.

The gods headed by Indra asked Brahmā the Grandfather : we need an entertainment which would be both visible and audible. For the *śūdra*-like castes cannot listen to the Vedas so do create the fifth Veda which would be good for all strata of society and that would help to convey to the masses an awareness that otherwise was difficult to imbibe.

3. The nature of reaction of Brahmā.

Having heard that, Brahmā sent away the king of gods and remembered all the four Vedas taking recourse to *yoga*. Finally he said : I create the art of theatre in the form of the fifth Veda that relates to *dharma* and *artha* and fame. It is comprehensive, contains (good) instruction and shows all doings of future generations. It is also endowed with the import of all *Śāstras*, utilises all crafts and is derived from the four Vedas.

4. Search for the practitioners of theatre.

After thus creating theatre Brahmā said to the Lord of gods I have created the *itihāsa*, let the gods practice it. Do instruct in it those that are skilled, wise, brave and tireless. Having heard this Lord Śakra, bowing with folded hands, answered the Grandfather : the gods are powerless in understanding, remebering knowing and practising it. But those sages that know that what is secret they can do it. Consequently it was Bharata himself that was commissioned to study the science and to impart it to his hundred sons.

5. The first performance.

After Bharata trained his sons he turned again to Grandfather asking what should be done next. He answered that the performance of the Veda called *nāṭya* should be given on the occasion of the flag festival of Indra. Thus on the occasion when the *asuras* and *dānavas* were conquered and joyful immortals assembled, after celebrating benediction with the vedic *mantras* the play on the victory of gods over demons was enacted. Gods were overjoyed but demons objected. Gods gave actors many gifts among which due to its symbolic meaning Kubera's gift of crown may be mentioned. Subsequently there was a conflict between demons and actors. It was averted by Brahmā who lectured on the universal aspect of the art and the objective character of its depiction of reality. Subsequently Brahmā ordered a theatre hall to be built and invested it with the defenses by posting gods in its different parts.

Here ends the sequence of events that is necessary for our argument. But we shall have to depart now from the self-imposed limitation of the *Adhyāya* I to invoke one more mythical event that, structuraly speaking, is indispensable for our argument.

6. The curse of the *ṛṣis*.

The sons of Bharata being prompted by vulgarity ridiculed the *ṛṣis* themselves in the theatrical gathering. Having heard about that *munis* trembled in horrible anger and looking like flames cursed the actors : you are not deserving the status of twice-born having mocked us. Consequently you and your offspring will be Śūdras.

With this event our survey comes to an end. What remains to be done is to show that such sequence of events and such treatment of the matter resulted from a comprehensive knowledge of the socio-historical processes that were taking place and from the right assessment of the degree of development of society that was required in order that the sophisticated art of theatre could develop.

Before we take recourse to the history of Indian cinema with the help of which we shall try to prove how valid this ancient analysis is, we shall consider briefly the time of origin of the kernel of the *nāṭyotpatti* myth. As it has been said our conviction is that it is contemporary with Lord Buddha. Trevor Ling, the British historian of Buddhism suggestes quite convincingly indeed that Buddhism appeared as a confession of a new category of people the city dwellers. He insists that around the middle of the first millenium

B.C. the rural cattle tending and field cultivating society thanks to the growing accumulation of wealth and brisk trade started creating comparatively modern type of market economy. Where market appears township follows. Nomads and cultivators emerge from the countryside and settle in towns. Kings remake their tents or their timber country houses or clay ones into fortified strongholds close to the very same market which they want to protect and of course to control. Large numbers of people uprooted from their villages lose moorings. In addition wealth corrupts them. Thus they need new set of easily discernible criteria that would be better suited to the changed circumstances. Previously the ritualistic life centered mainly around the vedic sacrifice in its *gṛhya* aspect required particular village surroundings and the rythm of rural existence. All this was lost in the hubbub of towns. This void was rapidlly being filled up by the teachings of the greatest rebel that human history ever has known - Prince Siddhārtha. His teachings of what we could call well balanced renunciation, proved to be very attractive in the given circumstances. So much so that even music inspired by them was enough to make scores of people mainly nobility - abandon lay life and turn to *sangha* to look there for their *nirvāṇa*.[164] The very foundations of the *vaidika dharma* were threatened. But not for long. *Brāhmaṇas* well trained in scholarly dispute and logic struck back. The gist of the teaching of the Vedas was condensed and put in such an idiom as to appeal easily to the nobility of the times-which proved to be most vulnerable to the message of the Buddha. It was given the form of the *Bhagavadgītā* and adressed to Arjuna - the paragon of virtue for the nobility. Thus the *vaidika dharma* began to recover slowly the lost grounds. Meanwhile the teaming population of the cities looked for amusement and entertainment. It is from the *Nāṭyaśāstra* that we know it - this entertainment must have often been of a rather cheap kind - striptease included.[165] The early Buddhism outrightly condemned such shows sharing the same attitude with some of the hyper orthodox *brāhmaṇas* responsible for calling music, dance and singing *mṛtyoḥ senāḥ*. Yet dead-set orthodoxy could not do much against urbanisation and the onslaught of Buddhism. It required more open attitude to counter it. It required considerable openness, enlightement and insight to notice, describe and analyse the main challenges of the epoch. The *Gītā* most certainly at that time was not a work of narrow orthodoxy. So it is not surprising that it is precisely this text that calls aesthetic experience - *āhuti* (IV. 26b). The reformers of *vaidika dharma* had thus to pay attention to other means of countering the growing influence of Buddhism. Popular *samājas* at which most probably slapstick comedies reigned supreme with beautiful actresses available probably not only for striptease but may be also for live sex shows came into the purview of reformers.[166] Lower classes of people summarily called in the *Nāṭyaśāstra śūdrajātayaḥ* were excluded from direct contact with the vedic lore and therefore even more than the upper social strata they must have been exposed to the persuasive proselytism of the *bauddhas*. The *Gītā*, also

termed *upaniṣad ex definitione*, was not meant for them. Thus reformers decided to utilise the most popular vehicle for propagating the *vaidika dharma* at the there! They had analyse its nature and as the result of their enquiry they propounded the theory which later on enabled Kālidāsa to call theatre *kāntaḥ kratuḥ*. *Nāṭya prayoga* was for them a *yajña* and as such it required precise science of the *Śāstra* type which it duly received in the form of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Thus the *nāṭyotpatti vyākhyā* analyses the conditions which were necessary for the sophisticated art of theatre to come to being. As it is evident the interpretation offered above is based more on intuition then on the tangible historical proofs. Yet, at the moment, it seems that further study will reveal nothing that could definitely invalidate this view point. But at the same time we may not be in position to add soon many more convincing arguments in support of this theory. Thus the temptation to suggest more detailed interpretation of the sequence of events of the *nāṭyotpatti* enumerated above-say with reference to Rājagṛha or Pāṭaliputra may be at the moment rather risky. Let us therefore propose to use the vehicle of time to whisk us to Bombay at the turn of last century.

Overrun by the British firmly, indeed established by the turn of century, India began to experience all the curses of modern development. People populating great Indian cities became "addicted more openly to sensual pleasures : they were under the sway of desire and greed (capitalism?) became infatuated with jealousy and anger (class struggle?) and thus found their happiness tarnished with sorrow". By then a sophisticated city theatre was long since dead. If one were to verbalise the aesthetic demand of the city people of that time, one could probably say that they "wanted an object of diversion which should be visible as well as audible". It is fairly certain that if one scanned carefully Calcutta and Bombay press of the epoch, one could surely find remarks to the point that both these cities welcomed the new art of "cinematography." The phenomenon of the Parsi theatre constitutes an ample proof of the need of entertainment which was being experienced by the city populace. But apparently that was not the complete answer of Providence. Theatre by its very nature has to remain an elitarian means of artistic communication at least when numbers are concerned. Theatre simply was not enough for what already by then appeared to be teaming millions of India's great cities. These millions needed something more appealing. Then *Brahmā*, the Providence, scanned the entire world's wisdom with its chemistry and physics and found in the distant France brothers Lumiere experimenting with what soon appeared to be what Paul Weiss in his "Cinematics" (1975) calls both visual and audible art (p. 4). Thus this gift of Providence has fulfilled the demand of the people and has come to India. "Its experience is that which the Taoist, the *Yogī*, the mystic seek; the wonder is felt by those religiously inclined; the learning grips the sensitive young; the enquiry is the concern of speculative men" (p. 19). At first the whole thing was entirely European. But Europeans hardly

could run the show. They like the gods of the mythological accounts of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* (unintended and unjustified flattery), were not in a position to reach the broader audience with their films. They did not stand firmly on the Indian soil and hidden in their cool bungalows, they did not cast the same sharp shadow on the parched soil of India in summer, they did not perspire together with Indians and their eyes rarely winked in those moments when Indian eyes winked. What initially would seem to the Indian audience amusing, interesting and exotic, at the longer run, was simply foreign, strange and unearthly. If at that moment European film would have had its spokesman in India he would have undoubtedly said to Providence; O Lord, Europeans are not capable at these filmi tasks. And then he would have certainly suggested to Providence to look for an Indian ṛṣi who would grasp the secrets of this new art and who could put it successfully to practice in India. The eye of Providence at that time must have fallen upon Dadasaheb Phalke. He then after grasping the art from its original source and after teaching it to his family (unhappily he did not have hundred sons) must have approached Providence and declared his readiness to put this newly acquired art to test. The voice of Providence could have been easily recognised by Phalkemuni in the expectation of India's millions: *yathā daityāḥ suraiḥ jitāḥ*–as demons were defeated by the gods. So the first film was a mythological about Rājā Hariścandra. Later on, this slight departure from the *Nāṭyotpatti* myth was rectified and the first film produced in Prabhāt Studios at Poona some time in the thirties was the *Amṛta manthan*–a closer parallel to the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Now the role of demons was assumed by the English. There is no inconsistency in treating them once as gods and later as demons. After all demons are fallen gods! So when Indian film came to grips with current and contemporary *daivāsuram,* i.e., the Indo-British confrontation and the struggle for independence the British staunchly objected like *Virūpākṣa* of yore and called to life the Board of Censors to ensure that the whole affair is not anti-British. Of course, a question whether today it should also be suspected of representing demonaic interests is of purely internal Indian character and its consideration would be misplaced with an outsider. Yet, despite this conflict some *modus vivendi* was struck out and for the same glory be to *Pitāmaha* whom we have been calling Providence for the sake camouflage.

Everything would have worked all right had it not been because of some unruly sons of Phalkemuni who decided to make fun of not so much the ṛṣis as in the last chapter of the *Naṭyaṣāstra* but the brahmins and the sanctified cast order. The main culprit was K.Subramanyam, a brahmin from Madras who in his films permitted himself such liberties. Some time in the thirties a gathering of learned brahmins–some of them University professors–met in the holy town of Kumbakonam and outcasted the poor fellow, happily without much practical consequences And thus the word of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* became flesh. For, there too the sons of Bharatamuni were reduced to the lowliness

of *śudras* as penalty for their anti-rishism.

These striking parallels between myth and the film history in India are not only a matter of funny coincidence. To my mind they verify, on the one hand the sound scholarship of the ancients and the validity of their observations and on the other, they prove that this is not a development particular to the twentieth century but in reality it is reaction to the cultural challenge that the Indian society faced then and is facing now.

The mode of this reaction is determined supposedly by the very same parameters that must have been at work in Rājagṛha, Pāṭaliputra, Puruṣapura, Takṣasilā and in Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, Madras. Aesthetic experience is a matter of taste. Plantain leaves may be changed into plates, new vegetables may be added like potatoes, tomatoes or brocules but the way Indian food tastes remains unchanged.

The same applies to art. If one is to relish *rasa* that emanates from *dṛśyaśravya prayoga* here in India one has to keep always the same set of at least basic parameters be it Pāṭaliputra or Bombay.

Footnotes :

161. See Concept of Ancient Indian Theatre, New Delhi 1974
162. See Bombayya phium the Kaliyugi avatara of Sanskrit Drama in Pushpanjali
163. Concept........p. 19
164. Op. cit. p.171 footnote G.
165. N.S. (Kāvyamālā No 42) Adhyāya 22, Sloka 284-288; GOS. XXII, 289 & 295-299
166. ibidem.

IX. THE HERO IN SANSKRIT DRAMA

The root "*nī*" in Sanskrit means to lead, guide, conduct, direct, govern. Its *nomen agentis "netṛ"* as also *"nāyaka"* are commonly used to denote a hero in Sanskrit drama. The question that should be asked now is whether this term applies exclusively to the theatre, and means simply the leading role in a performance, or whether it should be associated with the broader cultural context that moulded theatre and determined its intellectual framework.

For, whenever we think about a hero we invariably ask : A hero of what ? Naturally, our attitude depends on whether we deal with a hero in soccer, in war, or a hero with regard to renunciation and altruism. Thus, in the course of the present study we shall have to try to answer not only questions that directly concern his looks and behaviour, but also those that pertain to the nature of the involvement that creates a hero. In order to do justice to the needs outlined above we shall first turn our attention to what the dramatists themselves have to say about their heroes. After that, we shall review briefly the opinions of theoreticians and, finally, we shall try to answer the seemingly simple question : What is Sanskrit drama ? Or, more precisely, what is the nature of performance in classical Indian theatre, and in what way does it determine the character of the hero? There can be little doubt about the idealistic treatment of the hero by Sanskrit dramatists. He has to be both an ideal lover and an ideal warrior; he must be both tender to his lady-love and tough with his enemies. Generally speaking, he must be the embodiment of all virtues, and a perfect example of manliness and valour. In addition, he must be exceedingly handsome and strong, yet delicate, gifted both for the fine arts and for warfare.

Bhavabhūti makes Sītā in his "Rāma's later history" exclaim when she sees Rāma's picture : "Lo! Like a newly expanding lotus, dark and soft, tender and fully developed in the charms of his person - (my) father gazing in rapt amazement on his mild and lovely form - the bow of (god) Śaṅkar broken (in twain) with careless ease - the (waving) tufts of hair gracefully adorning (his face) - thus is my noble Lord painted here !"[167] Kālidāsa in turn makes the general in the *Śakuntalā* describe in the following words Duṣyanta naturally underlining his martial features :

"Like a mountain-roving elephant, (he) possesses a body the fore part of which is hardened by the incessant friction of the bow-string, which can stand the rays of the sun and is not affected by the slightest fatigue, which, though reduced in bulk,

is not noticeable (as such) owing to its muscular development and which is the very essence of strength."[168]

Further on it is said that in the eyes of hermit youths he is resplendant (*dīptimataḥ*) and his arms are long like the city gates (literally : the bars of the city gates, *nagaraparigha prāṁśubāhuḥ*),[169] and one of the pupils in Kaṇva's hermitage says that there is no need to talk of Duṣyanta aiming his arrows. It is by the mere twang of his bow string from afar, as if by the roar of the bow, that he dispels obstacles:[170]

Similarly, Śārṅgarava calls him the foremost of the worthy (*arhatām prāgrasaraḥ*).[171] Bhāsa, too, does not stint with regard to superlatives for his hero. For instance, in the *Avimāraka* he puts the following words concerning the prince Avimaraka in the mouth of one of his minister : "He was a handsome youth, but not conceited; young but modest, brave but courteous, delicate but strong."[172] Still another minister adds : "This form divine, his speech saintly with the brilliance of a warrior, with tenderness and strength."

Speaking about the hero's father as well, the minister, a hero himself says :

I saw the gentleman, a worthy father of a virtuous son. His shoulders were broad and lofty, huge and firm with exercise; his powerful wrist bears the familiar mark of rubbing on a bowstring. Though in concealment, his appearance proclaims his royal birth He is like the sun - hidden behind a cloud, but revealed by its radiance.[173]

If we add that the beauty of Avimarka is considered by *vidyādhara* to be equal to his own,[174] then the picture of the hero as painted by Sanskrit dramatists will almost be complete, though, of course, one can endlessly add epithets, similies, and eulogies. Now, there is one absolutely obvious feature of the description of a hero in Sanskrit drama which must be discussed : departicularisation, or, if one prefers, generalisation. It would be singularly unproductive to search for elements of the hero's picture that would allow the creation of a truly individualised image. At best, what would emerge from such an attempt would be a sort of 'Bombay oil-print'. There is nothing surprising or unusual about this if we remember that the principle of such generalisation was worked out theoretically by the ancient Indian aestheticians and, later, most pointedly formulated by Abhinavagupta (10-11th century A.D.). The lack of individual characteristics of the hero is a direct consequence of the fact that whatever happens on the stage must happen in general. Thus, the hero of a given event must represent in himself the pure, refined, not to say distilled essence of valour and charm, which in the course of its dramatic development sheds all characteristics that would link it to a particular person, time, or place. The characterisation of the hero of a Sanskrit drama clearly reflects the musical quality of ancient Indian theatre. The aesthetic impulses, *vibhāvas, anubhāvas,* and *vyabhicāribhāvas,* that come from the stage must evoke in the audience a purely emotional response that differs form an emotional response in everyday life by virtue of its being shorn of any particular associations, or any direct connection to the experiences of everyday life. Such an experience is called the taste or *rasa.* Thus, every dramatic role and situation on the stage has an obvious pattern of musical notes

and chords that evoke emotional responses, though we can hardly associate them with anything that we know from our everyday audial experiences.

Whatever can be found on the hero in ancient theoretical treatises clearly supports this contention. The earliest among these texts, the *Nāṭyaśāstra,* deals with the topic in chapter XXXIV, verses 17-21 and 23f.[175] To a certain extent, the remarks concerning the king (84-88) and the leader of the army (89f.) also apply to the here; so also the instructions about the distributions of roles that can be found in chapter XXXV, verses 5f., the role of the gods (9ff.), the role of kings (12f.), and the role of army leaders and secretaries. Thus, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* introduces a double category according to which it classifies the hero. Consequently, it discusses four classes : the self-controlled but vehement (*dhīroddhata*), the self-controlled but lighthearted (*dhīralalita*), the self-controlled and exalted (*dhīrodātta*) and the self-controlled and calm (*dhīrapraśānta*). These four classes may be either superior (*uttama*) or middling (*madhyama*). Gods belong to the first class, kings to the second, ministers to the third, and brahmins and merchants to the last. Here too, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* gives a definition of a hero :

> If there are several male characters in a play, then the one who, though in distress, ultimately attains elevation, is considered the hero. And if there are more than one who (fit such this description), then the one whose misfortune and (subsequent) elevation are prominent should be (deemed) the hero.[176]

The hero is clearly classified from the point of view of his role in generating emotional responses. Though different categories of this principal character of the play are defined, no scope is given to any further individualisation of the hero. Applying a musical analogy, it can be said that this definition determines the key in which the dramatic role should be played or acted. It simply connects the state of being a hero to the specific predicament that most obviously creates a hero. A more detailed definition of one of the four classes, i.e. the *dhīralalita* one, does not adduce anything that would cause us to modify essentially the opinion we have formed so far. Here is what the *Nāṭyaśāstra* has to say on the subject:

> The king should be : intelligent, truthful, master of his senses, clever, and of good character, he should posess a good memory, be powerful, high-minded, and pure, be farsighted, posess great energy, be grateful, be skilled in using sweet words, he should take a vow to protect the people, be an expert in the methods of various works, he should be alert, without carelessness, he should associate with old people, be well versed in the *Arthaśāstra* and in the practice of various policies, he should be a promoter of the various arts and crafts, be an expert in the science of polity, and should have a liking for (all) this. (In addition), he should know his real situation, prosperity and decline, the weaknesses of the enemies, the principles of *dharma,* and he should be free of evil habits.[177]

Similar descriptions can be found in the *Arthaśāstra* and the *Manusmṛti.* An exhaustive review of what other ancient theoreticians have to say on the subject has been

undertaken by S.N. Shastri.[178]

Following the *Daśarūpaka* of Dhanañjaya (10th century A.D.),[179] Shastri adds three classes of the *dhīralalita*-hero : gallant *(dakṣiṇa)*, deceitful *(śaṭha)*, and bold *(dhṛṣṭa)* and lists the eight personal merits of the hero : beauty of character *(śobhā)*, vivacity of character *(vilāsa)*, sweetness *(mādhurya)*, mental equilibrium *(gāmbhīrya)*, steadfastness *(dhairya or sthairya)*, brilliance *(tejas)*, affability *(lālitya)*, and magnanimity *(audārya)*.[180] This appears to exhaust all that the theoreticians have to say about their hero. When we add that the roles of heroes should be played by "actors of the best kind who have beautiful eyes, eyebrows, forehead, nose, lips, cheeks, face, neck, and other beautiful limbs, who are tall, possessed of pleasant appearance, dignified gait, and are neither fat nor lean, are well-behaved, wise, and steady by nature..."[181] the picture becomes almost complete. We must say : almost, because in actual theatrical practice - known to us from the surviving classical theatre of Kerala, the *Kūḍiyaṭṭam* - the costume and make-up of a hero is strictly conventionalized and unchangeable. Thus, it obliterates all individualistic traits that may have persisted, making the analogy to a musical score fully pertinent.

At this point we may ask ourselves if the description of the hero in Sanskrit drama that has been offered above, and which boils down to underlining his basic function as an appropriate impulse to evoke a suitable emotional response called the taste *(rasa)* is all that can be said about him. Technically speaking this may be so. But, on the other hand, it would leave outside the purview of our investigation the nature of theatre and its interpretation according to the basic notions of the traditional Indian *Weltanschauung*. Since the hero in Sanskrit drama is our main consideration here we shall limit ourselves to a very brief presentation of conclusions that have been worked out in detail elsewhere.

"Theatre is the nature of the world with its happiness and despair, endowed with the actor's fourfold means of expression."[182] This nature of the world is nothing more and nothing less than the sacrifice *(yajña)*. What is *yajña?* The one-without-second *(ekameva advitīyam)* becomes many for the sake of creation and, in turn, the many of creation strive for merger into the one, i.e. for liberation *(mokṣa)*. One of the innumerable participants in this eternal sacrifice is the desiring subject and the desired object-the hero and the object of his desire, i.e. the heroine. And as the *yajña* of yore was accomplished in the teeth of opposition from the *asura-rākṣasas* with whom the gods waged incessant war *(daivāsuram)*, so this *nāṭyavedamahāsattra* - as Abhinavagupta would have it, or this *kāntaḥ kratuḥ cakṣuṣām* of Kālidāsa is also carried to its fruition in the contest and strife inherent in the predicament that creates a hero. Before we carry the argument further let us return for a moment to the dramatist and hear how Kālidāsa makes the heroine and her companion speak about king Purūravas, the hero of the *Vikramorvaśīyam*. When she regains her senses and opens her eyes she says : "was it great Indra who saved me having seen the supernatural power?" Her friend Citralekhā answers : "Not great Indra but the royal sage Purūravas, who is like Indra in his prowess." Later on Citraratha will say to Purūravas about Urvaśī

that she was previously created by Nārāyaṇa for Indra and that now she has been rescued from the hands of the demon by you (Purūravas), his friend :[183)]

We have quoted this passage because it seems to indicate unmistakeably the *daivāsuram* conflict as the prime source of inspiration. And justifiably so, because chapter I of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* mentions *daivāsuram* as the subject of the first, or 'premiere' performance *(yathā daityaḥ suraiḥ jitāḥ)* Further on it makes Indra the patron deity of a hero and Sarasvati the patron deity of a heroine. Indra is indeed the uncontestable hero of the *daivāsuram* conflict. Nothing, therefore, prevents us from believing that Indra was also the chief hero of the first performance which, as we remember, was a representation of the victory of the gods over the *asuras*. Thus, the association of Indra and *nāyaka* in each subsequent performance, which, in a way, is always a representation of some other manifestation of the universal conflict between the gods and the *asuras,* needs no comment for the time being. It is Sarasvatī, who in this particular association seems to be something of a mystery. Yet, the moment we consider her presence in *Nāṭya* in the light of her brahmanical association with Indra, it stops to be mysterious.

If the dating of the antiquity of the kernel of the first *adhyāya* of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* is accepted as the middle of the first millennium B.C., then there can be little doubt about the identity of Sarasvatī of the *Nāṭyaśāstra* with the brahmanical goddess of the same name. The association of our Sarasvatī with India makes the possibility of her being directly ideutical with the river Sarasvati remote, since it is difficult to detect any meaningful relationship between Indra and this river goddess. This fact makes the idea of the existence of any *ṛgvedic* source of this association also very improbable since, as Macdonell puts it" there is nothing to show distinctly that Sarasvatī is ever anything more in the *Ṛgveda* than a river goddess, and even then her only association comes through *vāc*".[184)] The post-*brāhmaṇa* association of Indra and Sarasvatī is also negligible and overshowed by the unusual relationship of that goddess with her father, Brahmā.[185)] Thus, the goddess Sarasvatī of the *Brāhmaṇas,* who is usually identified with *Vāc*[186)] appears to be identical with the goddess Sarasvatī of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.

The *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* has the following passages :

> Now the gods and the Asuras, both the them sprung form Prajāpati, entered upon their father Prajāpati's inheritance : the gods came in for Mind and the Asuras for Speech. Thereby, the gods came in for the sacrifice and the Asuras for Speech; the gods for yonder (heaven) and the Asuras for this (earth). The gods said to the *Yajña* (m. the sacrifice) : "That *Vāk* (f. speech) is a woman; beckon her, and she will certainly call thee to her... Say to her: 'Come hither to me where I stand' and report to us her having come saying: 'She has indeed come'." the gods then cut her off from the Asuras; and having gained possession of her and enveloped her completely in fire, they offered her up as a holocaust, it being an offering of the gods. And in that they offered her with an *anuṣṭubh* verse, thereby they made her their own; and the Asuras being deprived of Speech were undone crying

"He lavah, he lavah"

"They (*Ādityas?*) brought *Vāc* (speech) to them (*Āngirasas*) for their sacrificial fee. They accepted her not, saying : 'We shall be losers if we accept her'... Now *Vāc* was angry with them : 'In what respect, forsooth, is that one (*Sūrya*) better than I? Wherefore is it that they should have accepted him and not me?' So, she went away from them. Having become a lioness she went on seizing upon (everything) between those two contending parties, the gods and the Asuras... Being willing to go over to the side of the gods, she said : 'What would be mine if I were to come over to you?' 'The offering will reach thee even before (if reaches) *Agni*.' She then said to the gods : 'Whatsover blessing you will invoke through me, all that shall be accomplished unto you.' So, she went over to the gods.[187)]"

Probably, on the strength of these and similar passages, Keith concluded that speech forms a ground of contest between the gods and the *asuras*. But the gods finally win her.[188)] Thus, the *daivāsuram* wars are fought among others also for the possession of Speech. The question now arises : What has made Speech so important that the gods deemed it worthwhile to fight the *asuras* for her sake?

The *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* quotes the following *mantra* of the *Vājasaneyī* (V. 14) and *Ṛgveda* (V.18.1) *saṁhitās:* "They harness the mind and they harness the thought." The *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* offers the following gloss on this passage : "With the mind and with speech they truly perform the sacrifice. When he says "They harness the mind'. he harnesses the mind; and when he says and they harness the thoughts', *dhī,* either by reciting the *Veda,* or by readiness of speech, or by songs, - with those two thus harnessed - they perform the sacrifice."[189)]

Still elsewhere the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* will say :

"That same fire, then, they have kindled (thinking): 'In it, when kindled we will sacrifice to the gods'. In it, indeed, he makes these first two oblations 'to Mind and Speech (or Voice)'. For, Mind and Speech when yoked together convey the sacrifice to the gods. Now what is performed (with formulas pronounced) in a low voice, by that the mind conveys the sacrifice to the gods; and what is performed (with formulas) distinctly uttered by speech, by that the speech conveys the sacrifice to the gods. And thus takes place here a twofold performance whereby he gratifies these two thinking: 'gratified and pleased these two shall convey the sacrifice to the gods."[190)]

But finally, who are these two and what is their connection with our subject? As an answer to this query we shall once more quote a passage from the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa:* "Indra, assuredly, is the mind, and Sarasvatī is speech..."[191)] Thus, the sacrifice cannot be accomplished without Indra and Sarasvatī. Because as Mind and Speech they are interdependent, for with Mind one sets Speech in motion, with Speech set in motion by Mind he provides the oblation for the gods.[192)] The communion between Indra (Mind) and Sarasvatī (Speech) is so close that the *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa* actually identifies Indra with Speech.[193)]

The meaning of the association of Indra and Sarasvatī with the hero and heroine of *Nāṭya* now becomes abundantly clear. Every performance is a *daivāsuram* conflict in its course and a sacrifice in its meaning. In every performance, therefore, the union of a *nāyaka* with a *nāyikā* is as substantial as the union of Indra with *Vāc-Sarasvatī*, which, being brought about through the victory over the demons in the *daivāsuram* struggle, is an integral part of every sacrifice.[194)]

Nāṭya was created in the likeness of the sacrifice, its heroes and heroines in the likeness of Indra and Sarasvati. What it has to convey to men is the truth, the entire and exact truth, about the nature of the world.

We may, therefore, conclude now and try to answer to questions that have been formulated at the outset of this enquiry. A hero of Sanskrit drama is actually called a leader because, on the one hand, he is a sort of leading 'tone' of an audio-visual commposition *(dṛśyam, śravyam)* that every *nāṭyaprayoga* is. In his other incarnation as the Mind-Indra yoked together with Speech-Sarasvatī - conducts this delightful sacrifice for the eyes through its course of the five *saṁdhis* to its fulfilment when the desiring subject and the desired object become one-without-the-second, bestowing upon the *sahṛdaya* the taste of wonder *(adbhuta rasa).*

Footnotes :

167. *Rama's Later History, or Uttararāmacaritam,* vol. 4, translated by S.K. Belvalkar, Harvard University Press, 1915, pp. 19f.
anavaratadhanurjyāsphālanakrūrvaṁ ravikiraṇasahiṣṇu kleśaleśaiḥ abhinnaṁ apacitaṁ api gātram vyāyatatvād alakṣyam giricara iva nāgaḥ prāṇasāram bibharti

168. *The Abhijñāna-Śākuntalā of Kālidāsa,* edited with the commentary of Vidyāvācaspati (the *Bālabodhinī*) by S. D. Gajendragadkar and translated into English by A. B. Gajendragadkar, Bombay, 1920, p.36. (11.4)

169. Gajendragadkar : p.44f.

170. Gajendragadkar : p.50. (111.7).
kā kathā bāṇasamdhāne jyāśabdenaiva dūrataḥ
huṁkāreṇaiva dhanuṣaḥ sa hi vighnān apohati

171. Gajendragadkar : 111, verse 15.

172. *Thirteen Plays of Bhāsa,* translated into English by A. C. Woolner and L. Sarup, *Punjab University Oriental Publications,* 1930; reprinted in New Delhi, p. 66.

173. Woolner : 68, 1.8.
vyāyāmasthiravipulocchritāyatāṁso
jyāghātapracitakiṇolbaṇaprakoṣṭhaḥ
praccanno py anukutilakṣyarājabhāvo
meghāntargataravivat prabhānumeyaḥ

174. Woolner : 89.

175. See Manmohana Ghośh's edition of the Nāṭyaśāstra, Calcutta, 1956.

176. The *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Vol. II, translated by Manmohan Ghosh, Calcutta, 1961, p. 203.
vyasanī prāptaduḥkha vā uyjyate bhyudayena yaḥ
tathā puruṣabāhulye pradhāno nāyakaḥ smṛtaḥ
(XXXV. 23)

yatra anekasya bhavato vyasanābhyudayau punaḥ
prakṛṣṭau yasya tau syātāṁ sa bhavet tatra nāyakaḥ
(XXXV. 24)

177. *Ghosh* : 1961 : 211.
178. *The Laws and Practice of Sanskrit Drama*, Varanasi, 1961, pp. 203-210.
179. Shastri : 207.
180. Shastri : 209
181. Ghosh : 215.
182. M.C. Byrski, Concept of Ancient Indian Theatre, Delhi 1974
183. *puru Nārāyaṇena iyam* ***Kālidāsa, Vikramorvaśī****, I.16 atiṣṛṭā Marutwate daityahastād apācchidya suhṛda samprati tvayā.*
184. Macdonell, Arthur Anthony, *Vedic Mythology. Grundriβ der Indo-Arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde* 3:1, Straβburg, 1897, p. 87.
185. Hopkins, Edward Washburn, *Epic Mythology*, Straβburg, 1915, reprinted in Delhi 1974, S.53.
186. *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* (hereafter in the footnotes : ŚB), 4.5.8.10, 5.2.2.13 f., 5.3.4.25, 5.3.8., 7.5.1.31, 11.2.4.9, 2.6.3, 13.1.8.5, 14.2.1.15; See also Keith, Arthur Berriedale, *The Ṛgveda-brāhmaṇas : The Aitareya and Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇas of the Rigveda, Har vard Oriental Series, 25, Cambridge, Mass.*, 1920, pp. XLV, 153, 264, 371, 405, 417, 426
187. *ŚB*, 3.5.1.18-22
188. Keith, Arthur Berriedale, *The Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and the Upanishads, Harvard Oriental Series*, 31-32, Cambridge, Mass., 1925.
189. *ŚB*, 3.5.3.11
190. *ŚB*, 1.4.4.1-2.
191. *ŚB*, 13.9.1.13
192. Keith : 1920 : 138.
193. Keith : 1920 : 354.
194. The intimate relationship between Indra and *Vāc-Sarasvatī* allows us to take her as being identical with *Indrāṇī*. Both Sarasvatī and Indrāṇi are identified with *Vāc* (Macdonell, Arthur Anthony, *Bṛhad-devatā Attributed to Śaunaka, Harvard Oriental Series*, 5, Part I, Cambridge, Mass., 1904, pp. 51ff. {II. 72ff.}) Both are associated with the Maruts (Macdonell : 1897 : 78). Besides, Indrāṇi seems to have had a rather meagre independent existence. Her name appears to be a simple epithet of the wife of Indra (idid.). If we admit such possibility in spite of the lack of any specific identification of the two, then a *Ṛgvedic* hymn about Indra, Indrāṇi, and Vṛṣakapi (*RV* 10.72, Macdonell : 1897 : 153 ff.) can acquire some meaning for *Nāṭya*. Consequently, it may not be altogether unjustified to suppose that there is some kind of relationship between Vṛṣakapi and Vidūṣaka. Both are the hero's (or Indra's) beloved friends. Both incur the anger of the hero's partner (Indrāṇi, the heroine). Finally, both are compared to the monkey. This would give a new strength to the hypothesis made almost half a century ago by A. Gawronński *(Poczatki·Dramatu Indyjskiego a Sprawa Wplywow Greckich*, pp. 30ff.) that Vṛṣakapi is a prototype of the Vidūṣaka.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The original Sanskrit texts referred to in this book

1. Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya
2. Avimāraka of Bhāsa
3. Bhagavadajjukīya of Bodhāyana
4. Bhagavadgītā
5. Bhāvaprakāśa of Sāgaranandin
6. Caturvargacintāmṇi of Hemādri
7. Daśarūpaka of Dhanañjaya
8. Hitopadeśa of Nārāyaṇa
9. Kāmasūtra of Vātsyāyana
10. Kathāsaritsāgara of Somadeva
11. Kṛtyakalpataru of Lakṣmīdhara Bhaṭṭa
12. Laṭakamelaka of Śaṅkhadhara
13. Mahābhārata
14. Mānavadharmaśāstra
15. Mandaramarandacampū of Śrīkṛṣṇakavi
16. Mattavilāsa of Mahendravikramavarman
17. Mudrārākṣasa of Viśakhadatta
18. Nāṭyadarpaṇa of Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra
19. Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni
20. Nītivākyāmṛta of Somadevasūri
21. Pratāparudrīya with the commentary of Kumāraswāmin
22. Pratijñāyaugandharāyaṇa of Bhāsa
23. Puruṣārthacintāmaṇi of Viṣṇubhaṭṭa
24. Puruṣārthaprabodha of Brahmānandabhāratī
25. Puruṣārthasudhānidhi of Sāyaṇa
26. Puruṣārthopadeśa of Bhartṛhari
27. Ṛgveda
28. Śākuntalā of Kālidāsa
29. Śatapathabrāhmaṇa
30. Sūktiratnahāra of Kaliṅgarāja
31. Svapnavāsavadattā of Bhāsa
32. Ūrubhaṅga of Bhāsa

Addenda :

33. Amarakośaṭīkāsarvasva of Vandyaghaṭīya Sarvānanda
34. Āpastambīyadharmasūtra
35. Caturvargasāra of Rādhāmangalam Nārāyaṇaśāstri

36. Nāradasmṛti
37. Śatakas of Dhanarāja
38. Śatakas of Janārdana
39. Śatakas of Narahari
40. Viṣṇusmṛti
41. Yājñavalkyasmṛti
42. Naṇṇūl
43. Padāvali of Vidyāpati

The other sources referred to in this book

1. Artola, G. The Earliest Plays about India, Saṁskṛta Raṅga Annual IV, Madras 1965, p. 1-19
2. Bhatt, G.K. The Origin of Nāṭya : Role of Śiva. Annals, B.O.R., Institute, vol. LVI Poona 1975
3. Boguslawski, w. Dziela, vol. X, Warszawa 1830
4. Byrski, M.C. Can Sanskrit Drama tell us anything more? Educational Theatre Journal, vol. 27, no. 4 December 1975, pp. 445-452
5. Byrski, M.C. Concept of Ancient Indian Theatre, New Delhi 1974
6. Byrski, M.C. Wyobrażenie ról w starożytnym teatrze indyjskim. "The distribution of roles in the ancient Indian theatre" (in Polish), Pamietnik Teatralny, XXIV, 2(94), pp. 179-85, 1975
7. Byrski, M.C. Grotowski and The Indian Tradition, Journal of Sangeet Natak Akademi, New Delhi 1970
8. Daniélou, A. Les Quatres Sens de la Vie, Paris 1976
9. De, S.K. A History of Sanskrit Literature, Calcutta 1962 (Second Ed.)
10. Frye, N. Anatomy of Criticism, New York 1969.
11. Gawroński, A. Review of the book by J. Schmidt, Az ó-ind epila, Budapest 1921, Rocznik Orientalistyczny II 1925, p. 283-4
12. Ghosh, M.M. The Nāṭyaśāstra: A Treatise of Hindu Dramaturgy and Historionics Ascribed to Bharata-Muni, vol. I, transl. by Calcutta 1950
13. Gonda, J. Change and Continuity in Indian Religion, Hague 1965.
14. Hiriyanna, M. Sanskrit Studies, Mysore 1954
15. Jha, Ganganatha, Manusmṛti – The Laws of Manu with The Bhāṣya of Medhātithi vol. I, Calcutta 1920
16. Kane, P.V. History of Dharmaśāstra, vol. II part I, Poona 1941
17. Keith, A.B., The Religion and Philosophy of The Veda and Upaniṣads (H.O.S.), Harvard 1925
18. Keith, A.B., The Sanskrit Drama, Oxford 1924
19. Konow, S., The Indian Drama transl. by S.N. Ghoshal from German original Das indische Drama Berlin 1920, Calcutta 1960
20. Krishnamoorthy, K., Essays in Sanskrit Criticism, Dharwar 1964
21. Krzyżanowski, J. Nauka o literaturze, Wroclaw 1969.
22. Kulkarni, V.M. The Conception of Sandhis in The Sanskrit Drama, Journal of The Oriental Institute, University of Baroda, vol. V., June 1956, No 4, pp. 389-402
23. Kunhan Raja, C. Survey of Sanskrit Literature, Bombay 1962
24. Lavastine, P., Trivarga, (Les Trois Valeurs), in Rene Guenon et l'actualite de la pensee traditionalle, Actes du Colloque International, Editions Baucens Braine-Le-Comte 1977
25. Lazari-Pawlowska, I. Wzorce indyjskiego perfekcjonizmu. Patterns of Indian Perfectionism (In Polish) Etyka, 12/1973
26. Lévi, S. Le Théâtre Indien, Paris 1890
27. Mainkar, T.G., The Theory of the Saṁdhis and the Saṁdhyaṅgas, Poona 1960

28. Mankad, D.R., Types of Sanskrit Drama, Karachi 1936
29. Monier-Williams, M., Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Oxford 1956
30. Nicoll, A. The Theatre and Dramatic Theory, London 1962
31. Pandey, R.B., Hindū Saṁskāras, Delhi 1969
32. Peacock, R. The Art of Drama, 1957
33. Potter, K.H., Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, New York 1963
34. Preminger, A. Editor, Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, Princeton 1965
35. Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy (In Polish Translation), Warszawa 1958
36. Raghavan, V. A note on the name "Daśarūpaka", Journal of Oriental Research vol. VII, part III, pp. 277-290, Madras 1933
37. Raghavan, v. The Vṛttis, Journal of Oriental Research, vol. VI, part IV, pp. 346-370, vol. VII, part I, pp. 33-52, vol. VII, part II, pp. 91-112, Madras 1932
38. Ramulu, Somanchi, A. Critical Study of the Theories of Sanskrit Poetics. Unpublished Thesis of Punjab University 1955
39. Rocher, L. the Textual Tradition of the Bhāratīyanāṭyaśāstra : A Philological Assessment, Typescript of a paper delivered at The University of Hawaii, 1974
40. Sarma, V.A. Is Mokṣa A Puruṣārtha?, Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal, vol. VII, pts I-II, 1969, pp. 95-99
41. Shamashastri, R., The Concept of Mukti in Indian Philosophy, Jha Commemoration Volume, Poona 1937, pp. 349-358
42. Shamasastri, R., Kautilya's Arthashastra transl. by, Mysore 1956
43. Shastri, S.N. The Laws and Practice of Sanskrit Drama, Varanasi 1961
44. Sūryakānta, Saṁskṛta vāṅmaya kā vivecanātmaka itihāsa, Nai Delhi 1972
45. Tripāṭhi, P.V., Puruṣārthacatuṣṭaya, Vārāṇasī 1970
46. Willman-Grabowska, H., Évolution semantique du mot "dharma", Rocznik Orientalisytyczny vol. X, Lwów 1934, pp. 38-50
47. Wilson, H.H. Select Specimens of the Theatre of the Hindus, 2 vols., 3rd ed., London 1871
48. Windakiewicz, S. Teatr kollegjów jezuickich w dawnej Polsce, Kraków 1922
49. Winternitz, M. A History of Indian Literature, v. III, Delhi 1963
50. Yamunācārya, M., The Ethics of Pravṛtti and Nivṛtti, Siddha-Bhāratī (Felicitation volume of Dr. Siddheshwar Varma) part II Hoshiarpur 1950, pp. 129-131

Addenda :

51. Serrebryanyi, S.D., Tvorchestvo Vidyāpati Ṭhākura i bengalskaya viṣṇuitskaya poezziya (The works of Vidyāpati Ṭhākur and the Bengali Viṣṇuite poetry), Maskva 1973
52. Syrkin, S.Y., K systematizacyi nekatorih ponyati v sanskrite (Towards systematization of certain notions in Sanskrit) in a volume entitled Semiotika i vastochnye yaziki (Semiotics and the eastern languages) Maskva 1967, pp. 147 ff.
53. Klein, E., A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, Amsterdam 1967
54. Mayrhoffer, M. A Concise Etymological Sanskrit Dictionary, Heidelberg 1963.

Index of Technical Terms

Adhibala 29, 58, 68
Aṅgahāras 10
Anubhāvas 95
Anumāna 29, 59 68, 77
Apvāda 29, 60, 78
Artha 11, 12, 13, 33, 34, 35, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49,50, 83,-84, 88
Arthaprakṛti 23, 31
Asaṁbhrāṁta Bhāva 10
Avapāta 17
Ākṣipti 29, 58, 68, 77
Āmukha 15, 63
Āṅgika abhinaya 13, 14
Ārabhaṭī vṛtti 10, 11
Āraṁbha 23
Āvalgita 15, 63
Āvega 10
Bhāṇa 3, 4, 15
Bhāratt vṛtti 10
Bhāṣaṇa 30, 61, 71
Bhāvavyāpāra 11, 12
Bindu 4, 23
Bīja 4, 23, 54
Cārī 10
Cetanavyāpāra 11
Dakṣiṇa Nāyaka 97
Dharma 11, 12, 16, 34, 35, 38, 39, 43, 44, 48, 49, 50, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 88, 96
Dhīralalita 96, 97
Dhīrapraśānta 96
Dhirodātta 96
Dhīroddhata 96
Dhṛṣṭa Nāyak 97
Ḍima 3, 4
Dīptatara Bhāva 10
Drava 29, 60, 78
Dyuti 29, 60, 70, 78
Garbhasaṁdhi 4, 5, 25, 58
Grathana 30, 60
Hārya 3
Īhāmṛga 3, 4, 5
Itivṛtta 3, 22, 86
Itihāsa 22, 89
Kapaṭa 5, 59, 81
Karaṇa 10, 27, 55, 66
Kathodghāta 15, 72
Krama 28, 59, 69, 77
Kāma 11, 12, 14, 33, 34, 35, 41, 43, 44, 48, 49, 50, 68, 74, 82, 83, 84, 85
Kāryāvasthā 86
Kaiśikī vṛtti 10, 11
Līlā 10, 11
Mokṣa 34, 35, 36, 38, 48, 49, 50, 81, 86, 9‾
Mukhasamdhi 4, 25
Narmadyuti 28, 32, 77
Narmagarbha 16, 32
Narman 16, 28, 32, 77
Narmasphañja 16
Narmasphoṭa 16
Nāndī 87
Nāṭaka 2, 3, 4, 5, 18, 33, 34, 53, 54, 64, 74
Nāṭikā 54, 74
Nāṭyam 17, 33, 89, 98, 100
Nāṭyaveda 87
Nāyaka 94, 98, 100, 101
Netṛ 94
Nirvahaṇasaṁdhi 4, 25, 78
Niyatāpti 23, 60, 61
Paribhāṣaṇa 30, 61, 70
Paribhāvanā 27, 55, 66
Parikara 27, 55, 65
Parinyāsa 27, 55, 65
Parivartaka 15, 63
Paryupāsana 28, 57, 67
Patākā 24
Phalāgama 23
Pragayaṇa 28, 57, 67
Prahasana 3, 4, 5, 15
Prakaraṇa 2, 3,4, 5, 18, 53, 54, 73, 74,75
Prakarī 24, 25
Prarocanā 15, 30, 60, 70
Prasaṅga 29, 78
Pratimukha saṁdhi 25
Pratiṣedha 29, 60, 70, 78
Pravṛttaka 15, 73
Prārthana 29, 58, 77
Prāpti 27, 55, 65, 76
Puruṣārthas 5, 6, 11, 18, 33, 34, 35, 36, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 74, 83, 85

Pūrvavākya 30, 61, 71
Rajoguṇa 11, 43, 82
Rasa 16, 34, 72, 85, 86, 93, 95, 97
Rūpaka 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 15, 33, 34, 63
Śabdaprayoga 2
Śakti 29, 60, 78
Śaṭha 97
Śṛṅgāra 5, 33, 34
Sallāpaka 63
Samavakāra 3, 4, 5, 34
Samādhāna 27, 55, 65
Saṁdhi 4, 7, 21, 25, 30, 32, 60, 70, 86, 100
Saṁdhyaṅga 5, 26, 32, 55, 75
Saṁghātyaka 16
Saṁksiptaka 17
Saṁlāpaka 15
Saṁpheṭa 17, 29, 32, 60, 78
Saṁraṁbha 10
Sattvaguṇa 11, 43, 82
Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa 86
Sāttvatī Vṛtti 10
Sūtradhāra 15, 64, 87
Tamoguṇa 11, 43, 83
Tāpana 28, 57, 67, 76
Toṭaka 29, 58, 68, 77
Trikapaṭa 7, 59
Triśṛṅgāra 7, 12
Trivarga 11, 31, 34, 35, 36, 44, 47, 65, 82
Trividrava 7
Traiguṇya 11
udbheda 27, 55, 66, 76
Udghātyaka 15
Udvega 29, 58, 59, 70, 77
Upakṣepa 27, 55, 64
Upanyāsa 28, 57, 67
Utsṛṣṭikāṅka 2, 3, 4
Utthāpaka 15, 63, 76
Varṇasaṁhāra 28, 57, 67, 77
Vastūtthāpana 17
Vākya 18
Vibhāvas 95
Vibodha 30, 60, 70
Vidhāna 27, 55, 65, 76
Vidhūta 28, 57, 67, 76
Vidrava 5, 6, 29, 77, 81
Vidūṣaka 58, 59, 76, 80, 101
Vilobhana 27, 55, 65, 76
Vimarśasaṁdhi 4, 5, 25
Virodhana 29, 60, 70, 78
Viṣkambhaka 2, 70, 73
Viṭa 4
Vīthī 3, 4, 15, 63, 72, 74
Vṛtti 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12, 18, 32
Vyabhicāribhāvas 95
Vyavasāya 29, 60, 78
Vyāyoga 3, 4
Yatna 23
Yukti 27, 55, 65, 76

ABOUT THE BOOK

How to read and understand Sanskrita drama ? The Author in quest of indigenous methodology investigates the Natyasastra and specially focuses his attienation upon the typology of Sanskrit drama, the four demenours, the span-structure and the three fold scheme of the traditional Indian value system. The criteria thus formulated are put to test while analysing two plays of Bhasa-the Svapnavasvadatta and the Pratijnayaugandhnrayana, as well as the Sakuntala of Kalidas. The reader is invited to try this analytical system and to discover for himself the expected layers of Ancient Indian drama.

1997 300.00

BHARATIYA VIDYA PRAKASHAN

1-UB, JAWAHAR NAGAR,
BUNGALOW ROAD,
DELHI-110007 (INDIA)

P.B. NO. 1108,
KACHAURI GALI
VARANASI-2210001 (U.P)